





History of the Steel Industry in the Port Talbot Area 1900-1988 
 
 
By Stephen Parry 
 
Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of PhD 
 





The candidate confirms that the work is his own and that appropriate credit has been 
given where reference has been made to the work of others. 
 
This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and 





Firstly I would like to thank Professor Steven Tolliday and other Leeds University 
staff for their invaluable advice, guidance and not least patience in producing this 
work.  I would also like to express my appreciation to the staff of Leeds University 
Library, Swansea University Library, Cardiff Central Library, Port Talbot Library, 
Skipton Library and the staff at the National Archives in Kew for their help in 
obtaining materials.  Thanks are also expressed to those employees, managers, 
union officials, both past and present, involved with Port Talbot Steelworks who have 
provided information and views on various issues.   
 
I would like to express my appreciation to Peter Knowles Photography for kind 
permission to reproduce the photograph on page 194, and the National Museum of 





This thesis examines the history of steelmaking at Port Talbot in South Wales from 
the start of modern steelmaking in 1902 to 1988.   Although the British steel industry 
has been studied at national level, few studies have looked at company level and 
fewer on plant level studies.  By studying this large and significant steelmaking site 
this thesis sheds light on the interaction between national constraints and local 
forces for change or inertia and on the interaction of plant management, industry 
leadership and national Government policies.  A number of themes are examined 
including issues of locational inertia and change; technological innovation and 
choice; relationships to, and changes in markets; products and demand levels; the 
role of the state; and issues of decision making.  The later includes managers, 
management structure, conflict among managers, corporate rivalries, relationships 
with banks and Government, and within nationalised industries. 
 
The thesis covers the origins of modern steelmaking at Port Talbot in the 1900s, its 
expansion and integration with iron making during World War One.  It looks at Port 
Talbot within the framework of heavy steel rationalisation in the 1920s and the 
inconclusive manoeuvrings to build a strip mill in the 1930s.  After World Ward Two 
Port Talbot emerged as Britain‟s leading strip mill through a complex interplay of 
technological and locational choices including Government pressure and corporate 
rivalries.  The boom years of the 1950s were followed by consolidation and 
modernisation in the 1960s through the Government inspired over expansion of the 
strip mill sector.  After re-nationalisation in 1967 Port Talbot became involved in 
internal struggles with rival strip mills over investment.  At each stage the thesis uses 
the detailed local adaptation and innovation within that context. 
 
The thesis draws on extensive primary sources including the National Archives, 
Government Reports and documents, company records, Bank of England papers, 
trade papers, technical journals, trade union papers and local newspapers.  The 
secondary literature on the steel industry is discussed and revised where appropriate 
and this study adds a full-scale plant level industrial history of one of the most 
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Glossary 
Acid Process Any steelmaking process where the furnace lining and 
slag is chemically acidic. 
 
Annealing A heating process to remove stresses from rolled steel. 
 
Bar A finished steel product commonly in flat, square, 
round or hexagonal shape rolled from billets ½”-4” in 
diameter. 
 
Basic Process Any steelmaking process where the furnace lining and 
slag is chemically basic. 
 
Basic Oxygen System/Steel Method of steelmaking.  A vessel is charged with scrap 
and molten iron before pure oxygen under pressure is 
blown onto it. 
  
Battery  Group of coke ovens. 
 
Bessemer Process First commercial method of bulk steelmaking.  Air and 
steam under pressure is blown through molten iron. 
 
Billet Rolled or forged steel 1½”-5” square or round in shape. 
  
Blast Furnace A furnace where air is blown through molten iron ore, 
coke and lime to produce molten pig iron. 
 
Bloom A semi-finished product mostly square in cross section 
and larger than 5” square.  Used to produce girders, 
beams and other structural shapes. 
 
Burden The charge of raw materials into a blast furnace. 
 
Campaign The continuous long-term operation of a blast furnace. 
 
Cogging Mill Primarily rolling mill that produces blooms. 
 
Coil A finished steel product such as sheet or strip which 
has been wound or coiled after rolling. 
 
Coke Ovens High temperature ovens used to convert coal to coke 
by baking out volatile materials. 
 
Cold Mill Rolling mill used to roll hot rolled steel strip to produce 
thinner, smoother and stronger steel for commercial 
use e.g. sheet. 
 
Continuous Casting A process for solidifying liquid steel in the form of a 
continuous strand rather than individual ingots.  
 
Continuous Rolling Rolling mill where the steel goes through several 
consecutive rolls at the same time. 
 
Cupola Miniature blast furnace used to melt pig iron. 
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Electrolytic Tinning Method of producing tinplate by means of electro-
deposition.  
 
Flat Products Steel products including sheet, strip and plate that is 
made from slabs. 
 
Four High Mill A rolling mill with 4 rolls mounted horizontally but only 2 
rolls do the rolling.  The others are for back up. 
 
Hand Mill A rolling mill where iron or steel is manhandled through 
the rolls. 
 
Hearth  Portion of a furnace that holds the metal being heated. 
 
Heat One steelmaking cycle. 
 
High Top Pressure High pressure used in a blast furnace to increase yield. 
 
Hot Metal Molten metal. 
 
Hot Strip Mill Rolling mill with a number of consecutive rolling stands 
used to produce thin steel strip. 
 
Ingot Steel block ready for rolling. 
 
Integrated Steelmaking Iron and steel is produced at the same site. 
 
Melting Shop Building where steel is made. 
 
Mild Steel Steel that contains between 0.15%-0.25% carbon. 
 
Open-Hearth Process Bulk steelmaking method using molten iron, scrap and 
limestone developed by Charles William Sieman.  It 
was largely replaced by the BOS process. 
 
Pickling Removal of scale or oxides by hot acid solution from 
metal surfaces before processing in the cold mill. 
 
Pig Iron High carbon iron produced in a blast furnace. 
 
Plate  A flat rolled product rolled from slabs of between 
0.125”–3” in thickness. 
 
Pulpit An enclosed control area in a rolling mill. 
 
Reversing Mill A rolling mill where the steel is passed back and forth 
through the rolls. 
 
Rimmed Steel Low carbon steel where the rim of the ingot is almost 
pure iron. 
 
Rolling Mill The plant which reduces and transforms the shape of 
semi-finished steel by passing it through rolls. 
 
Roughing Stand Initial set of rolls for rolling slabs or ingots. 
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Semi-Finished Steel Products such as slabs, billets and blooms which are 
further processed into saleable products. 
 
Shear Machine used to trim bars, plates and sheet. 
 
Sintering A process which combines ores too fine for efficient 
blast furnace use with flux and coke to form larger 
clumps. 
 
Sheet Flat rolled steel over 12” in width and less than 0.2” 
thick. 
 
Slab A wide semi-finished product made from ingots or 
continually cast commonly between 6”-9” thick and 24”-
60” wide.  Sheet, strip and plates are made from slab. 
 
Slag Hot waste drawn off the top of molten metal. 
 
Steel  An alloy of iron and carbon containing between 0.15% 
and 1.4% carbon. 
 
Strip A flat rolled product less than 0.2” thick. 
 
Stripper Crane that removes ingots from their moulds. 
 
Teeming The flow of hot metal into ingot moulds. 
 
Tilting Furnace Steelmaking furnace that is tipped for pouring. 
 
Torpedo Specialist railway vehicle used to transport molten iron 
from the blast furnaces. 
 
Universal Rolling Rolling mill where the steel is rolled from top to bottom 
and side to side at the same time. 
 









This thesis looks at the history of steelmaking in the Port Talbot area of South Wales 
from the start of modern steelmaking in 1902 until British Steel‟s privatisation in 
1988.  It is a plant level study of one of Britain‟s most significant steelmaking sites.  It 
fills an important gap in the understanding of an essential industry.  Yet as a plant 
level study it does have consequences for the understanding of the wider industry.   
 
There are a number of reasons for choosing Port Talbot.  Atkinson and Baber1 claim 
that the documentation of South Wales‟ economic past, unlike its social and political 
history, has failed to attract a commensurate share of academic interest.  One of 
South Wales‟ main industries since the 1860s has been the steel industry.  As late 
as the mid 1970s South Wales still possessed four integrated iron and steelworks.  
The largest and most successful of these was Port Talbot.  The latter‟s significance 
goes beyond the local area as it has taken the British steel industry into new areas in 
terms of scale of production, technological change, company structure and profit 
levels.  Port Talbot is one of Britain‟s three remaining integrated iron and 
steelmaking sites along with Scunthorpe and Redcar.  What is surprising about 
steelmaking at Port Talbot is that it has not attracted more academic attention.  It has 
certainly attracted academic interest but from the narrower perspectives of regional 
policy, the sociological perspective or even technical aspects and even then often 
over relatively short periods of time.  What has been lacking is a study of its long-
term steelmaking activities.  This work fills that gap. 
 
There are also personal reasons for choosing this particular site.  I was born locally 
and grew up in Port Talbot.  My father and other family members worked there as 
process workers or tradesmen.  As I grew up the steelworks was often a subject of 
discussion.  The success of the steelworks and the resulting improvements in the 
workforce‟s living standards gave my generation opportunities that my parent‟s 
generation lacked. 
 
This thesis is a long-term history of a major British steelmaking site.  Its contribution 
lies in drawing together a complex local history that sheds new light on broader and 
                                                          
1
 M. Atkinson and C. Baber, The Growth and Decline Of The South Wales Iron Industry 
1760-1880 (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1987), p.1. 
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better known historical processes.  The British steel industry is moderately well 
covered by broad overall historical accounts at industry level, notably by Duncan 
Burn2, J.C. Carr and W. Taplin3, John Vaizey4 and B.S. Keeling and A.E.G. Wright5 
and for shorter periods by David Heal6, G.F. Dudley and J.J. Richardson7, R.A. Bryer 
et al8 and Heidrun Abromeit9.  Studies of sub-sectors (e.g. Kenneth Warren10 or Paul 
Jenkins11) are rarer and there are only a few studies that go down to detailed 
corporate level (notably Peter Payne12 and Steven Tolliday13).  Hence, this thesis 
makes a contribution in analysing the development of a single large and nationally 
significant steelmaking site.  This makes it possible to shed light on how change and 
development at plant level occurred within the framework of wider national 
constraints, highlights forces for change and inertia at plant level, and looks at the 
interaction of plant management, industry leadership and national Government 
policies.  It is a work of industrial history and does not engage with the debates of 
economics or political scientists directly, though the material contained here throws 
some light on these matters. 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Duncan Burn, The Economic History of Steelmaking 1867-1939 (Cambridge: At The 
University Press, 1961), The Steel Industry 1939-1959-A Study In Competition And Planning 
(Cambridge: At The University Press, 1961). 
3
 J.C. Carr and W. Taplin, A History Of The British Steel Industry (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1962). 
4
 John Vaizey, The History of British Steel (London: Weidenfels and Nicolson, 1974). 
5
 B.S. Keeling and A.E.G. Wright, The Development Of The Modern British Steel Industry 
(London: Longmans, Green and Co Ltd, 1964). 
6
 David W. Heal, Industrial Britain-The Steel Industry In Post War Britain (Newton Abbot: 
David and Charles, 1974). 
7
 G.F. Dudley and J.J. Richardson, Politics and Steel in Britain 1967-1988, The Life and 
Times of the British Steel Corporation (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, 
1990). 
8
 R.A. Bryer et al, Accounting for British Steel-A Financial Analysis of the Future Of The 
British Steel Corporation 1967-1980 (Aldershot: Gower Publishing Company Limited, 
1982). 
9
 Heidrun Abromeit, British Steel, An Industry between State and the Private Sector 
(Leamington Spa/Heidelberg: Berg Publishers Ltd, 1986). 
10
 Kenneth Warren, The British Iron and Steel Sheet Industry Since 1840 (London: G Bell and 
Sons Ltd, 1970). 
11
 Paul Jenkins, Twenty By Fourteen-A History of the South Wales Tinplate Industry 1700-
1961 (Llandysul Dyfed: Gomer Press, 1995). 
12
 Peter L. Payne, Colvilles and The Scottish Steel Industry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979). 
13
 Steven Tolliday, Business, Banking and Politics-The Case of British Steel 1918-1939 
(Cambridge Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 1987). 
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The account is a detailed historical and largely chronological one, but certain themes 
and issues recur over the course of the history that are worth flagging up. 
 
i) Locational advantage: One of Port Talbot‟s great long-term strengths has been its 
location, a coastal site with relatively ample land for expansion.  This made the 
location well placed to benefit from the shift from the use of indigenous raw materials 
to using richer overseas sourced raw materials.  However, despite being a coastal 
location, limitations imposed by the dock put constraints on the full use of imported 
ores until 1970 when a purpose built harbour was built.  This meant that low quality 
British ores had to be transported by rail from the Midlands to supplement imported 
ores.  Locational advantage required both local locational features (site conditions, 
access, infrastructure etc) as well as broader locational advantages to take full 
effect, and legacies of past developments often stood in the way of new ones. 
 
ii) Technology: Port Talbot was the site of major technological changes that helped 
transform the wider industry.  The establishment of fully integrated iron and 
steelmaking through to rolling on a single site was established, rather painfully, in the 
first part of the twentieth century.  The adoption of radical strip mill technology was a 
long and difficult struggle that spanned World War Two.  Subsequently BOS 
technologies and continuous casting again transformed steelmaking.  All of these 
were in some respects long and slow battles.  Port Talbot did not pioneer these 
technologies but followed others often more slowly than corporate management 
would have liked and with an element of fear of the consequences.  These 
technologies all involved big step changes, huge implications for products and 
product markets, interrelatedness with other existing or new technologies at plant 
level, and new questions about how these technologies fitted in with existing 
locational constraints.  Arguably the most far reaching technological change was the 
building of the harbour that allowed Port Talbot to fully benefit from its coastal 
location and ensured survival into the twenty-first century. 
 
iii) Government: Government policies throughout have been of enormous importance 
at Port Talbot.  During the First World War, the Government largely financed and 
shaped the breakthrough into integrated steelmaking.  In the 1920s, the Bank of 
England, acting as a sort of specialist agency on behalf of the Government, prodded 
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industrialists into the rationalisation of South Wales‟ heavy steel industry and as is 
argued here had unfortunate longer-term consequences for the development of strip 
steel production at Port Talbot.  The development of the Port Talbot strip mill and the 
subsequent development of rival strip mills from the late 1950s were all powerfully 
influenced and shaped by the Government.  From nationalisation in 1967 issues of 
national planning or strategic calculations in the run up to privatisation in 1988 
dominated the agenda.  This thesis stresses the multiple roles of Government.  
Issues of regional policy and local interests were often very powerful.  Steel was 
often seriously affected indirectly by policies primarily targeted at other goals, notably 
the protection of the British coal industry.  As the scale of investment grew, 
Government became a crucial supplier of funds and guarantees for enormous 
investments.  Under nationalisation, Government though often divided between 
different interests, became the dominant decision maker and allocator of resources 
within the industry.  Port Talbot was at times a beneficiary and at times a victim of 
shifting Government policies. 
 
iv) Entrepreneurs and managers: Port Talbot‟s origins lay in pools of local family 
wealth and regional business networks in the late nineteenth century, and families 
like the Gilbertsons, Wrights, Baldwins and Beales continued to play leading roles 
until the end of World War Two as owners and as managers.  They were only slowly 
displaced by new generations of professional managers including accountants such 
as Julian Pode, engineers such as Fred Cartwright and professional managers 
including Brian Moffat.  In contrast to other famous British companies there was 
perhaps a lack of charismatic managers and risk takers at the helm such as Firth at 
Richard Thomas, MacDiarmid at Stewarts and Lloyds or Craig at Colvilles.  Instead, 
Port Talbot under private ownership was characterised by complex decision making 
processes including difficult tradeoffs between different stakeholders and partners 
within the firm and strong external pressures and constraints arising from the 
corporate networks and alliances that it was involved in.  These had a profound 
effect in the crucial areas of heavy steel rationalisation and the entry to strip steel 
production, and after a brief period in which nationalisation seemed to have 
remedied this, they re-emerged in new forms after denationalisation in the 1950s.  
Under public ownership the emphasis shifted to the complex interactions between 
plant, regional and nation management within BSC.  
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v) Demand and markets: Port Talbot always had to deal with changes in demand 
and markets, both in terms of volume and product base.  The shift from heavy to light 
steel production between the 1930s and the 1950s was an immense change and the 
move to new light steel products is a major theme of the story.  Above all the 
situation was characterised by profound uncertainties over demand and difficulties of 
accurately forecasting future demand with such huge fixed investments which 
required several years to come on stream.  The war and generous Government 
subsidies provided Baldwins with the integration that they aspired to only for it to fall 
into severe overcapacity problems during the 1920s.  In the 1930s there was 
controversy about whether consumer demand would ever justify massive 
investments in integrated strip steel production.  The pioneer firm, Richard Thomas, 
was a casualty of its own precocity.  Port Talbot as a private enterprise was 
generally a cautious follower.  After nationalisation in 1967 it was swept into BSC‟s 
national plans for expansion and its own future development often came to depend 
on national calculations on the balance of advantage between key rival locations.  
The interplant rivalry between Port Talbot, Llanwern and Ravenscraig within BSC 
becomes a central part of the story in the latter part of the thesis. 
 
vi) Economists versus geographers: The thesis does not deal directly with economic 
theories relating to the industry.  However, the historical approach tends to fit much 
more comfortably with the work of industrial geographers like David Heal and 
Kenneth Warren with their stress on the importance of historical legacies and 
constraints and the importance of conjunction and timing in key locational decisions.  
As a result, the thesis often takes issue with the work of the economist Duncan Burn 
who places his emphasis on the particular cost advantages of investment decisions 
at particular points of time.  It shows that on several occasions, the solutions that 
seemed to make most sense in terms of narrow cost benefit analysis might well have 
proved disastrous in the longer run.  
 
A brief synopsis indicates the scope and focus of the thesis :- 
 
Chapter 1 briefly looks at local pre-twentieth century iron production.  It discusses 
the rise and fall of iron production at the inland site of Cwmavon.  It also looks at the 
shifting patterns of local business, the role of bankers and individual entrepreneurs, 
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and the role of raw materials and transport cost in determining industrial location.  
Highlighted is the increasing pressure within South Wales to relocate iron and steel 
production from inland sites to coastal sites.  
 
Chapter 2 examines why large scale steelmaking started at Port Talbot in the early 
years of the twentieth century and its development until the end of World War One.  
The stimulus involved market changes and the interaction with other expanding 
industries.  Once opened the first Port Talbot steel company quickly failed.  It is 
argued that cash flow problems was the main cause.  Production restarted in 1907 
under the new direction of Baldwins, a relatively new and aggressive steelmaker who 
widened the product range, targeted new markets and made strategic alliances with 
key customers.  It was obtained for a very low price which allowed investment, 
expansion and movement into new profitable lines of production.   
 
Chapter 3 covers the building of the neighbouring Margam Steelworks which was 
built to work in conjunction with Port Talbot Steelworks during World War One in 
response to Ministry of Munitions pressures to rapidly increase steel production.  Yet 
pre-war Baldwins had contemplated the integration of iron making into the 
steelmaking process.  It was financed through high wartime profits and generous 
Government subsidies. The scheme was unfinished at the end of the war and the 
lack of demand in the 1920s left Baldwins with severe overcapacity.    
 
Chapter 4 looks at the 1920s.  The depressed conditions of the 1920s meant that 
Baldwins could not fully exploit the Port Talbot/Margam complex and pushed the 
company towards failure necessitating radical financial reconstruction.  Following 
this, Baldwins with the support of the Bank of England, merged its heavy 
steelmaking interests at Port Talbot with those of GKN in order to facilitate the 
rationalisation of all South Wales plate and rail production.  Ironically, this probably 
made subsequent developments in South Wales more difficult particularly with 
regard to light steelmaking in the 1930s as Baldwins and GKN had created complex 
issues of control and decision making.   
 
Chapter 5 examines steelmaking during the 1930s and World War Two.  The partial 
merger between Baldwins and GKN resulted in all South Wales plate and rail 
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manufacture being concentrated at Port Talbot.  This resulted in the closure of 
Dowlais Steelworks and rebuilding of Cardiff East Moors Steelworks.  It is argued 
that the Dowlais closure may have been premature.  The rationalisation and the 
1930s revival in markets resulted in a highly profitable company.  Yet Richard 
Thomas‟ strip mill development left Baldwins‟ tinplate interests highly exposed.  The 
differing interests of Baldwins and GKN prevented any strip mill development.  
 
Chapter 6 covers the building of Port Talbot‟s hot strip mill in the late 1940s which 
was one of Britain‟s largest ever industrial projects.  Its complex origins involved an 
interplay of technological and locational choices, Government industrial and regional 
policies, internal decision-making issues and corporate rivalries.  The planning and 
debates are examined in depth from corporate and Government records and the 
thesis revises older views that the Government imposed locational compromise on 
the industry.  Closely related to the strip mill project was the merger of Baldwins with 
Richard Thomas to form Richard Thomas and Baldwins and subsequently the Steel 
Company of Wales involving all the major South Wales light steelmakers.   
 
Chapter 7 looks at the boom years of the 1950s with rising demand for sheet and 
tinplate, expanding output and increasing profits.  Government support had been 
vital in building the strip mill but in South Wales denationalisation broke the close 
links between the steelmakers.  The Government was instrumental in fostering rival 
strip mill developments by Colvilles (Ravenscraig) and RTB in Wales (Llanwern) that 
created damaging overcapacity and major liabilities for the companies that owned 
them.  This chapter argues that building a second strip mill at Port Talbot would have 
been a more effective policy to work with Ebbw Vale and Shotton.  This chapter also 
highlights the interplay of Government policy and corporate strategies and the 
difficulties of planning massive projects in the face of fluctuating and unpredictable 
patterns of demand. 
 
Chapter 8 covers the period from 1961 to nationalisation in 1967.  Rather than a 
period of expansion this was a period of consolidation, modernisation and financial 
decline as the Steel Company of Wales positioned itself to respond to the challenges 
of the two new strip mills.  Again there was a failed attempt to build a second strip 
mill at Port Talbot.  Despite this the decision to convert to BOS and building a 
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purpose built harbour ensured the long-term viability of Port Talbot as a major 
steelmaking centre.  The issue of manning levels is examined and it is argued that it 
was a far more complex issue than simply intransigence by the unions.    
 
Chapter 9 examines the period from the second nationalisation in 1967 to 1978 
which created a new environment for Port Talbot.  BCS initiated plans for massive 
expansion based on hugely overoptimistic forecasts of growth in demand.  The plan 
was exposed by the oil crisis of 1973-74 and subsequent intensification of 
competition which exposed British overcapacity and sub-optimal locations.  Port 
Talbot should have been well placed to benefit from rationalisation in the strip mill 
sector in a congested market but BSC had linked Port Talbot‟s expansion to the 
closure of Shotton.  The result was political stalemate but expansion and 
modernisation of Llanwern and Ravenscraig.  
 
Chapter 10 looks at the major changes in manning levels and working practices at 
Port Talbot that took place between 1979 and 1981 following the return of a 
Conservative Government in 1979.  Port Talbot survived partly because of its latent 
strengths in technology and location and also because of rigorous internal 
rationalisation through its „Slimeline‟ programme.  It is argued that the latter was 
rushed but that it bought time for a more considered approach to future 
developments. 
 
Chapter 11 examines the period from 1982 to privatisation in 1988.  It is argued that 
continuing investment particularly at Port Talbot and limited expansion both here and 
at Llanwern led to the marginalisation and eventual closure of Ravenscraig.  Port 
Talbot survived because of that investment and its long-term productive and 
locational advantages and because management exploited its new found strength 
over its workforce.   
 
Chapter 12 briefly looks at the events since 1988 and at the overall conclusions and 
wider implications of the Port Talbot story.  
 
To address the various issues raised a whole range of primary sources have been 
used.  A new and highly detailed primary source used for the first time in a 
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systematic way is the National Archives in Kew.  Papers have been used from the 
Board of Trade 1901-09; Ministry of Munitions 1916-17; Iron and Steel Institute 1931; 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government 1945-48; British Iron and Steel 
Federation 1946; H.M.T. 1947-49 and 1969-72; Ministry of Supply 1951-54, Iron and 
Steel Board 1955-59; Department of Trade and Industry 1973-82; Department for 
Industry 1977-79; and Prime Ministers Papers 1961.   
 
Other primary sources include various Government Reports; Acts of Parliament; 
Bank of England papers; Annual Reports and Accounts of the Steel Company of 
Wales, the British Steel Corporation, British Steel plc and Corus; trade association 
reports particularly the British Iron and Steel Federation; trade union papers; trade 
papers including the „Iron and Coal Trades Review‟, „Steel Times‟ and „Steel Times 
International‟; company newspapers including the Steel Company of Wales‟ „The 
Dragon‟ and the British Steel Corporation‟s „Steel News‟ and the local newspapers 
including the „Port Talbot Guardian‟, „South Wales Evening Post‟ and the „Western 
Mail‟.   
 
The major secondary sources are the literature sources quoted earlier and also 
particularly Peter Jackson‟s „The Letter-Books of W. Gilbertson and Co Ltd, 
Pontardawe, 1890-1929‟14.  A work of significance on Port Talbot is Ralph Fevre‟s  
„Wales is Closed‟15. It looks in detail at the outsourcing of functions at Port Talbot 
Steelworks in the early 1980s from the sociologist‟s viewpoint.  C.W. Roberts‟ „A 
Legacy From Victorian Enterprise – The Briton Ferry Ironworks and the daughter 
companies‟16 looks at iron and steelmaking in an area close to Port Talbot.  Although 
primarily written from a technical viewpoint contains useful information on the wider 
local industry.  A work in the trade papers of note is David Brinn‟s BSC‟s „Port Talbot 
Works‟17.  It concentrates mainly on technical aspects of the steelworks but was later 
published separately by the steelworks as a stand alone paper. 
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This piece of work addresses a deficiency in the literature and adds considerably to 
the knowledge of the steel industry in South Wales and the wider industry.  A map of 
South Wales showing the location of Port Talbot in relation to other local works in the 
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Chapter 1: Pre-Twentieth Century: The Inland Iron and Steel 
Industry in the Port Talbot Area 
 
Before the start of the twentieth century, the Port Talbot area saw numerous 
attempts at the development of iron and steel enterprises.  Between the 1820s and 
1890s a variety of small proprietors and entrepreneurs attempted to use local iron 
ore and coal to develop iron and copper enterprises.  Locational advantages at this 
time drew them to Cwmavon and early success stimulated the creation of a dock at 
what is now Port Talbot to serve their needs in the 1830s.  But the dock itself shifted 
the locational advantages by making richer imported iron ore available.  Iron making 
in the area remained a fragile boom and bust business with several different 
entrepreneurs successively trying to make a success of Cwmavon‟s assets.  In the 
end the demise of wrought iron and the rise of steel undercut all of these efforts and 
defeated the efforts of a string of proprietors to establish profitable iron making on 
what had become a marginal site with declining locational advantages.  The 
experience of the area with iron and steel technologies and the presence of the dock 
at Port Talbot were important latent assets for the next phase of local steel 
development. 
 
The history of iron making in the Port Talbot area extends back to at least 1253 
when Walter Lovel, Lord of North Cornelly, granted the monks of Margam Abbey the 
privilege of extracting iron and lead ores from his lands.  Similar concessions were 
also made by his neighbour Philip De Cornelly.  The quantities of iron produced were 
small and were used for local domestic purposes.  Production took place in small 
furnaces located at Graigafon using local ore and charcoal obtained from timber in 
the nearby Margam and Baglan Woods.  Following the dissolution of the 
monasteries the local landowners, the Mansels and their lessees, continued to work 
the local iron and coal on a small scale.  Until the mid eighteenth century iron making 
in South Wales was limited to a number of scattered charcoal fired furnaces.  The 
limitations resulting from the dependence on timber ensured that the industry 
remained small, scattered and often migratory19. 
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In 1717 the first Lord Mansel of Margam set up the Afan or Avan Forge within the 
parish of Margam on the south bank of the River Avon for the purpose of refining 
local iron.  The forge with a large attached pond fed from the waters of the River 
Avon, was run by the Mansels until 1726.  It was then leased to Philip Jenkins, 
Rowland Pitt in 1747 and Coles and Lewis in 1760.  By 1737 it may have been 
capable of smelting ores as well as refining iron.  Coles and Lewis later erected a 
second forge alongside the original forge.  The original forge became known as the 
Upper Forge and the newer forge the Lower Forge.  The first local commercial 
mining of coal occurred at Waunlas, Cwmavon which is situated in the Avon Valley 
about 3-4 miles from what is now Port Talbot in 1748.  By about 1750 coke ovens 
had been erected at the site to produce coke for the Afan Forge20.  If iron was being 
smelted in 1737 it must have been by a charcoal fired furnace as commercial mining 
did not get underway for a further decade.  Early industrialisation at Cwmavon was 
largely stimulated by demand for raw materials at the Afan Forge.  It was not until the 
1750s and 1760s that coke smelting became widespread in South Wales21.   
 
The two forges were acquired by John Miers in 1782.  By 1803 there are indications 
that tinplate was being produced at the Afan Forge although it was not until 1822 that 
the industry became firmly established22.  At the start of the nineteenth century 
Britain had 16 tinplate works of which 11 were located in Wales.  The first Welsh 
tinplate was probably produced at Pontypool in 1720.  The stimulus for the 
development of the tinplate industry was its increased use in storage containers for 
tea, coffee, confectionary etc during the first half of the nineteenth century23.   
 
In 1811 the Afan Forges passed to Samuel Fothergill Lettson who also leased land 
north of the river in Cwmavon for coal working.  Lettson was impressed by the 
availability of iron ore in close proximity to the coal at Cwmavon.  This led to the first 
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large scale development in iron making in the area when in 1819 Lettson built the 
first blast furnace in Cwmavon.  To supply the water used at the furnace he 
constructed a weir, sluice gate and feeder canal from the River Avon as well as a 
water wheel.  Low quality iron ore was also brought to the blast furnace from nearby 
Oakwood and Bryn.  Before iron making started Lettson‟s enterprise failed in 
December 1819 when he ran short of capital.  Following the failure he sold the 
enterprise to two Cornishmen, John Vigurs and Leonard Smith in 1820.  It was these 
who, with the support of the Earl of Jersey, commissioned the blast furnace in 
182024.   
 
A second blast furnace was later added along with a foundry and rolling mill for the 
production of blackplate to be used in the manufacture of tinplate.  The sheets 
produced at Cwmavon were taken to Vigurs and Smith‟s Ynysgerwn works in the 
Neath Valley by pack pony for tinning.  In 1825 their tinning plant was transferred to 
Cwmavon25.  By 1825 the Cwmavon plant consisted of a blast furnace, a forge with 
drop hammer, a mill to produce tinplate bar, a sheet mill, and a tin house26.  The 
local iron industry moved up the Avon Valley and expanded to exploit Cwmavon‟s 
locational advantages.   
 
Economic geography suggests that if the sources of raw materials are different from 
its market an industry will seek to locate to minimise transport costs27.  As metal 
smelting is a bulk reducing process with raw materials being larger and heavier than 
the finished product transport costs are reduced by locating the industry near to the 
major raw materials.  In the case of Cwmavon both coal and limited supplies of iron 
ore were available.  Thus the site held locational advantages over the site of the 
Afan Forge.  By 1830-31 the cost of raw materials in the production of pig iron 
accounted for between 80-85% of the production costs.  In 1839 at Merthyr‟s 
Plymouth Ironworks it took 2¾ tons or ore and 2½ tons of coal to produce a ton of 
pig iron.  There would be a gradual reduction in the amount of coal needed to 
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produce a ton of iron in proportion to iron ore used28.  Thus the locational pull was 
towards sources of iron ore.  With copper production the position regarding raw 
materials was even more pronounced.  In 1804 to produce one ton of copper it took 
30 tons of coal and 12 tons of ore29.   Thus it was important to locate the smelting 
near to coal sources.  Unlike iron smelting there was no ore at Cwmavon but an 
established coal industry.  Thus it made sense to co-locate iron and copper smelting.  
This took place in 1839 with the building of the Cwmavon Copper Works30.     
 
The growing industrial activities at Cwmavon created a need for a suitable dock 
facility to import raw materials and export coal and finished products.  To satisfy this 
need a dock was constructed near Taibach between 1835 and 1837.  It was built by 
C.R.M. Talbot, the head of the landowning Mansel family.  It was after him that the 
new dock was named Port Talbot.  The dock further stimulated the local iron 
industry31.  This freed further developments from the restrictions of available local 
iron ore.  It also spurred the development of the copper industry at Cwmavon with its 
dependency on non local ore.  Between 1835 and 1836 local annual iron ore imports 
increased from 140 tons to over 2,800 tons32.   All these developments have to be 
seen against a background of increasing demand for iron as industrialisation 
gathered pace during the first half of the nineteenth century.  UK pig iron production 
increased from 68,300 tons in 1788 to 2,701,000 tons in 185233.  
  
By 1838 two blast furnaces were in operation at Cwmavon using a 50% imported ore 
burden.  Each of these blast furnaces had an output of about 2,000 tons/annum and 
used 3 tons of coal per ton of iron produced.  The cost per ton of iron produced was 
£3-5s34.  This was not a particularly large output by South Wales standards.  By 
                                                          
28
 Atkinson and Baber, p.16. 
29
 Ronald Rees, King Copper-South Wales and The Copper Trade 1578-1895 (Cardiff: 




 A. Leslie Evans, Taibach and District, pp.54-55.  Brinn, p.5. 
32
 Atkinson and Baber, p.39. 
33
 Carr and Taplin, p.6. 
34
 GKB, Guest Keen Baldwins Iron and Steel Co Ltd (Port Talbot: Private Publication, 1937), 
p.28.  Brinn, p.5. 
 27 
1808-12 the average output from the blast furnaces at Merthyr‟s Plymouth Ironworks 
was 2,035 tons and by 1827 the South Wales average was 3,022 tons per furnace35. 
 
On 29th May 1841 the whole of the Cwmavon industrial complex was taken over by 
the „Governor and Company of Copper Miners in England‟ or „The English Copper 
Company‟ along with the two blast furnaces at Pontrhydyfen Ironworks further up the 
Avon Valley.  Over the next few years the new company prospered.  During 1845, 
36,412 boxes of tinplate, 2,389 tons of copper, and 134,506 tons of coal were 
produced at Cwmavon.  By this time there were 7 blast furnaces, 68 puddling 
furnaces, 20 balling furnaces and 6 mills in operation.  In 1844 steam power in the 
form of a steam engine was introduced.  Cwmavon works now employed about 880 
people36. 
 
During 1839 William Gilbertson moved from London to Cwmavon to take over as 
manager or partner.  He remained at Cwmavon until April 1844 with the then 
partnership being dissolved in January 1846.  It was his family who would build the 
original Port Talbot Steelworks in the early years of the twentieth century37.  
 
By the early 1820s South Wales accounted for about 40% of UK pig iron output.  In 
the middle of the nineteenth century although output in terms of tonnage had 
increased the region‟s significance as a proportion of UK output had declined as new 
areas such as Cleveland, Cumbria, Lincolnshire and Northampton started 
production38.  By 1828 rail manufacture had become an important activity for most 
South Wales iron works.  This stimulated the construction of larger mills in order to 
roll the required larger masses of iron.  There was also a need to add to the number 
of puddling and balling furnaces39.  In 1846 a rail mill and an engineering workshop 
were built at Cwmavon40.  By 1847 the Cwmavon complex employed 3,00041.    
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Financial difficulties resulted in a major restructuring of Cwmavon in 1847.  The 
expansion of the 1840s had been largely financed by loans from the Bank of 
England.  This resulted in a debt to the Bank of £270,000.  When the Bank of 
England raised the Bank Rate early in 1847 it triggered the insolvency of the English 
Copper Company in the autumn of 1847.  As a result the Bank took possession of 
the company‟s assets and operated the facilities at Cwmavon from April 1848 until 
May 185242.   
 
The Bank of England returned the company to a group of former English Copper 
Company shareholders in May 1852.  They re-appointed William Gilbertson as 
manager.  Between 1852 and 1860 the net profits made by the company came to 
£215,527.2s.2d with a preference dividend of 7.5% paid regularly.  The Cwmavon 
Works was now financially at its peak.  In 1861 Gilbertson left to buy his own tinplate 
works in Pontardawe.  During the next six to nine years Cwmavon endured net 
losses due to lower demand and prices for iron, coal, and copper43.  
 
The British iron industry experienced another short boom which peaked in 1871-72.  
This stimulated production and increases in capacity which by 1873 exceeded 
demand.  When there was a general downturn in trade from the autumn of 1873 
prices began to fall and remained low until 187944.  It was from this point in the early 
1870s that the Cwmavon works went into a gradual and steady decline.  The first 
closure was the rail mill that ceased production in 1874.  This was caused by the 
substitution of steel for wrought iron in the manufacture of rails i.e. Cwmavon was 
unable to respond to the technological changes taking place.  No doubt the years of 
losses caused problems in the ability of the company to raise sufficient capital to 
build a viable steelworks.  During 1876 the company went into liquidation45.  The 
closure of the rail mill reflected a wider trend within South Wales.  Wrought iron rail 
production fell from 534,000 tons in 1869 to 100,000 in 187746.  Most of the old 
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established Welsh manufacturers withdrew from iron rail production by 187747.  
Cwmavon was a casualty of that process. 
 
In 1877 all the company‟s local assets were purchased by James Shaw, an engineer 
from Aberdeen.  He immediately formed a limited company under the name of „The 
Cwmavon Estates and Works Company Limited‟ and ran this as managing director 
until 1882.  Production continued at the copper works, the blast furnaces, the 
western bar mills and the collieries.  In 1878 the Coppee Company (Great Britain) 
Limited built a battery of 80 non by-product coke ovens at Cwmavon.  Iron ore was 
imported from Spain and production in 1880 amounted to over 1,000 tons of 
iron/week48.  
 
By 1883 the iron and steel industries went into a 3 year long deep worldwide 
depression.  This resulted in a fall in pig iron output.  During 1883 only 12 Welsh 
puddling furnaces were working compared to 30 a few years earlier49.  In 1882 the 
Cwmavon Estates and Works Company was hit by the trade depression and went 
into liquidation.  The closure came very early as it was 1883 when the full downturn 
in trade took place.  This suggests that other factors were at work.  These factors 
include lack of modern plant and with imported ore locational disadvantages.  This 
caused a further break up of the company into smaller units.  The copper works 
remained idle until 1884 when it was purchased by the Rio Tinto Company.  The 
remaining plant i.e. the blast furnaces, forges and collieries were taken over by a 
new company, the „Cwmavon Works Proprietors‟ in 188450.  The works were 
probably idle between 1882 and 1884.  A small steelworks, the Express Steelworks, 
was built near to the blast furnaces which worked for four years between 1889 and 
1893 supplying steel bars to the Cwmavon tinplate works.  It was the first steelworks 
in the Port Talbot area.  In 1893 Wright, Butler and Company, to whom ownership 
had passed in 1892, closed it51.   They only kept one blast furnace in operation with 
an output of approximately 500 tons/week and even this was soon taken out of 
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operation although not demolished until 192852.  The coke ovens continued to 
operate until 1921 leaving only the tinplate works in production53.  Unlike the other 
undertakings in Cwmavon this continued to flourish.  In 1941 the tinplate works was 
acquired by the Government Ordinance Department and production ceased in 1944.  
It was dismantled in 1946 under the Tinplate Redundancy Scheme54. 
 
From the 1870s onwards two fundamental pressures worked against Cwmavon.  
Firstly the replacement of wrought iron by steel because of its lower production costs 
and superior physical properties meant that its output became technologically 
obsolete.  No successful conversion to steelmaking took place largely because of the 
scale of investment required.  Whether a larger company with greater access to 
capital could have achieved a transition at this site is open to question.  The second 
factor was that once the local ore had to be supplemented, and the proportion of coal 
to ore required declined, the site lost its locational advantages.  It then made more 
economic sense to produce iron and steel on the coast and eliminate the costly 
transport of iron ore to Cwmavon.  This last factor meant that a successful 
conversion to steelmaking at this site would have been very unlikely. 
 
The new owners, Wright, Butler and Company, were to play a crucial role in the 
subsequent history of steel at Port Talbot but in the 1880s and 1890s its primary 
attention was elsewhere.  The company was formed in 1878 by Colonel Sir John 
Roper Wright to produce open-hearth steel tinplate bars at the Elba Steelworks, 
Gowerton near Swansea.  Wright and Butler had been associated with the building 
of an open-hearth steelworks at Panteg in 1873 to make steel rails and fishplates.  
This had closed in 1879.  Wright, Butler and Company acquired it in 1882 but 
converted it to produce tinplate bars.  During 1885 Alfred Baldwin and Company 
opened the Panteg Tinplate Works.  In 1892 Baldwin in association with Wright and 
Butler restarted the Pontymoila Tinplate Works.  Both here and at Panteg they 
started to produce galvanised sheet in 189555.  This led on the 7th April 1902 to the 
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amalgamation of Wright, Butler and Company with Alfred Baldwin & Company 
Limited, E.P.W. Baldwin Limited, the Blackwell Galvanised Iron Company Limited, 
and the Bryn Colliery Company to form Baldwins Limited56.  Wright stated that the 
object of the merger was to more effectively meet competition57.  An anonymous 
company official also stated that the merger would result in more economic working 
which would help fight foreign competition58.  They were attempting to rationalise 
production and exploit the benefits of economy of scale.   
 
This merger was part of a wider process that was underway within the British steel 
industry at the time.  It was no coincidence that big groups began to emerge at this 
time including Dorman Long, Guest Keen and Nettlefold (GKN) and Stewarts and 
Lloyds.  The stimulus for these mergers was the effect of foreign competition, growth 
of giant corporations overseas and the need to rationalise to meet this challenge59.  
Baldwins emerged as an integrated company with interests in coal and pig iron 
production through to a wide range of finished products, particularly sheet60.  At 




Table 1.1: Baldwins’ Initial Shareholders61 
 Shareholding 
Alfred Baldwin MP 25,000 
John Roper Wright 20,000 
Isaac Butler 25,000 
Roger Beck 20,000 
Stanley Baldwin 5,000 
Samuel L. Dore 5,000 
H.A. Saunders 100 
Total 100,100 
 
                                                          
56
 Anon. „Great Steel Combine‟. South Wales Daily Post (henceforth SWDP), 26th March 
1902.  Anon. „Baldwins Limited‟. The Economist (henceforth Economist), 19th October 1919, 
p.751.  Anon. „The New Margam Works of Baldwins Ltd‟, I&CTR, 17th September (1920), 
354-359 (p.353).  J. Horton, „Baldwins Adds New Plant‟, I&CTR, 21st October (1920) 1133-
1139 (p.1133).  GKB, p.31.  Carr and Taplin, p.268.  Warren, British Iron and Steel, pp.106-
107.  Rees and Rees, p.48.  Vaizey, p.9.  Brinn, p.6.  Jackson, p.404. 
57
 John Roper Wright. Quoted in „Great Steel Combine‟. SWDP, 26th March 1902. 
58
 Anon, „Big Iron and Steel Combine‟. SWDP, 9th April 1902. 
59
 Carr and Taplin, p.183. Warren, British Iron and Steel, pp.106-107. 
60
 Carr and Taplin, pp.268-269. 
61
 Anon, „Big Iron and Steel Combine‟. SWDP, 9th April 1902. 
 32 
It was proposed to only issue 4½% debentures and 5½% preference shares to the 
public.   
 
At its formation in 1902 Baldwins had major South Wales interests in the production 
of tinplate and sheet.  What they lacked was a significant interest in the heavy end of 
the steel industry producing plate, sections, rails etc.  It was this that subsequently 
drew them into developments at Port Talbot. 
 
Wright, Butler and Company were the last of a succession of proprietors, partners 
and limited liability companies (as well as an interlude of ownership by the Bank of 
England), who tried to make a success of iron production in the Port Talbot area 
during the nineteenth century.  All of them struggled with the boom and bust of the 
industrial cycle, shortages of capital, shifts in technology and locational advantage.  
But Cwmavon and its neighbourhood gradually lost its early locational advantages 
and became a marginal production area.  Considerable energy was expended by 
local entrepreneurs in attempting to resolve these problems but by the end of the 
nineteenth century iron and steelmaking had ceased in the Port Talbot area. 
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Chapter 2: Port Talbot Steelworks 1901-1921: From Failure to 
Success: A Tale of Two Companies  
 
This chapter looks at the first two Port Talbot steel companies that were formed in 
the early years of the twentieth century.  It explains their contrasting failure and 
success up to the early 1920s.  Port Talbot Steelworks was built by the Port Talbot 
Iron and Steel Company (PTI&SC) in 1901-02 formed by the Gilbertsons, a 
steelmaking family based in Pontardawe who wanted to exploit market opportunities 
as the price of tinplate and tinplate bar rose from 1899 and Emily Talbot.  It failed 
within a year of production starting.  The existing literature62 claims that the failure 
was due to technical and industrial relations problems but this chapter argues that 
the primary cause of the failure was a cash flow problem caused by an 
underestimation of building costs.  The cash flow problem meant that the technical 
issues encountered could not be overcome.  It also argues that the steelworks was 
too small to be viable and that the PTI&SC failed to meet customer demands. 
 
The Port Talbot Steel Company (PTSC) was formed in 1906 to reopen the 
steelworks.  Baldwins and the Gloucester Railway Carriage and Wagon Company 
(GRCWC) were joint owners.  The latter became a joint owner to secure a reliable 
source of plate for their railway wagon building business.  Ownership later 
broadened to include shipbuilders who were also trying to secure a source of plate. 
By doing this Baldwins were getting their customers to partly finance the required 
investment before they bought out their partners in 1915.  This was triggered by their 
plans to build a nearby iron works.  As Port Talbot Steelworks was obtained from 
Emily Talbot/Margam Estate for much less than it had cost to build it allowed the 
PTSC to raise the necessary capital for expansion and diversification into new and 
expanding product ranges.  It is argued that diversification of the product base 
reduced the vulnerability of the company if demand for one product fell dramatically.  
The costs of expansion and the scope of Government assistance during the First 
World War are examined along with the financial performance of the company 
through to the early 1920s.  It reveals a highly profitable company but that the seeds 
of future problems of industry overcapacity during the 1920s were sown during World 
War One.      
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To understand the rationale behind building Port Talbot Steelworks it is necessary to 
examine the wider local industrial scene at the turn of the twentieth century.  
Towards the end of the nineteenth century the mine owners of the Llynfi, Garw and 
Ogmore Valleys became concerned about the inadequacies of Porthcawl Harbour 
through which their coal exports were being shipped.  It was owned by the Great 
Western Railway (GWR) who were unable, or unwilling, to expand the facilities due 
to the treacherous nature of the seaward approaches to the harbour63.  To find a 
suitable outlet for their expanding coal exports they initially looked towards the new 
dock at Barry.  Unfortunately it lacked an adequate rail connection as the 
construction of the connecting Vale of Glamorgan Railway was proceeding very 
slowly.  Instead they looked westward towards Port Talbot.   
 
In 1890 steps were taken to promote a public company to improve the existing Port 
Talbot Dock to handle larger modern vessels and to provide a railway connection 
with the neighbouring coalfield64.  The resulting Port Talbot Railway and Dock 
Company (PTR) was incorporated on 31st July 1894.  Its largest shareholder was the 
daughter of C.R.M. Talbot, Emily Talbot through her Margam Estate.  The railway 
opened for freight in August 1897 and the dock in 1898 although it was not finally 
completed until 190165.  Despite steady growth the early years saw trade at the dock 
well below its full capacity.  The PTR saw the Pontardawe steelmakers, the 
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In 1861 William Gilbertson left Cwmavon and leased the Pontardawe Tinplate Works 
which he and his son Arthur developed.  On William‟s death in 1882 leadership of W. 
Gilbertson & Co Ltd passed to Arthur.  In 1890 he installed two open-hearth furnaces 
at Pontardawe and opened the Glynbeudy Tinplate Works at Brynamman67.   
 
Although South Wales had produced tinplate from at least 1720, from 1870 onwards 
tinplate production tended to be concentrated in the Swansea sub-region.  The area 
had locational advantages in the form of available coal, navigable rivers to import 
raw tin and export finished tinplate, adequate water supplies, experienced workers 
readily available from the declining copper industry and sufficient sulphuric acid as a 
by-product from copper smelting68.      
 
In 1900 Gilbertson was looking to expand steelmaking capacity.  His firm like other 
South Wales firms involved in the tinplate industry had been badly affected when the 
American Congress passed the McKinley Act.  This imposed a tariff on all tinplate 
imported into the USA of 2.2 cents/pound from July 1891 in order to stimulate 
tinplate production in the USA.  It raised the cost of Welsh tinplate imported into the 
USA by 70%69.  
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The impact initially was not as great as might have been expected as the American 
industry was not large enough to fully supply their canning industry.  It really took 
effect from 1894.  The result was that the price dropped from 18s 3d per box in 1891 
to under 10s in 1894.  There were 519 tinplate mills in South Wales in 1890 but only 
308 in the whole of the UK by mid 189670.  During 1899 tinplate demand began to 
increase.  As a consequence there was a rise of over 50% in the price of tinplate 
bars to £7-0-0d a ton.  The number of working tinplate mills in South Wales 
increased from 319 in January 1899 to 416 in October 1899.  This increase in 
demand was driven by the home market.  British tinplate consumption increased 
from 2,300,000 boxes in 1896 to 4,400,000 in 1906 due to greater demand from the 
food canning industry71. 
 
The McKinley tariff cost the Gilbertsons virtually all their trade with the USA (225 
tons/week).  In response to this they converted their tinplate mills into sheet mills and 
began to galvanise from 1899 (they returned to the tinplate trade in 1911 with a new 
6 mill works)72.  During 1900 with home demand and prices for tinplate and sheet 
increasing the Gilbertsons decided to increase their steelmaking capacity to meet 
demand for tinplate bars.  In 1900 Arthur Gilbertson agreed to build a new 
steelworks on a 12 acre site adjacent to Port Talbot Dock.  The decision resulted 
from a convergence of interests of the Gilbertsons, Emily Talbot/Margam Estates 
and the PTR.  Emily Talbot‟s cousin, and Clerk to Glamorgan County Council, 
Thomas Mansel Franklen aware of the benefits of a steelworks to local employment 
and to the PTR approached the Gilbertsons about the possibility of building a 
steelworks at Port Talbot73.  The approach was encouraged by Emily Talbot/Margam 
Estate who agreed to lease the land74.  She was also prepared to financially support 
the building of the steelworks through the use of a debenture/mortgage, the issue of 
shares to nominees and acting as guarantor for bank loans.  A private joint stock 
company was established.  The financial structure was such that in the event of 
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company failure all the property went to Emily Talbot/Margam Estate75.  As will be 
seen this would occur.   This financial structure was typical of the pattern that Ranald 
Michie claims to be the main means of raising funding for industrial investment in the 
late nineteenth century where funding was raised through friends, relatives or 
business acquaintances76.  
 
The site held clear advantages for steelmaking.  Firstly there was sufficient land 
available to build a steelworks and importantly enough for future expansion.  The 
nearby dock allowed the import of raw materials and export of finished products.  
There was good railway access to coal over the PTR.  The nearby GWR mainline 
allowed the easy movement of raw materials in and finished products out onto the 
national railway network77.  Overall the location offered considerable advantages for 
steelmaking. 
 
The new company, the PTI&SC, was incorporated on 21st August 1900 with a 
nominal capital of £10,000 divided into 200 ordinary shares of £50 each78.   Initially 
only £2,500 of capital was called up split between the Gilbertson family and 
nominees of Emily Talbot/Margam Estate79.  Over the next two years the capital was 
increased to £40,000.  Most leading positions in the company were held by members 
of the Gilbertson family with Arthur Gilbertson acting as Managing Director80. 
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The building of the steelworks took place during 1901-02.  Sir C. Furness originally 
estimated the cost to be £70,000.  A subsequent estimate from Taylor and Farley 
increased this to £100,000.  By early April 1902 the actual cost was already 
£110,000.  They had accepted Furness‟ estimation which had underestimated the 
cost of installing the groundbreaking electrical and hydraulic power, the difficulty in 
getting suitable water supplies, and the cost of the foundations81. 
 
By August 1902 the company had mortgages/debentures of £130,000 and still 
needed £15,000 to pay off the contractors and interest on the mortgage82.  Therefore 
building costs must have been approximately £145,000 (not the £250,000 quoted by 
Brinn83).  Even before production had started the PTI&SC was in financial trouble 
through an underestimation of the building costs.  As will be seen this miscalculation 
led to a cash flow problem which resulted in company failure even before the 
technical problems described in the literature fully emerged.  
   
The plant included a battery of three cupolas with blowing plant to re-melt purchased 
pig iron to supply molten iron to the two 60 ton open-hearth furnaces for steel 
production84.  These were relatively large furnaces for the time.  During 1904 only 
12% of all British open-hearth furnaces were of 50 tons capacity or more.  The 
majority were between 20-30 tons capacity with the larger furnaces being 
concentrated in Scotland and the North East85.  Although only two furnaces were 
initially built more furnaces were later added to the melting shop.  Therefore it was 
built with the potential for future expansion.  Even before completion in 1902 a 
German firm approached the Gilbertsons about adding blast furnaces86.  These blast 
furnaces were never built.   
 
To obtain pig iron for the steelmaking process the Gilbertsons approached a 
Canadian firm.  They were already fully committed to supplying the American market 
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so they approached a German firm but their price was too high.  In the end they 
bought 4,000 tons of pig iron from the Ukraine for delivery starting in May 190287. 
 
Technical problems with the steelmaking process meant that the pig iron could not 
be used as quickly as anticipated.  This only worsened the PTI&SC‟s already difficult 
cash flow problem88.  Gilbertson claimed that they had bought „abnormal‟ amounts of 
pig iron because Franklen, now a PTI&SC director, had told them “not to miss a 
favourable chance of getting pig iron89”.  This is a surprising statement.  As 
established steelmakers they were relying on a non steel man to determine raw 
material purchasing policy.  This indicates slack control. 
 
Steel was made by a modification of the Bertrand-Thiel process called the Pourcel 
method.  The Bertrand-Thiel process had evolved during the 1890s at Kladno in 
Austria as an attempt to make open-hearth steelmaking using lower grade, highly 
phosphoric basic pig iron a continuous process.  It involved two steel refining 
furnaces instead of one with the charge being partially refined in the first furnace 
before being tapped into the second for finishing.  It was claimed to reduce costs by 
over 25% and increase output but it was rarely used in Britain or on the continent for 
technical reasons90.    
 
It was at the cupolas that the only recorded incidents of industrial action occurred.  In 
July 1902 the workers asked for what Gilbertson claimed to be “unreasonable wages 
for unskilled men”.  They affected production for a week but were dismissed without 
a strike91.  This can hardly have been responsible for the company failure92, though it 
seems to have been used as an excuse to deflect responsibility for the company‟s 
failure from the Gilbertsons. 
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Port Talbot Steelworks was built to initially produce between 650-700 tons of 
steel/week.  The open-hearth furnaces were commissioned in the spring of 190293.  
By late July 1902 Gilbertson stated that he hoped to increase weekly output to 1,000 
tons/week once the technical problems were sorted and a third furnace added94.  
Actual output only reached 2,800 tons in July95.  The projected output of 1,000 
tons/week was certainly low compared to most Swansea area steelworks :- 
 
Table 2.1: Swansea Area Steelworks Capacities96 
Steelworks Opened Maximum Weekly Capacity Closed 
Landore-Swansea 1868 1,600tons (5 open-hearth furnaces)  1951 
Elba-Gowerton 1870 2,450tons (6 open-hearth furnaces) 1967 
Melyn-Neath 1883    200tons (2 open-hearth furnaces) 1903 
Upper Forest-Swansea 1886 2,000tons (4 open-hearth furnaces) 1957 
Briton Ferry Steel 1890 1,500tons (8 open-hearth furnaces) 1951 
Pontardawe 1890 2,000tons (5 open-hearth furnaces) 1962 
Albion Works-Briton Ferry 1893 5,000tons (8 open-hearth furnaces) 1978 
Bryngwyn-Gorseinon 1897 1,600tons (5 open-hearth furnaces) 1951 
Gravesend-Gorseinon 1900 2,000tons (5 open-hearth furnaces) 1961 
Cwmfelin-Swansea 1905 2,000tons (5 open-hearth furnaces) n/a 
 
The technical problems had not been overcome by late August 1902.  Output was 
just 600 tons/week and the PTI&SC was beginning to lay men off.  Gilbertson was 
now complaining that they had been misled by the patentees as to what this method 
of steelmaking could achieve97.  
  
Port Talbot Steelworks‟ only rolling mill was a three stand 32” bar mill used for the 
production of steel sections, tinplate bars and billets98.  It was probably the first mill in 
Britain to have electrically driven auxiliaries99.  Problems were also encountered in 
the mill where the machinery was too powerful for the production of tinplate bars.  
During September 1902 a customer complained about the tinplate bars being 
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underweight although the quality was described as excellent100.  This again indicates 
a lack of managerial control.  The Gilbertsons were fully occupied dealing with the 
steelmaking problems and trying to raise more capital.  As a consequence they 
neglected rolling operations and customer requirements.   
 
It is clear that the Gilbertsons put a great deal of effort into improving a technically 
difficult method of steelmaking.  An additional problem was that the workforce was 
inexperienced with this method.  It also became clear that a third furnace was 
needed but the lack of capital made this impractical.  A further problem was that the 
price of tinplate fell just as the steelworks was starting up :-   
 
Table 2.2: UK End of Year Prices of Bessemer Tinplate Steel101 
 Tinplate Bars (per ton) £-s-d Tinplate (per box) £-s-d 
1899 £7-0-0 £0-15-9 
1900 £5-5-0 £0-13-3 
1901 £4-17-6 £0-13-0 
1902 £4-12-6 £0-11-9 
1903 £4-5-0 £0-11-3 
1904 £4-6-6 £0-12-6 
1905 £5-1-6 £0-13-0 
1906 £6-0-0 £0-15-0 
 
Gilbertson attributed this to under priced German tinplate bars coming into South 
Wales.  The PTI&SC‟s response was to try to widen the product base to produce 
tram rails and sections but again the lack of capital prevented this102.  In an attempt 
to raise more capital Gilbertson wrote on a number of occasions to Franklen asking 
him to intercede with Emily Talbot/Margam Estate but she was unwilling to invest 
further103.  The Margam Estate accounts for the year ended 24th March 1906 showed 
a balance in the capital account of £948,970 but stated :- 
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“It should, however, be remembered that included in the above £948,970 is the 
Asset – Port Talbot Iron and Steel Co Limited Loan account £89,817-13s-9d (the 
ultimate realisation of which is very doubtful).…. 104.”   
 
All production ceased at Port Talbot Steelworks in February 1903.  Approximately 
250 men were made redundant105.  The PTI&SC was wound up in 1904106.  After the 
closure the Gilbertsons concentrated on increasing steel production at their 
Pontardawe Steelworks.  In 1933 they were taken over by Richard Thomas and Co 
for £350,000107.  Under the terms of the debenture/mortgage Port Talbot Steelworks 
became the property of Emily Talbot/Margam Estate108. 
 
The main reason for the PTI&SC‟s failure was a cash flow problem and 
undercapitalisation.  This emanated from a gross underestimation of the cost of 
building the steelworks.  They accepted the lowest estimate even though others 
quoted much higher figures.  Even these proved to be below the actual building cost.  
As a result insufficient capital was raised.  The Gilbertsons then failed to raise the 
additional capital required to overcome the technical problems, increase production 
and to diversify the product base.  The choice of a novel method of steelmaking was 
always going to be a risk.  It was a failure which linked to a lack of capital meant that 
there was no scope for manoeuvre when things went wrong.  A workforce 
inexperienced in this steelmaking method added to the problems.  Other managerial 
failures included a lack of control over the production process resulting in under 
weight tinplate bars and over purchasing of raw materials.  The fall in the price of 
tinplate bars exacerbated the problems.   
 
Port Talbot Steelworks, now owned by Emily Talbot/Margam Estate, lay idle from 
1903.  Emily Talbot was the PTR‟s largest shareholder.  The PTR‟s Chairman was 
Sir John Roper Wright, a major shareholder and director of Baldwins.  He was in an 
excellent position to fully appreciate the potential of this site for a successful 
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steelworks.  In 1905 Emily Talbot approached and persuaded Wright to reopen Port 
Talbot steelworks under Baldwins109. 
 
Wright was to become the first major personality in the twentieth century history of 
steelmaking at Port Talbot.  He was born near Chorley in Lancashire in March 1843.  
Wright undertook an engineering apprenticeship in Preston and assisted William 
Siemens in developing the open-hearth steelmaking process.  Following this he 
became a prominent manager at the Landore-Siemens Steel Company.  During 
1873 he formed an association with Isaac Butler which led to the formation of Wright 
Butler and Co and was the driving force behind the formation of Baldwins.  In 1908 
he became Baldwins‟ chairman and led their expansion to make Baldwins a major 
player in both the steel and tinplate industries.  He had practical knowledge of the 
steel industry as both an engineer and as a senior manager110.           
 
Why then did Baldwins want to reopen Port Talbot Steelworks?  From 1901 onwards 
the overall trend in British steel ingot production was upwards (see Appendix 1).  
Between 1905 and 1914 British steelmakers found expanding markets in the Empire 
for such heavy products as plate, girders and rails.  This was part of a worldwide 
increase in steel production from 36 million tons in 1904 to 75 million tons in 1913111.  
From 1903 steel prices, including tinplate bars, were rising again (see table 2.2).  
Rising output and prices made this an ideal time for Emily Talbot/Margam Estate to 
get Port Talbot Steelworks back into production and to recoup at least some of her 
investment.   
 
In August 1906 a new company, „The Port Talbot Steel Company Limited‟ was 
registered to take over Port Talbot Steelworks with a nominal capital of £100,000 
divided into shares of £1 each112.  There were six directors including the future Prime 
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Minister, Stanley Baldwin, and John Roper Wright.  The main shareholders in the 
new company were Baldwins and the Gloucester Railway Carriage and Wagon 
Company who each nominated 3 directors113.  Duncan Burn is therefore incorrect 
when he states that Baldwins virtually absorbed the Port Talbot Company in 1906114.  
They only controlled a half of the PTSC shares.  It was 1915 before Baldwins bought 
out the GRCWC.  
  
The PTSC initially leased the site but purchased the plant.  They later purchased the 
site115.  Baldwins benefited from an increase in steelmaking capacity at a time of 
rising demand and prices for what was, and will be shown as, a very low price.  Yet 
there were other substantial benefits to Baldwins.  By going into partnership with the 
GRCWC, Baldwins were sharing the cost and getting a customer to partly finance 
the ensuing expansion.  Thus Baldwins‟ risk was reduced.  As the steelmaker 
Baldwins would be in charge of day to day operations.  The product base was to be 
broadened to include plate and later rails and sections.  Thus Port Talbot was 
moving into new markets.  This allowed Baldwins to compete regionally with Guest 
Keen and their steelworks at Dowlais and Cardiff.  It also reduced the risk from 
sudden market collapse in particular product lines as had happened with tinplate in 
the 1890s.  By broadening their product base Baldwins could shift production into 
other products at times of difficulty with one product.  Thus from Baldwins‟ 
perspective the formation of the PTSC can be seen as both aggressive in 
challenging the established heavy product steelmakers and defensive in that it 
reduced the chances of company failure by broadening the product base.   
 
There were also advantages for the GRCWC in establishing a stake in a steel 
company.  This period saw an increased use of steel in the construction of railway 
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wagons which stimulated demand for light plate116.  To cater for this new market a 
light plate mill was built at Port Talbot and commissioned in September 1908 as the 
GRCWC had experienced difficulty in obtaining steel plate to construct railway 
wagons117.  The building of the light plate mill guaranteed the GRCWC a source of 
raw materials118.  They regularly placed substantial orders at Port Talbot119.  The 
GRCWC were therefore involved in a process of vertical integration.  Their financial 
stake in the PTSC ensured their loyalty as a customer.   
 
As for the PTSC‟s financial structure the initial nominal capital of the company was 
£100,000.  Only 50,007 shares were distributed in August 1906 with 25,000 each 
going to Baldwins and the GRCWC120.   The 7 remaining shares were issued to the 
directors.  These were fully paid with the remaining 50,000 shares only raising 6/- 
per share.  Therefore only £15,007 was raised in capital.  Also in August 1906 the 
PTSC issued a debenture of £40,000 to Emily Talbot/Margam Estate121.  To the 5th 
October 1906 the receipts and payments of the company on its capital account 
were:- 
 
Table 2.3: Capital Account Receipts and Payments to 5th October 1906122   
Particulars of Receipts £ Particulars of Payments £ 
From Shareholders 15,007 Purchase-Contract 16-8-06 10,000 
From Miss Talbot 40,000 Purchase of Plant  40,000 
  Preliminary Expenses 700 
  Purchase of New Plant 1,263 
Total 55,007 Total 51,963 
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The PTSC acquired Port Talbot Steelworks and invested in new plant for just 
£40,000 raised by debenture and share capital of £15,007.  The new plant related to 
the rebuilding of the open-hearth furnaces (see below).  As the steelworks had cost 
£145,000 to build it was obtained for a very low price.  What was even better for the 
PTSC was that Emily Talbot/Margam Estate provided the bulk of the capital to buy 
the steelworks off her.  This was a paper transaction and the PTSC acquired the 
steelworks for virtually nothing.  The method of acquisition allowed capital to be 
available to diversify into new profitable product lines.   
 
What then did Emily Talbot/Margam Estate get from this arrangement?  She 
effectively acted as a banker to the PTSC operating through loans secured by 
debentures.  Interest would be paid and she was able to earn something on her 
original substantial investment in the steelworks.  As mentioned earlier, she was the 
major shareholder in the PTR.  A reopened steelworks would generate business for 
the local railway and dock.  A similar financial relationship was put in place as with 
the PTI&SC where a debenture was issued.  Company failure meant that ownership 
would again revert to her.  The financial relationship differed in that she owned no 
shares in the PTSC even through nominees.  The debenture was a means of 
reducing her financial risk. 
 
The PTSC immediately started to modify the existing plant.  The cupolas were 
dismantled and the furnaces rebuilt as normal cold charged open-hearth furnaces.  
This rebuilding reduced the capacity of the furnaces from 60 to 50 tons.  One was 
acid and the other basic.  The first steel was produced and rolled by the PTSC in 
January 1907.  A third open-hearth furnace of 50 ton capacity came into operation in 
August 1907.  In March and September 1908 two more 50 ton basic open-hearth 
furnaces were added.   Also in September 1908 the light plate mill was installed123.  
The mill is shown below :-  
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To fund this a further £18,748 was raised by issuing the remaining shares to 
Baldwins and the GRCWC for 7/6d per share124. 
 
The PTSC began to make, and increase, its profits as shown below :- 
 
Table 2.4: PTSC Profit and Loss 1909-1912125 






Regrettably no information on turnover or on how the figures were made up is 
available.  Throughout this period at yearly intervals £1,000 was paid off the original 
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mortgage/debenture of £40,000126.  The company was still raising capital.  In 1907 
an increase in nominal capital from £100,000 to £150,000 was authorised127.  The 
call on this capital took place in the following years to finance further expansion :- 
 
Table 2.5: Call on PTSC Shares 1909-1910128 
Year Ending 
31st March  
No Fully Paid 
Up £1 Shares 
No Shares Paid 
Up 10/- Each 
No Shares Paid 
Up 15/- Each 
Amount 
paid Up 
1909 100,000 50,000 Nil £125,000 
1910 100,000 Nil 50,000 £138,500 
 
Therefore between 1909 and 1910 the company raised an extra £13,500 capital from 
the shareholders.  On 26th May 1909 a resolution was passed by the company 
authorising a second mortgage/debenture for £74,000129.  Thus the company had 
raised £87,500 of extra capital.  It is reasonable to assume that this capital was used 
to finance the continuing expansion.  During 1912 there was a further increase in 
nominal capital from £150,000 to £500,000.  This was done by the creation of 
350,000, new £1 shares.  Of this nominal increase of 350,000 only 189,000 new 
shares were actually allotted on 14th August 1912 with only an amount of 2/6d per 
share being paid130.  This only raised £2,362-10s for the company.  The distribution 
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Table 2.6: Distribution of New PTSC Shares 1912131 
Name Description Allotted Shares 
GRCWC  Railway Carriage and Wagon 
Builders 
50,000 
Baldwins Ltd Ironmasters 50,000 
Workman Clark & Co Ltd Ship Builders-Belfast 20,000 
Kingston Clark & Company Ltd Ship Builders-Port Glasgow 20,000 
Louis Vandalle Fulton   Merchant-Greenock 6,000 
Peter MacCallum Lang  Merchant-Greenock  7,000 
James Fulton (Junior) Shipowner-Greenock 4,000 
John James Lang   Shipowner–Greenock 4,000 
John Roper Wright   Ironmaster–Swansea 5,000 
William Charles Wright   Ironmaster–Swansea 5,000 
John Cecil Davies   Steel Manufacturer–Swansea 5,000 
Stanley Baldwin  Ironmaster & MP-Stourport 5,000 
Roger Beck  Ironmaster–Swansea 5,000 
John Albert Matthews  Shipowner–Gloucester 1,000 
Edward Lyons Evan-Thomas  Shipowner–London 1,000 
Lilian Evan-Thomas  Widow-London 1,000 
Total  189,000 
   
Table 2.6 shows a broadening of ownership with shipbuilding and shipping 
companies buying stakes in the PTSC.  It is possible to speculate that the 
shipbuilding companies were investing to guarantee a source of shipbuilding plate.  
As the heavy plate mill had yet to be built the customer was again helping to finance 
product development at Port Talbot and ensured customer loyalty.  By 1910 the 
demand for heavy plate for shipbuilding had increased as the number of warships 
being built was unprecedented large132.  What made the position difficult for 
shipbuilders was that price control associations had developed.  This meant that 
certain associated firms insisted on selling only to certain shipbuilding firms133.  
Buying into the PTSC, who were moving into heavy plate production, was a means 
of circumventing these restrictions and gaining access to raw materials.     
 
The market for sections had increased.  To meet this demand a tandem 16”/12” 
three-high section mill was commissioned in January 1912.  It was almost 
immediately modified to produce light rail sections (a market that the Gilbertsons had 
wanted to enter).  Other products produced included light angles, tees, flats and 
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other sections for constructional engineering.  This became known as the light bar 
mill134.  A heavy rail finishing department was also established (see Appendix 2 for a 
description of the plant).   
 
To meet the growing demand for heavy plate from the shipbuilding industry and for 
heavy boiler manufacture a second melting shop and a 42” reversible heavy plate 
mill were built.  A powerhouse was also built.  These extensions necessitated the 
acquisition of more land135.  The new melting shop was commissioned in May 1914.  
It consisted of four 60 ton capacity cold charged basic open-hearth furnaces136.  As 
further furnaces were added later the melting shop was built with a view to further 




This part of the steelworks became known as the „New Side‟137.  Once completed the 
GRCWC Chairman, Vassar-Smith, described Port Talbot Steelworks as the best 
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equipped steelworks in Britain able to turn out both steel and plate considerably 
cheaper than its competitors138.  It had modern plant and excellent access to raw 
materials and transport.   
 
The PTSC allowed Baldwins to compete in new markets.  They and regional rivals 
GKN were willing to compete with Scottish, North Eastern and Midland plate and 
section steelmakers even where district agreements existed to divide up their 
markets.  They were prepared to ignore these agreements and to compete against 
these other producers with their established interests139. 
  
The PTSC‟s additional four furnaces had a capacity of 2,000 tons/week which 
brought the full capacity of the works up to 5,000 tons/week140.  This, and the product 
base, now differentiated Port Talbot from the other Swansea area steelworks (see 
table 2.1).  As well as supplying bar to the tinplate and sheet manufacturers it had 
expanded its steelmaking capacity and product base.  Port Talbot was becoming a 
steelworks of national importance.  In 1913 the biggest UK steelmaker was Dorman 
Long with output in three of its plants totalling over 700,000 ingot tons/year.  No 
other firm had a capacity of over 500,000 tons (Colvilles had a capacity of 320,000).  
In terms of steelmaking capacity Port Talbot with a capacity of 260,000 tons/year 
was in the same category as Britain‟s largest steelmakers.  The building of heavy 
mills was certainly not unique in Britain at this time.  New heavy mills were built at 
Cargo Fleet (in the North-East), Skinningrove, Partington and Normanby Park Works 
(Scunthorpe).  The latter was built by Lysaghts, a South Wales based firm.  The 
Redbourn Hill blast furnace plant (also near Scunthorpe) was bought by Richard 
Thomas and Co, the South Wales based tinplate firm to supply pig iron to its South 
Wales plants141.  Lysaghts are of particular interest as like Baldwins they moved into 
the heavy end of the steel industry.  Both companies were exploiting new market 
opportunities particularly with regard to shipbuilding.  As argued previously, by 
diversifying the product base they were protecting themselves from sudden falls in 
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demand for any particular product.  As will be seen later this move into heavy 
steelmaking was to cause Baldwins particular problems in the 1920s. 
 
Although Lysaghts only built four open-hearth furnaces of 45 tons capacity at 
Normanby Park they also built three blast furnaces to become a fully integrated iron 
and steelmaker.  They thus ensured a source of raw materials in the form of pig iron 
that was lacking at Port Talbot.  A difference between Lysaghts and the PTSC was 
that Lysaghts moved their steelmaking to the ore field whereas the PTSC, once blast 
furnaces were added, developed easier access to richer imported ore.  Thus at Port 
Talbot energy costs per ton of iron produced would be less. 
 
In 1912 there were a total of 536 open-hearth furnaces in Britain.  By 1923 only 38 
were larger than the 60 ton capacity furnaces built at Port Talbot142.  Just as 
important as size was the technology used.  Unlike those installed by the PTI&SC 
the rebuilt and new furnaces were of a tried and tested design.  By doing this the 
PTSC were reducing risk to maximise the return on their investment.  Both the size 
of the furnaces and efficiency of the design gave the PTSC an advantage over the 
established heavy steelmakers.  The latter often used plant that was relatively 
inefficient143.  By the start of World War One the PTSC had developed Port Talbot 
into a relatively large and modern steelmaker of national significance producing a 
wide range of products.  The company was in an excellent position to exploit the 
market opportunities created by World War One.  
 
After the outbreak of World War One the Ministry of Munitions requested a further 
expansion of steelmaking operations in Britain to support the war effort144.  At Port 
Talbot this resulted in building the adjacent Margam Steelworks (see Chapter 3) and 
adding two open-hearth furnaces to the new Port Talbot Melting Shop (see table 
2.7).  The building of the two basic open-hearth furnaces was part of an evolving 
process producing shell steel.  Pre-war only six British firms produced shell steel.  
The rapid wartime growth in demand for shells necessitated a lowering in the 
acceptable steel quality standards.  In January 1915 the amount of acceptable 
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phosphorous in shell steel was raised, and raised again, in October 1915 and April 
1916.  This meant that producing shell steel by basic open-hearth furnaces was now 
acceptable.  The additional furnaces at Port Talbot were part of this process of 
increasing shell steel production.  Despite this the specifications for making shell 
steel remained far more exacting than those required to produce commercial mild 
steel145.  In addition demand for Port Talbot‟s normal steel products was 
exceptionally high in order to support the war effort.  
 
From early in World War One it was clear that steel production, particularly for shells, 
would play an important part in the war effort.  To control steel production the 
Ministry of Munitions was set up on 9th June 1915146 (see Chapter 3 for more 
details).  Control of steelmaking naturally extended to Port Talbot Steelworks where 
priority was given to orders supporting the war effort.  At Baldwins‟ 1915 AGM John 
Roper Wright stated that Baldwins were doing all they could to keep up the supply of 
steel for shell making and were laying down special plant to support this147.  This 
included the building of the two additional open-hearth furnaces already mentioned.  
They were authorised in March 1916 when the Ministry of Munitions asked Baldwins 
to proceed with extensions at Port Talbot worth £96,000 alongside extensions at 
their Gowerton and Panteg steelworks148. 
 
These investments would produce an additional 100,000-110,000 tons/annum of 
steel ingots.  This together with additional rolling plant and the rearrangement of the 
existing furnaces used to produce tin and sheet bar enabled about 200,000 extra 
tons of steel/annum of shell and Mannesman steel bars to be produced.  It was 
anticipated that it would take approximately 6-9 months to complete the work.  At 
completion an additional £10,500 had also been spent at Port Talbot (see table 2.7).  
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As also shown below in table 2.7, 46% of the expenditure was written off by the 
Government under the Munitions of War Act 1915 and Finance (No2) Act of 1915149. 
 
Table 2.7: Port Talbot Extensions Agreed With the Ministry of Munitions150 




19th April 1917 No2 Melting Shop 2x60ton Basic 
Open-Hearth Furnaces 
£96,770 46% 
19th April 1917 Expenditure-Boiler & Roof £10,500 46% 
8th April 1918 Plate Flattening Machine £6,197 Grant 
4th May 1918 Finishing Machine & Motor* £745 46% 
Total  £114,212  
* The stimulus for this was the failure of the PTSC to meet rail quality standards on 
Government contracts151. 
 
The evidence suggests two authorisations in 1916 and 1917 by the Ministry of 
Munitions.  It increased Port Talbot‟s capacity to 7,000 tons of ingot steel/week152 
(364,000 tons/annum).    
 
Prior to World War One Port Talbot had experienced substantial increases in 
capacity and movement into new product lines.  This was largely market driven and 
allowed Baldwins, through the PTSC, to challenge established steelmakers.  The 
expansion during World War One was different.  It was driven by Government 
requirements to support the war effort and in particular for munitions.  Thus only a 
temporary steel market was created.  Post war demand for munitions was bound to 
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fall dramatically leaving overcapacity throughout the industry.  A further problem with 
this type of widespread subsidised investment was that it would be more difficult to 
concentrate production at the more modern and efficient steelworks like Port Talbot.  
Thus post war Port Talbot was prevented from reaching its full potential as a 
steelmaking site due to Government inspired and subsidised expansion even at 
unsuitable sites. 
 
World War One also brought major changes in the structure of the PTSC.  On 12th 
May 1915 Baldwins held an extraordinary shareholders meeting to get approval for 
the board to acquire all the PTSC shares.  At this meeting the Chairman, John Roper 
Wright, presented Baldwins‟ plans for a blast furnace plant for the production of pig 
iron to be built near Port Talbot Steelworks.  It would work in close association with 
Port Talbot and achieve full integration to maximise efficiency.  It therefore made 
sense for Baldwins to gain full ownership of the PTSC.  The Baldwins shareholders 
gave their approval153.  The GRCWC exchanged 124,996 one pound shares in the 
PTSC for an equal number of fully paid shares in Baldwins154.  Baldwins‟ takeover of 
the PTSC had been completed by 1916155.  Surprisingly, the PTSC remained a 
subsidiary of Baldwins until 1930 when it was fully absorbed into the parent company 
whereas the new Margam Steelworks was to be directly owned by Baldwins. 
 
By 1918 Port Talbot Steelworks employed 1,700 workers156.  Under the impetus of 
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Table 2.8: PTSC Profits and Assets 1913-1920157 
Year Ended 31
st
 March Profit (£) Assets–Buildings Plant (£) Stock On Hand (£) 
1913 62,425 249,590 66,499 
1914 41,601 505,868 71,751 
1915 43,085 580,148 149,928 
1916 50,311 574,703 240,508 
1917 264,887 610,509 270,471 
1918 211,790 559,608 335,677 
1919 187,718 521,391 379,086 
1920 177,101 494,124 460,207 
 
The expansion of 1914 doubled the company assets.  Also during 1914 the 
mortgage/debenture of 1906 for £40,000, and that of 1909 for £74,000 were both 
fully paid off158.  The settlement of the 1906 mortgage/debenture finally ended Emily 
Talbot/Margam Estate‟s interest in Port Talbot Steelworks.  The 
mortgage/debentures were replaced with a Lloyds Bank „First Mortgage Debenture‟ 
of £300,000 which was taken out on 26th March 1914159.  As can be seen from table 
2.8 profits were given a major boost from the year ending 31st March 1916.  With the 
economy geared to war production and high demand for shell steel and plate the 
PTSC was well placed to respond to these demands which was reflected in their 
profits. 
 
The success of the PTSC can be attributed to a number of factors.  They obtained 
the property cheaply and the Government subsidised their World War One 
expansion.  The PTSC was more successful than the PTI&SC as it had greater 
access to capital, a wider product range and demand was higher.  All these factors 
contributed to the success of the PTSC.  However, for a long period the PTSC was 
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operating under temporary boom conditions which hid deeper industry wide 
problems which only emerged during the 1920s.  
 
By the end of World War One Port Talbot Steelworks had developed into a relatively 
large, highly profitable modern steelworks consisting of 11 open-hearth furnaces, a 
steelmaking capacity of about 364,000 tons, with heavy and light bar and plate mills 
at a favourable coastal location.  Products included bars, billets, blooms, rails, 
sections and plate.  The building of Margam Steelworks would ensure a source of 
pig iron.  The problem for the industry was that the general industry wide expansion 
during World War One led to over capacity which only became apparent once the 
short post war boom ended.  
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Chapter 3: Building Margam Steelworks: An Integrated Iron 
and Steelworks To Support Port Talbot Steelworks 
 
The building of Margam Steelworks during the First World War marked the 
integration of iron making into the steelmaking process and a major increase in 
steelmaking capacity.  It was a major step in Baldwins‟ strategy of vertical 
integration.  Prior to World War One plans had been produced to build blast furnaces 
to supply Port Talbot with pig iron so as to free the PTSC from uncertainty over pig 
iron supply.  The start of World War One delayed these plans.  However, during 
World War One the Ministry of Munitions encouraged a national increase in steel 
output.  The building of Margam and its blast furnaces was part of this process and 
an important long-term development for steelmaking in the Port Talbot area.  
Wartime needs meant that a new melting shop and a rolling mill were also built 
alongside the blast furnaces.  After the war this only added to Britain‟s interwar 
surplus of steelmaking capacity.  In the 1920s Margam‟s underutilisation pushed 
Baldwins close to company failure.  Nevertheless the developments were critical in 
allowing the Port Talbot area to be chosen as the location for Britain‟s third hot strip 
mill in the 1940s.     
 
Between Port Talbot Steelworks‟ reopening and World War One there had been a 
large increase in capacity and diversification into new products.  As previously 
shown other firms such as Lysaghts followed a similar strategy.  Lysaghts had built a 
new integrated iron and steelworks at Normanby Park, near Scunthorpe.  Also near 
Scunthorpe Richard Thomas and Co bought and had modernised the Redbourn Hill 
Ironworks160.  Both rival steelmakers had established modern iron making plant as 
part of their steelmaking process yet Port Talbot lacked an integrated iron works.  
This put Port Talbot at a commercial disadvantage as the PTSC had to rely on the 
open market to obtain its raw materials in the form of pig iron.     
 
From its formation in 1902 Baldwins had developed a strategy of making the 
business as self-contained as possible161.  In pursuit of this they eventually acquired 
a number of collieries to ensure coal supplies and the Oxfordshire Ironstone 
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Company to guarantee iron ore supplies.  They also acquired the North Wales 
Brymbo Steel Company in 1918162.  This was not an innovative approach.  As early 
as 1906 this was a recognised process within British industry.  Shipbuilding and 
engineering companies had formed alliances with steelmakers to ensure access to 
steel supplies163.  The interest of the GRCWC and later shipbuilding companies in 
the PTSC was part of this process.   
 
The previous chapter noted that in 1902 a German firm considered building blast 
furnaces near Port Talbot Steelworks.  In 1912 an unnamed company was formed 
that proposed to spend between £400,000 and £500,000 on new coke-ovens, blast 
furnaces and by-product works at Port Talbot Dock164.  The location of the proposed 
plant was the site where Margam Steelworks was eventually built.  As the site is only 
a half mile from Port Talbot Steelworks and lacked any steelmaking plant it must 
have been intended to support Port Talbot Steelworks.  It would have given Port 
Talbot Steelworks the integration with iron making that it lacked.  The two sites could 
have been linked with their own internal railway system allowing the easy movement 
of iron to Port Talbot‟s Melting Shops.  
 
Therefore prior to 1914 proposals to integrate iron making into the steelmaking 
process had twice been considered at Port Talbot.  There was also a report that 
negotiations had taken place in 1912 to build a new steelworks to produce bars165.  
Unfortunately, no information was given as to which firms were involved.  Therefore 
the outbreak of World War One may have delayed the integration of iron making into 
the steelmaking process.  
 
In parallel with these proposals was a plan to enlarge Port Talbot Dock.  This 
involved extending the south breakwater by 1,800‟, the north breakwater by 500‟, a 
new 800‟ wharf at the proposed blast furnace site and a second 800‟ wharf at the site 
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of a by-product plant166.  A second lock to the south of the existing lock 875‟ in 
length, 90‟ wide, deepening of the dock from 27‟6” to 32‟ and the approach to the 
dock deepened to 45‟ on Spring tides was also proposed.  It will be shown later that 
in the 1950s when the deepening of the approach channel was again being 
considered that it could only be deepened from 21‟ to 23‟.  The start of World War 
One prevented the dock development.  Had it gone ahead and been successful it 
would have allowed larger ore carriers to enter Port Talbot Dock.  This would have 
reduced the cost per ton of ore discharged and made the building of the harbour in 
the 1960s a much less financially attractive proposal.  Without the harbour it is 
unlikely that steelmaking would have lasted into the current century.  Therefore it had 
important long-term implications for steelmaking at Port Talbot. 
 
After the start of World War One as demand for steel rose and labour shortages 
emerged it became apparent that the industry would struggle to fully support the war 
effort.  As already mentioned in response to emerging shortages of steel, particularly 
for shells, the Government formed the Ministry of Munitions in June 1915167.  William 
Charles Wright, the son of Baldwins‟ Chairman, John Roper Wright, and previously 
manager of Port Talbot Steelworks joined the new Ministry soon after it was formed 
in 1915.  He is the second of the individuals who played a significant role in the 
history of Port Talbot steelmaking.  In June 1915 he was appointed to supervise 
supply and distribution within the Ministry of Munitions.  Part of this role involved 
fixing steel prices.  By January 1916 Lloyd George‟s Parliamentary Secretary, and 
Deputy Head of the Ministry of Munitions, criticised Wright for coaching the 
steelmakers to demand higher prices for their products and greater tax relief in 
connection with steelworks extensions.  In September 1917 he became the Ministry 
of Munitions‟ Controller of Iron and Steel production168.  He introduced a high degree 
of planning and gained an invaluable insight into British steelmaking which he used 
during the rest of his career. 
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In 1925 he succeeded his father as Chairman of Baldwins.  As Chairman he faced 
some major problems partly through industry overcapacity which he had helped 
create during World War One.  His response to the problems was to look to mergers 
and alliances.  He was at the forefront of the mergers to form Guest Keen Baldwins, 
Richard Thomas and Baldwins and the Steel Company of Wales.  These mergers 
were aimed at modernising and rationalising the South Wales steel industry.  At the 
formation of Guest Keen Baldwins in 1930 he became Deputy Chairman and 
Managing Director.   In 1936 he became Chairman and spent most of his time on 
external relations with customers and other steelmakers.  Throughout his career he 
developed a reputation for secretive dealing without telling his partners.  Yet he 
understood the benefits of mergers and the need to modernise the sheet and tinplate 
industries.  Unlike his father he was not particularly technically minded but he was 
good at recognising and promoting talented young managers.  These included Julian 
Pode and Fred Cartwright who led the local industry in the 1950s and 1960s169.  
Despite his reputation he was the right man to be in charge at Port Talbot during a 
very difficult period.  
 
One of the Ministry of Munitions‟ functions was to estimate future wartime steel 
demand.  During November 1915 it was estimated that during 1916 the supply of 
steel would be approximately 9,360,000 tons but demand would be 12,051,000 
tons170.  It resulted in the Ministry of Munitions pressurising the steelmakers to 
increase production.  During August 1916 the Ministry of Munitions formed its Iron 
and Steel Department under Sir John Hunter (he was succeeded by Charles Wright).  
This Department calculated the extra capacity needed to produce the additional steel 
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Table 3.1: UK Arranged Extensions 1916-1918172 




New Acid Steel 
Furnaces 
Total New Steel 
Furnaces 
Scotland Nil 31 8 39 
NE Coast 5 21 3 24 
Lincolnshire 4 9 Nil 9 
Midlands 5 38 10 48 
South Wales 4 14 5 19 
Cumberland 
& Lancashire 
4 17 10 27 
Total 22 130 36 166 
 
The problem was that this expansion did little to alter the pre-war distribution of plant 
both within and between districts.  Because of investment in modern plant at some 
badly located works rationalisation during the interwar period was made more 
difficult173.  The Port Talbot area differed from the wider UK steel industry as Margam 
Steelworks was one of only two new integrated steelworks that was built during 
World War One.  Duncan Burn is incorrect when he claims that Redcar was the only 
wholly new integrated plant to emerge from World War One.  He claims that at Port 
Talbot blast furnaces and coke ovens were added to a steelworks174.  In fact Margam 
was a fully integrated iron and steelworks with limited rolling plant of its own. 
 
Following an approach from the Ministry of Munitions Baldwins made plans for a new 
iron and steelworks which became Margam Steelworks.  Baldwins later claimed that 
Margam Steelworks was built at the Government‟s request to increase steel 
production175.  This is true but as seen plans existed pre-war to build an iron works.  
It can be argued that the Government request simply coincided with Baldwins 
ongoing strategy of vertical integration.  By producing their own pig iron they 
guaranteed a source of raw materials and brought them in line with their competitors.  
It gave Baldwins a more predictable price for its raw materials without resorting to 
the uncertainties of obtaining them on the open market.  
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Baldwins also benefited from the fact that this investment was supported by a 
Government 46% write off of profits against taxation176.  In effect, as with the 
purchase of Port Talbot Steelworks, the new works was obtained below full cost.  It 
is certainly debatable, on a commercial basis, if post war Baldwins required a third 
melting shop but as seen pre-war there were plans to build a melting shop on this 
site.  However, during World War One the national need for more steel justified this 
additional melting shop.  There is no evidence at the time of any concerns expressed 
by Baldwins regarding capacity either here or nationally.  Certainly during the early 
1920s the PTSC closed their older Port Talbot Melting Shop.  They may have always 
envisaged Margam Melting Shop replacing it.  Later they would hold the Government 
responsible for building what they then considered to be an unneeded steelmaking 
plant.  Yet after the 1920s slump Margam Melting Shop would prove an invaluable 
investment.  It allowed the future Guest Keen Baldwins to concentrate their heavy 
steel production at the Port Talbot/Margam complex and in consequence to close 
Dowlais Steelworks and rebuild Cardiff Steelworks.  In the later 1930s even with 
Margam Melting Shop, Port Talbot Steelworks was unable to meet the high demand 
generated by rearmament.  The ability of Margam to produce iron was also an 
important factor in attracting the strip mill to Port Talbot after World War Two and in 
supporting the boom years of the 1950s.  Although during the 1920s it was a major 
drain on Baldwins‟ finances in the longer term it was very important to steelmaking in 
the area.  
 
The initial estimated cost of the Margam blast furnaces in 1915 was £300,000 but by 
mid 1916 the cost had risen to £500,000177.  By 1917 the estimated cost of Margam 
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Table 3.2: Margam Works: Costings Agreed With the Ministry of Munitions178 
Date of Ministry Sanction Plant Estimated Cost (£) 
29th January 1917 Blast Furnaces 635,250 
29th January 1917 Hutting For Blast Furnaces 10,000 
13th July 1917 Coke Ovens 316,446 
19th April 1917 Steelworks: 4 Open-Hearth 
Furnaces 
250,000 
19th April 1917 Rolling Mill 275,000 
27th September 1917 Sintering Plant 35,000 
Total  1,521,696 
 
The site chosen for Margam Steelworks was about a half mile from Port Talbot 
Steelworks on land leased from Emily Talbot/Margam Estate 179.  The steelworks 
were linked by their own internal railway system.  Thus pig iron or steel ingots could 
be moved quickly and cheaply to Port Talbot Steelworks.  As with Port Talbot raw 
materials could be easily brought in by sea.  It was particularly well situated for the 
import of iron ore to supply its blast furnaces which were built almost at the quayside.  
This gave Margam access to richer foreign ores without the additional cost of rail 
transport to inland steelworks.  With richer foreign ores less energy was needed per 
ton of pig iron produced compared to iron works on Britain‟s ore fields.  The linking of 
the blast furnaces to a dock made Port Talbot an even more attractive steelmaking 
site.  As will be seen the ensuing cost advantages have allowed the growth and 
survival of steelmaking at Port Talbot.   
 
Yet Baldwins had created a problem for themselves at Margam.  As mentioned 
earlier Baldwins acquired the Oxfordshire Ironstone Company‟s quarries in 1918.  In 
1920 Baldwins Chairman, John Roper Wright, stated that the Oxfordshire quarries 
would supply their needs180.  If that was the case building the iron making plant at 
Margam in South Wales was not an ideal choice as the iron ore had to be 
transported long distances by rail.  It would have made more sense to have acquired 
an interest in an overseas ore field.  A successful example of this was the Orconera 
Iron Company which was formed in Spain in 1873 by the Dowlais Iron Company, 
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Krupps and the Spanish Ybarra Company181.  This meant that Dowlais and Cardiff 
East Moors had access to this richer ore (Oxford Ore had an iron content of 25% and 
Spanish ore 48%)182.  Thus to access the richer foreign ores Baldwins had to 
compete on an uncertain open market.  There is no evidence of Baldwins attempting 
to acquire any interest in any overseas ore field.  By failing to do this they failed to 
fully exploit Margam‟s locational advantages.  The eventual merger with GKN in 
1930 subsequently gave them controlled access to richer Spanish ore. 
 
At the time of planning Margam Steelworks, Port Talbot Steelworks was capable of 
producing about 5,000 tons/week.  The intention was to produce a similar tonnage at 
Margam.  The plant included a coal washery, coke ovens, blast furnaces, an open-
hearth melting shop, and a reversing rolling mill to produce billets, bars, sections and 
rails.  However, the emphasis was always intended to be on the production of pig 
iron and steel rather than rolling183.  Port Talbot Steelworks would do the rolling (see 
Appendix 3 for plant details). 
 
Duncan Burn states that none of the major wartime building schemes, including 
Margam, were approaching completion by the armistice184.  The war created a labour 
shortage and with quicker gains to be made from ad hoc extensions to existing 
steelworks it is unsurprising that progress at Margam was relatively slow.  
Construction of Margam Melting Shop commenced in August 1916185.  Much of the 
preliminary excavations and concrete work was provided by 430 German prisoners 
of war until 1919 when local labour took over186.  
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Work on the foundations for three blast furnaces started in April 1917 although only 
two were actually completed187.  Progress on these and the rest of the plant was 
slow with most of it not completed until after the armistice188.  Baldwins‟ Chairman, 
John Roper Wright, attributed this to problems with the contractors189.  Steelmaking 
on a limited scale started in September 1918 when two 70 ton open-hearth furnaces 
went into production.  The ingots went to Port Talbot Steelworks for rolling190.     
 
By 1920 two more open-hearth furnaces were added to Margam Melting Shop to 
meet the demand created by the short post war boom.  A fifth open-hearth furnace 
was added in 1922191.  At Baldwins‟ 1920 AGM Wright reported that one of the blast 
furnaces was nearing completion and would be blown in during July 1920 with the 
second following a month later192.  To support these blast furnaces approximately 
2,000 tons/week of coke was needed.  This required about 6,000 tons/week of 
coking coal which would come from Cribbwr Fawr Colliery which Baldwins had 
bought specifically to supply Margam.  Any shortfall was to be supplied by Taylor‟s 
Navigation Colliery and the Cardiff Navigation Colliery which Baldwins already 
owned.  This is a further example of Baldwins‟ drive for vertical integration.  
 
The first blast furnace was actually blown in during February 1922.  The second 
followed in April 1923193.  Both had 12‟6” hearth-diameters (see Appendix 3 for 
details).  Each blast furnace was capable of producing approximately 2,000 
tons/week of basic pig iron194.  Both blast furnaces are shown below during 1923-24 
:-  
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By British blast furnace standards these were relatively large but not exceptional.  
Those built at Cardiff in 1891 had hearth diameters of 10‟ which gave them a 
capacity of only 1,000 tons/week.  By 1918 these blast furnaces had been enlarged 
from 75‟ to 85‟ in height and electric hoists added195.   The two blast furnaces erected 
at Normanby Park had 11‟ hearth diameters and the third added in 1920 had a 13‟ 
hearth diameter196.  Margam‟s open-hearth furnaces with their 70 ton capacity were 
relatively large by contemporary British standards.   
 
Margam‟s one rolling mill consisted of 3 stands (cogging, roughing and finishing) with 
36” diameter rolls.  It was a reversing mill designed to produce billets, bars, sections 
and particularly rails197.  The mill is shown below :- 
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The delay in blowing in the blast furnaces was caused by a downturn in demand 
following the early post war boom.  In 1920 the UK produced 9,067,300 tons of ingot 
steel but only 3,703,400 tons in 1921 (see Appendix 1 for full details).  Therefore 
most of Margam Steelworks started production as the post war boom peaked or just 
after.  A further problem within South Wales was a shift away from the use pig iron to 
scrap as a raw material in steelmaking.  The stimulus for the change was a post war 
surplus of war material (this will be discussed later).   
 
It was anticipated that Margam Steelworks would produce about 5,000 tons/week of 
steel and employ between 1,000 and 1,500198.  In addition Port Talbot Steelworks 
was now capable of producing 6,000-7,000 tons/week.  The combined output of 
these two steelworks was therefore about 11,000 tons/week.  Because the older Port 
Talbot Melting Shop was taken out of use as Margam Melting Shop became 
operational in reality the actual capacity was lower.  Yet Port Talbot/Margam was 
now a large steelworks by British standards.   
 
The building of Margam Steelworks and other wartime acquisitions added 
£3,000,000 to Baldwins balance sheet of £7,000,000199.  Port Talbot/Margam‟s 
importance to Baldwins can be judged from the 1920 proportion of production 
concentrated there (they owned 6 other sites that produced iron and/or steel) :- 
 





Port Talbot/Margam as a 
% of Baldwins Capacity 
Pig Iron 300,000 220,000 73% 
Steel ingots 1,000,000 520,000 52% 
 
An oddity of ownership was that Port Talbot Steelworks was owned by the PTSC, a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Baldwins, while Margam Steelworks was owned directly.   
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This slightly different ownership would have an impact on operations during the 
1920s.   
 
In summary the building of an iron works to supply Port Talbot Steelworks with pig 
iron was considered at least twice before Margam Steelworks was built.  The war 
may have even delayed its building.  It fitted into Baldwins‟ strategy of vertical 
integration.  In reality the blast furnaces at Margam were an extension of Port Talbot 
Steelworks but full integration would be delayed during the 1920s because of trading 
conditions and differences in ownership.  The location at the dockside meant that the 
blast furnaces were ideally located to exploit richer imported iron ore.  What emerges 
at this time is that the Government for the first time were playing a major role in the 
steel industry and determining overall strategy.  Baldwins appeared to benefit as 
their expansion was heavily subsidised by the Government yet the resulting 
steelworks contributed little to the war effort as production started so late in the war.  
As demand for steel declined dramatically in the early 1920s Margam would become 
a drain on Baldwins‟ resources.  Yet Margam from the early 1930s became a vital 
component of a steelmaking complex of national importance and an important factor 
in securing the building of the strip mill there. 
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Chapter 4: The 1920s: From Boom to Recession and Merger 
with GKN 
 
Baldwins came out of World War One with progress well underway in building 
Margam Steelworks to support steelmaking at Port Talbot Steelworks.  It would 
enable them to take iron ore and coal through to finished steel on a single site.  
However, instead of benefiting from these investments they were frustrated by the 
poor trading conditions during the 1920s brought about by overexpansion throughout 
the industry during World War One, lack of demand from the steel consuming 
industries, an adverse exchange rate and closure of export markets.  Baldwins‟ 
production in the Port Talbot area during the 1920s, after the early 1920s boom, was 
never sufficient to justify their investment.  The position was such that the future of 
Baldwins itself was put in doubt.  Company failure was only averted by rationalisation 
and financial restructuring.  The latter involved the shareholders exchanging a major 
share of ownership for long-term debt.  Throughout the 1920s rumours persisted of a 
merger with GKN to rationalise South Wales heavy steelmaking and to gain access 
to funds to invest in modernisation and cost control.  When it occurred at the end of 
the 1920s it was only a merger of their heavy steelmaking assets rather than a full 
company merger.  It is argued that this was a missed opportunity for the South 
Wales tinplate and sheet sectors.  Surprisingly, despite the adverse trading 
conditions limited investment continued throughout the 1920s although it was largely 
confined to improvements in efficiency and placing Baldwins in a better position to 
merge with GKN.  
 
The 1920s were a difficult decade for the British steel industry.  By the late 1920s 
British industry had lost about 20% of its pre-war 1913 export markets.  It was the old 
staple industries such as coal, shipbuilding, engineering, textiles and steel that were 
the most affected201.   
 
Between 1913 and 1937 world steel production grew by 75%202 yet the British steel 
industry was unable to exploit this growth.  Prior to World War One most of Britain‟s 
exports went to semi-industrialised countries.  During the war a number of non 
                                                          
201
 Keith Laybourn, Britain on the Breadline–A Social and Political History of Britain 1918-
1939 (Stroud: Sutton Publishing Limited, paperback edition, 1998), p.7. 
202
 Tolliday, p.19. 
 72 
European countries either became producers for the first time or greatly expanded 
their capacity with the aim of becoming self sufficient in steel production e.g. 
Canada, Japan, India, Australia and South Africa203.  Even within Europe this trend 
was apparent with iron and steelmaking starting in Holland between the wars204.  It is 
probable that this process would have occurred without World War One but it 
speeded up that process.  Prior to 1914 Britain was exporting 40% of its steel 
production205.  But as a result of new production, tariffs, exclusions and an 
overvalued pound the British steel industry lost considerable parts of its export 
markets.  To add further to the British steel industry‟s problems Britain‟s markets 
remained unprotected and open to foreign producers whose own markets were 
protected.  Thus continental producers were able to target Britain‟s open market.  An 
overvalued pound further exposed the British steel market to foreign competition206.  
These problems were increased by the wartime expansion in capacity of the steel 
industry.  A combination of all these factors exposed the structural weaknesses of 
the industry which had been hidden by an expanding pre-war market.   
 
To illustrate the loss of markets for the British steel industry in a sector particularly 
relevant to steelmaking at Port Talbot, it is helpful to look at shipbuilding.  In terms of 
tonnage, British interwar shipbuilding peaked during 1921 with an output of 2.1 
million tons in an effort to replace war losses, but then averaged about 1 million 
tons/year during the rest of the 1920s and just 700,000 tons during the 1930s.  
Throughout the 1920s over a half of all shipbuilding berths remained empty but 
between 1930 and 1934 this figure increased to 80%.  During World War One Britain 
had increased shipbuilding capacity by about 40% but European and other 
shipbuilders had increased their capacities by even more.  This resulted in chronic 
world shipbuilding overcapacity.  Much of Britain‟s pre-war export markets were lost 
as foreign tariffs and government policies denied access to their markets207.   
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This decline in shipbuilding caused serious problems for the steel industry.  Before 
the early 1920s shipbuilding and repairing accounted for as much as 30% of Britain‟s 
steel output208.  By 1924 this proportion of output had fallen to 19% and by 1935 to 
8.3%209.  This decline in such a major market was one of the reasons for the serious 
problems that the steel industry experienced between the wars.  Of the rest of 
Britain‟s steel output, 30% went into producing tinplate and sheet and the remaining 
40% went into producing railway material, motor vehicles, engineering, building and 
constructional work etc210.   
 
Both Port Talbot and Margam were geared towards heavy steel production.  As a 
consequence they suffered particularly from depressed demand for plate, rails and 
structural steel.  Nationally steel plate production fell from 1,654,700 tons in 1920 to 
less than 600,000 tons in 1923.  Like plate, demand for structural steel and rails 
remained quite low throughout the 1920s.  Unlike plate and structurals, rail demand 
did not share in the recovery of the 1930s211.  These heavy steel products made up 
as much as 66% of national production in 1920 so the fall in demand had a 
disproportionate effect on the whole steel industry.  In contrast demand for lighter 
steel products such as tinplate and sheet remained more stable during the 1920s212.  
In 1913 the UK produced 16,441 boxes of tinplate, 16,498 in 1924 and peaked at 
17,597 in 1929213.     
 
As table 4.1 shows, British steel production plunged during 1921 into one of the 
worst recessions that it had ever experienced.  Production was running at only 
25½% of capacity.  In South Wales there were 24 steelworks with 150 furnaces and 
converters but with just an average of 54.75 in operation214.  In 1922 British steel 
production had recovered to about 45% of capacity215.  Although by 1929 steel 
production was greater than in 1913 overall capacity had increased substantially 
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during World War One.  The trigger for the downturn was the March to July 1921 
national coal strike216.  Steel production, because of the factors mentioned earlier 
struggled to recover. 
 
Table 4.1: British Pig Iron and Steel Ingot/Casting Production (tons)217 
Year Pig Iron 
Production   
Percentage Of 1913 
Pig Iron Output 
Steel 
Production   
Percentage Of 
1913 Steel Output 
1913 10,260,300 100.0% 7,663,870 100.0% 
1920 8,034,700 78.3% 9,067,300 118.3% 
1921 2,611,400 25.5% 3,625,800 47.3% 
1922 4,902,300 47.8% 5,880,600 76.7% 
1923 7,440,500 72.5% 8,481,800 110.7% 
1924 7,307,400 71.2% 8,201,200 107.0% 
1925 6,261,700 61.0% 7,385,400 96.4% 
1926 2,458,200 24.0% 3,596,100 46.9% 
1927 7,292,900 71.1% 9,097,100 118.7% 
1928 6,610,100 64.4% 8,519,700 111.2% 
1929 7,589,300 74.0% 9,636,200 125.7% 
1930 6,192,400 60.4% 7,325,700 95.6% 
 
The percentage fall in iron production compared to 1913 was greater than for steel.  
In South Wales during 1921 there were seven iron works containing 33 blast 
furnaces.  Yet only an average of 2.4 were in blast218.  This was partly attributable to 
the replacement of pig iron as a raw material in the steelmaking process with scrap.  
During the early 1920s the general depression and availability of redundant war 
material saw scrap prices fall relative to pig iron.  Throughout the 1920s between 40-
50% of the steelmaking charge was scrap.  It peaked at 60% in 1936 and remained 
about 50% after that.  The problem was that for technical reasons scrap could be 
substituted most easily under cold metal practice.  This favoured Britain‟s smaller 
non-integrated steelworks despite their poor fuel economy219.  These were the very 
steelworks that were unsustainable in the longer term when the price of scrap rose.  
This helped hold back the modernisation of the industry.  
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Unsurprisingly a protectionist lobby emerged among the British steel companies from 
the early 1920s demanding tariff protection220.  Although key figures in the 
Conservative administrations were sympathetic to some form of tariff protection 
strong opposition from the Treasury blocked any chance of their introduction.  There 
is no evidence that Baldwins were part of this lobby.  Part of the steel industry‟s 
response to the deteriorating situation was for some limited mergers to take place.   
This process quickened towards the end of the decade.  Despite these mergers the 
fragmented structure of the steel industry persisted.  There were still around twenty 
companies whose total output was equivalent to just one German Company, the 
Vereinigte Stahlwerke and only equivalent to approximately one third of the United 
States Steel Corporation221. 
     
Geoffrey Owen argues that the question of rationalisation to remove surplus capacity 
was closely bound up with protection222.  The steelmakers argued that there was no 
incentive to modernise and re-equip as long as continental steelmakers were free to 
dump their surpluses below cost in Britain whilst their own markets were protected.  
These points were raised at Baldwins‟ 1922 AGM by John Roper Wright as affecting 
Baldwin‟s performance223.  Yet rather than protection they saw the solution as cutting 
costs, particularly wages and a more favourable exchange rate.   
 
The fundamental problem that the steel industry faced during the 1920s was a lack 
of demand from the steel consuming industries.  In the immediate post-war period 
there were two sectors of the industry within South Wales supplying very different 
markets.  During the interwar period the sectorial divisions became very apparent.  
The first of these was the traditional heavy iron and steel producing sector (including 
Port Talbot and Margam) mainly located in the eastern and central parts of 
Glamorgan on the northern rim of the coalfield.  The second sector was located in 
South West Wales to the west of Port Talbot where virtually all the output of the 13 
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small steelworks was supplied to the local sheet and tinplate industries224.  As 
Steven Tolliday states the tinplate sector performed relatively better than the rest of 
the steel industry during the 1920s225.  Yet its share of world output fell from 45% in 
1914 to 23% in 1930.  
 
Table 4.2: South Wales Pig Iron and Steel Ingot/Casting Production (tons)226 
Year Pig Iron 
Production  
Percentage Of 1913 




1913 Steel Output 
1913 889,200 100% 1,807,300 100% 
1920 692,000 77% 1,884,300 104% 
1921 120,500 14% 854,500 47% 
1922 595,500 67% 1,873,900 104% 
1923 807,600 90% 2,212,100 122% 
1924 865,600 97% 2,254,600 125% 
1925 788,900 88% 1,962,800 109% 
1926 284,100 32% 902,100 50% 
1927 739,100 83% 1,927,300 107% 
1928 852,800 95% 2,158,600 119% 
1929 926,500 104% 2,336,100 129% 
1930 542,300 61% 1,503,200 83% 
 
The relative fall in South Wales pig iron production during 1920-21 was more than for 
Britain as a whole (see table 4.1).  This fall resulted from the greater use of scrap in 
the small cold charged steelworks in South West Wales where for technical reasons 
it was easier to substitute scrap for pig iron.  As noted earlier the cause of the shift 
was a surplus in ex-war material scrap which undercut the price of pig iron.  Yet after 
1921 South Wales generally shows relatively more steel production compared to 
1913.  This was attributable to the high proportion of sheet and tinplate production in 
South Wales for which demand remained proportionally higher than for heavy 
products227.  The two sectors of the steel industry in South Wales reacted quite 
differently to the economic downturn228.     
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It is unsurprising that the 1920s brought permanent closures to the older less 
efficient plants mainly producing heavy steel products located on the northern rim of 
the coalfield where ore transport costs from the docks to the steelworks finally 
brought closure.  In 1921 Cyfarthfa steelworks near Merthyr, after returning to 
production in 1916 to support the war effort, finally closed leaving steelmaking in the 
Merthyr area confined to Dowlais.  In Monmouthshire the steelworks at Blaenavon 
closed in 1922, its blast furnaces along with those at Tredegar closed in 1924 and 
steelmaking ceased at Ebbw Vale in 1929.  The outcome was that the South Wales 
industry tended to become concentrated on the coast between Newport in the east 
and Llanelli in the west229.  
 
By the end of World War One Baldwins had become a highly successful steelmaker.  
Since their formation in 1902 they had taken full advantage of suitable opportunities 
to acquire other businesses to develop vertical integration and to move into new 
product lines.  The development of the latter had been partly financed by their 
customers.  They had acquired Port Talbot Steelworks on extremely advantageous 
terms and had been subsidised in building Margam Steelworks.  Not only had 
Baldwins become highly profitable but they had challenged not just the established 
regional producers but even producers in other regions.  By British standards their 
plant was both large and modern.  Yet their success hid problems.  Despite the high 
profits in the heavy steel product lines that they had diversified into they also became 
vulnerable to any dramatic downturn in demand for these products.  This would 
occur in the early 1920s just as Margam Steelworks went into production.  There is 
circumstantial evidence that Baldwins realised their vulnerability in the years 
immediately after World War One.  They still owned substantial interests in tinplate 
and, as will be seen, they attempted to develop these further.  At another level 
Baldwins were part of the wider British steel industry‟s structural problem of being 
too small compared to some continental and North American steelmakers to deal 
with the economic difficulties that they faced. 
 
The early post-war years were highly profitable years for Baldwins (see table 4.3). 
This allowed them to continue expanding.  Their most important long-term mistake at 
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this time was their failure to acquire an overseas source of iron ore for Margam.  
Instead they concentrated on securing outlets for their steel.  This was part of a 
wider process in South Wales where steelmakers were acquiring control of rolling 
businesses in the lighter end of steelmaking as outlets for their expanded wartime 
capacity230.  It was an area of production where Baldwins were still able to make a 
profit in the late 1920s.   
 
As part of this process Baldwins acquired the British Mannesmann Tube Company in 
January 1921.  They paid 20 ordinary and 11 cumulative preference shares for every 
40 ordinary shares in the latter company231.  This allowed Baldwins to supply British 
Mannesmann with all their steel needs of about 1,000 tons/week232.  Baldwins also 
acquired the Eagle Tinplate Works in Neath (1921), the Fairwood Tinplate Works in 
Gowerton (1923) and the Wern Tinplate Works in Briton Ferry (1921) gaining 15 
tinplate mills in the process233.  This was part of a wider process of concentration of 
tinplate production around three main South Wales groups.  The other groups were 
Richard Thomas and the Briton Ferry Steel Company.  Some tinplate works that 
were absorbed were obsolete and inefficient.  They were bought partly for their 
goodwill, partly as a basis to claim quotas should they be introduced, and partly as 
an outlet for tinplate bars.  During 1925, in conjunction with the Anglo-Asiatic 
Petroleum Company, Baldwins built a large tinplate works at Swansea adjoining their 
Kings Dock Tinplate Works near Llandarcy Oil Refinery which had opened in 
1922234.  Output from its 16 mills was destined primarily for the expanding oil can 
market.  Initially it was registered as the Glamorgan Tinplate Company but was 
renamed the Elba Tinplate Works235.  It was the last traditional British tinplate works 
to be built236.  
 
During 1920 Baldwins themselves were subject to a takeover bid.  On 17th February 
1920 Baldwins received a letter from Sperling and Co confirming an offer to 
                                                          
230
 Tolliday, p.129. 
231
 Anon. „Baldwins and British Mannesmann Fusion‟. Economist, 21st January 1921, p.150.  
Carr and Taplin, p.383.  Burn, The Economic History of Steelmaking 1867-1939, p.384. 
232
 Anon. „Baldwins AGM‟, Economist, 29th January 1921, p.197. 
233
 Carr and Taplin, pp.383-384.  Tolliday, p.129.  Paul Jenkins, p.46. 
234
 D. Morgan Rees, p.229. 
235
 Carr and Taplin, pp.383-384. 
236
 Paul Jenkins, p.47. 
 79 
purchase all or part of Baldwins‟ ordinary shares for £3 per share subject to 
acceptance of 51% of ordinary shares.  Sperling were purchasing agents for the 
Northumberland Shipbuilding Company.  Baldwins‟ board recommended acceptance 
and 97% of the shareholders accepted it.  After an unexpected increase in Excess 
Profits Duty Tax from 40% to 60% the offer was withdrawn.  As a consequence the 
Northumberland Shipbuilding Company paid compensation of £850,000 to Baldwins 
(or 5/- per share) rather than go ahead with the purchase237.  This proved to be a 
sound decision for the Northumberland Shipbuilding Company.  Sperling offered £3 
per Baldwins share in 1921 but they were only worth 18/- in January 1922 and 5/- in 
May 1928238. 
 
During 1920 rumours circulated that Baldwins would merge with GKN239.  There 
were further rumours in 1923 that this amalgamation was again being considered.  
They were denied at Baldwins‟ 1923 AGM240 and in March 1924 Baldwins‟ directors 
again announced that rumours of a company reconstruction were groundless241.  
Arguably, both Baldwins and GKN were too small to deal with the problems that 
were emerging.  A merger between Baldwins and GKN in the early 1920s would 
have helped the regional steel industry to deal with its problems.  It could have 
allowed production to be concentrated at the more modern and efficient plants such 
as Port Talbot and Margam, allowed better access to raw materials, pooled 
resources and made it easier to raise funds.  A delay of almost a decade before a 
merger of Baldwins and GKN‟s heavy steelmaking interests prevented any serious 
resolution of the issues and seriously weakened Baldwins.    
 
By the end of World War One Port Talbot Steelworks consisted of 11 open-hearth 
furnaces (5x50tons and 6x60tons) with an annual steelmaking capacity of over 
300,000 tons.  Margam Steelworks had started limited steel production in September 
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1918 and by 1922 had 5 open-hearth furnaces (5x60tons).  Due to adverse market 
conditions its blast furnaces (completed by January 1921) were not blown in until 
February 1922 and April 1923.  Both steelworks were intended to work as one unit 
but a complication emerged.  Margam became a steelworks in its own right with 
limited rolling plant rather than focussing simply on iron production.  In a sense it 
emerged as a semi competitor to Port Talbot, particularly as the ownership differed 
slightly.  This might appear to be a legal technicality but as we will see it also 
ensured that complete integration in the wider sense could not be achieved.  It 
created the potential for conflicts of interest and full integration only took place when 
the PTSC was fully absorbed into Baldwins shortly before the merger with GKN in 
1930.       
 
Baldwins‟ financial performance steadily improved from a profit of £108,354 in 1902-
03 to £275,106 in 1912-13 (see Appendix 4).  The period 1917 to 1920 saw a steep 
increase in trading profits which peaked at £683,405 during 1919-20 before 
declining.  Dividends on ordinary shares ceased from 1920-21 although payments on 
preference shares continued until 1924-25.  Although Baldwins made a trading profit 
of £410,758 and a net profit of over £325,000 in 1921 (see Appendix 4 for full details) 
it was a disastrous year for the PTSC.  From 1921 Port Talbot and Margam faced a 
“severe set back in trade242.”  The 1921 coal strike brought Port Talbot and Margam 
to a standstill within days243.  The increasingly adverse trading conditions were 
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Table 4.3: Baldwins and PTSC Financial Results 1918-1929244 
Year Ended Baldwins Trading Profit (£) PTSC Profit/(Loss) (£) 
1918 442,900 211,790 
1919 554,997 187,718 
1920 683,405 177,101 
1921 410,758 (196,378) 
1922 306,132 (157,578) 
1923 484,760 19,063 
1924 493,520 267 
1925 214,078 1,032 
1926 255,837 (53,910) 
1927 120,009 (90,238) 
1928 220,107* (82,355) 
1929 352,042* - 
* recorded as „profit‟ 
 
Baldwins‟ profits came from their tinplate and sheet interests as their heavy steel and 
colliery interests were losing money.  The problem for Baldwins was that the heavy 
products that they had diversified into before the War, which had been highly 
profitable, were now the very products where demand fell most.  It is unclear how 
Baldwins were accounting for the PTSC‟s results in their accounts but from table 4.3 
the PTSC must have had a serious affect on Baldwins‟ financial results.  
 
In the early 1920s Baldwins‟ Chairman, John Roper Wright, attributed the poor 
performance of the PTSC to a number of factors which he felt also affected the wider 
British steel industry including adverse exchange rates which meant that German, 
French and Belgium steelmakers could undercut prices in export markets and even 
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in Britain.  Other factors highlighted as contributory to the PTSC‟s losses were the 
price of coal and high taxation245. 
 
Wright frequently emphasised taxation, transport costs and coal prices, probably in 
an attempt to pressurise the Government and suppliers to reduce costs.  He also 
blamed payments in connection with the housing of workmen, the general lack of 
demand for iron, steel and coal and continuing complaints about high railway and 
dock charges.  He stated that charges on iron ore from ship to works were 130% 
above pre-war rates at Port Talbot and 140% at Swansea.  Railway rates were said 
to have increased by between 70-90% over pre-war levels246.  In 1924 Charles 
Wright stressed the effect of continental competition on the PTSC and in 1925 and 
1926 he emphasised the effect of the high exchange rate on their financial 
performance247.   
 
A further problem for Baldwins and the PTSC is highlighted by Steven Tolliday.  
During the period 1920-1934 new integrated plant needed to operate at more than 
80% of capacity to cover interest and depreciation charges.  To realise the same 
profit existing plant only needed to operate at 40% of capacity248.  Port Talbot was 
not a brand new steelworks but was relatively new with heavy recent investment and 
it operated at considerably less than 80% of capacity.  Margam Steelworks was new 
and its capacity mainly came on stream only when demand for its pig iron and Port 
Talbot‟s heavy products had already peaked.   
 
As production at Margam Melting Shop increased it was decided in 1920 to close the 
older of the two Port Talbot Steelworks‟ Melting Shops.  It was demolished some 
years later.  Margam Melting Shop was probably always intended to be a post-war 
replacement for the smaller of Port Talbot‟s Melting Shops which was closed before 
the end of the post-war boom.  This rationalisation was intended to reduce costs by 
concentrating production on the more modern and efficient plant.  It also brought 
                                                          
245
 John Roper Wright, „Chairman‟s Address to Baldwins AGM‟, I&CTR, 3rd February 
(1922), 186. 
246
 Ibid, „Chairman‟s Address to Baldwins AGM‟, I&CTR, 12th January (1923), 68. 
247
 W. Charles Wright, „Baldwins Limited AGM‟, I&CTR, 26th December (1924), 1061 and 
Economist, 20
th
 December 1924, p.1102.  Ibid, Economist, 27
th
 November 1925, p.930.  Ibid, 
„Baldwins Limited AGM‟, I&CTR, 3rd December (1926), 878.   
248
 Tolliday, p.41. 
 83 
steelmaking capacity more inline with likely post-war demand.  The closure left Port 
Talbot Steelworks with 6 open-hearth furnaces249. 
 
Despite low demand Margam proved itself to be an efficient and productive 
steelworks250.  Although no exact utilisation rate is available, Wright stated that it was 
less than some of their other works which were given as 60%, well below the 80% 
utilisation rate needed to operate profitably.  During the financial years ended 1922 
and 1923 a lack of orders meant that Margam Steelworks only operated 
intermittently and made losses of £100,000 per annum251.  In 1923 an order for 
25,000 tons of rails was placed by the London Midland and Scottish Railway at Port 
Talbot Steelworks.  The latter had been working well below capacity throughout 
much of 1922252.   
 
The extent that production was below capacity can be illustrated by the data on the 
use of Margam‟s blast furnaces (see table 4.4).  From September 1924 to December 
1930 only a maximum of one of the two blast furnaces was in blast.  After the 
General Strike and the ensuing coal strike it was not until early 1927 that iron 
production restarted at Margam253.  Despite the low utilisation rate of Margam‟s blast 
furnaces it was still higher than the overall South Wales rate.  The problem for 
Baldwins was that based upon Tolliday‟s assertion that new plant needed to work at 
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Table 4.4: Blast Furnace Operations September 1922-December 1930254 













 September 1922  Nil 6 33 18% 
31
st
 March 1923 1 n/a n/a - 
30
th
 June 1923 2 11 36 31% 
30
th
 September 1923 2 9 36 25% 
31
st
 March 1924 2 11 36 31% 
30
th
 September 1924 2 7 31 23% 
31
st
 December 1924 Nil 7 31 23% 
31
st
 March 1925 1 8 31 26% 
30
th
 June 1925 1 8 31 26% 
31
st
 December 1926 Nil 1 30 3% 
30
th
 September 1927 1 8 26 31% 
31
st
 December 1927 1 4 24 17% 
31
st
 March 1928 1 7 24 29% 
30
th
 September 1928 1 8 24 33% 
30
th
 June 1929 1 10 22 45% 
31
st
 December 1930 1 2 22 9% 
 
Baldwins trading performance put the company under financial pressure.  Until 1921 
Baldwins had an issued capital of almost £6,000,000 and £500,000 in 4½% first 
mortgage debenture.  During the post war boom they issued a further £2,250,000 of 
7½ % mortgage debenture stock.  They considered raising these already high levels 
of debt to a total of £4,000,000 and issuing further shares, but the onset of the 
downturn meant that, fortunately in retrospect, they did not do this255.  
 
Despite a deteriorating situation Baldwins returned a trading profit throughout the 
1920s never falling below £120,000.  However, this was far below the £683,000 
returned during 1919-20.  In 1924-25 the net profit disappeared and became a net 
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loss of just under £44,000 and by 1926-27 this had increased to a loss of almost 
£130,000 (for full details see Appendix 4).  The main problem area for Baldwins was 
their interests in heavy steel.  Port Talbot barely broke even after 1923 and made 
heavy losses from 1926 (see table 4.3).  By 1926 Baldwins were unable to even pay 
a dividend on their preference shares (see Appendix 4).  With regard to Port Talbot, 
in 1926 Wright stated :- 
 
“…..the Port Talbot Steel Company had been practically at a standstill, with the 
exception of the light plate mill and light bar mill, which had worked intermittently.  
The heavy bar mill and heavy plate mill had been closed down since September of 
last year owing to keen competition in foreign heavy plates and sectional materials, 
and unless some legislation was introduced to counter the dumping of heavy steel 
goods, there seemed small prospects for the future of the heavy steel trade 256.” 
 
During 1926 Baldwins‟ financial position deteriorated to such an extent that they 
approached the Government for financial help.  This was refused on the advice of 
the Governor of the Bank of England, Montagu Norman257.  As a response in June 
1926 the company appointed an Advisory Committee to look at their financial 
structures.  This reported in 1928 that £3,786,431 of capital had been lost and 
should be written off their £6,000,000 share capital258.  The 5% „B‟ preference shares 
were written down by 6/- and the ordinary shares by 16/-259.  A new class of 6% first 
mortgage debentures to the value of £1,000,000 was created to provide badly 
needed capital taking precedence over all other debenture stock.  When this issue 
was made at 96½ in October 1928 it was over subscribed.  By April 1929 it was 
trading at 99½.  When Baldwins emerged from reconstruction their shares only 
represented 36½% of their capital as opposed to 66% before reconstruction.  Share 
capital had fallen from £6 million to £2.25 million while debenture capital had risen 
from £2.75 million to £3.75 million.  Thus the financial structure of the company was 
fundamentally changed from one dominated by shareholders to one dominated by 
debenture holders and debt.  In order to survive Baldwins‟ shareholders lost part 
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ownership of the company in exchange for larger company debt.  This restructuring 
as well as a survival strategy was also a prerequisite to a potential merger with GKN.  
 
In parallel with their financial reconstruction Baldwins sold their Netherton blast 
furnaces and their shares in the Canadian Steel Corporation and closed all collieries 
except for Cribbwr Fawr which supplied Margam with coking coal.  They also 
intended to sell the Briton Ferry Iron Works, the Wern Tinplate Works, the Brymbo 
Steel Company, and interests in Australia and South Africa260.  Brymbo Steelworks 
closed and was sold back to its previous owner, Sir Henry Robertson, for £25,000.  
After the introduction of tariffs it went back into production261.  Their interest in the 
Mannesmann Tube Company was exchanged for shares in the Mannesmannrohen 
Werke of Dusseldorf262.  Thus Baldwins underwent a fundamental reconstruction.  
The company was slimmed down to its core interests in tinplate and heavy steel 
production.  
 
For most of 1927 Port Talbot Steelworks remained virtually idle.  The heavy bar mill 
worked intermittently263.  By 1929 Charles Wright stated that at Port Talbot :-     
 
“With regard to the heavy side of their steel business, the Margam Works and Port 
Talbot were now worked as one unit under one control.  At these works they are 
fairly well off for orders in rails and sections, but with light and heavy plates there 
was a scarcity of orders, and prices in all cases are low.  At these works they are 
making steel for the British Mannesmann Tube Company 264.”  
 
The comment about Margam and Port Talbot working as one unit suggests that they 
had not previously been worked as one unit.  Margam had been built to supply Port 
Talbot with raw materials but Wright suggests that integration and overall control had 
come about slowly.  If this is correct it indicates a lack of managerial control by 
Baldwins.  This tightening of control was a precursor of the forthcoming absorption of 
the PTSC fully into Baldwins.  By 1929 only one of Margam‟s blast furnaces was in 
blast (see table 4.4) and only 2 of its 5 open-hearth furnaces were in production.  
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Unsurprisingly, Margam was losing money although no figure is available265.  From 
the opening of Margam Steelworks until 1932 the maximum combined annual output 
of Port Talbot and Margam was 250,000 ingot tons/annum266 at a time when their 
combined annual steel ingot capacity was about 400,000 ingot tons267.  Hence during 
this period the maximum combined output was 62.5% of capacity which was well 
below the 80% needed to fully cover costs. 
 
Despite the poor trading position modest investment continued to take place.  The 
investment was mainly confined to incremental improvements to the efficiency of the 
existing plant.  In 1927 two transporter unloaders were erected at Margam Wharf, 
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By 1931, after the merger with GKN had given them access to their Spanish ore, 
these unloaders discharged ore from Spain, Sweden, North Africa, and France269 
(see Appendix 5 for iron ore imported through Port Talbot Dock).  The investment in 
the transporters allowed quicker and more efficient discharge of the richer foreign 
ores.  This could suggest that Baldwins had been anticipating the merger with GKN 
and access to their Spanish ore. 
 
By 1927 both of Margam‟s blast furnaces had been relined and their hearth 
diameters increased from 12‟6” to 14‟270.  The result was an increase in furnace 
capacity.  At the time of completion Margam‟s two blast furnaces were capable of 
producing a total of 4,000 tons of basic pig iron/week271.  By 1931 it was claimed that 
each furnace could now produce between 2,500 and 2,800 tons/week of pig iron272.  
At first glance with such a low blast furnace utilisation rate this is an odd investment.  
Yet faced with fluctuations in demand an enlarged blast furnace made it possible to 
supply demand using just one blast furnace rather than two.  During 1931 the single 
operating Margam blast furnace was producing 2,450 tons/week of pig iron273.  Thus 
the blast furnace was operating near to maximum capacity.  With just one blast 
furnace in blast rather than two production costs were reduced in terms of fuel 
consumption and wages.  To maximise profit, or to reduce losses, it was better to 
drive one furnace as hard as possible in order to reduce costs per ton of iron to a 
minimum even if this meant not using the other blast furnace. 
 
During 1928 a new medium plate mill was installed at Port Talbot274.  This mill was 
located alongside the heavy plate mill and was designed to work in conjunction with 
it.  The mill itself was the Lauth type single 3-high stand of rolls which was capable of 
producing plate from ¼” to ¾” and up to 76” wide275.  Again, this seems a surprising 
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investment at a time when demand for plate was so low, but it allowed Port Talbot to 
provide a wider range of plate at a time when pressure was growing on steel firms to 
merge.  The obvious firm for Baldwins to merge with was GKN and the installation of 
this new mill strengthened Baldwins hand prior to a merger.  It created more modern 
plant and a full range of plate production compared to GKN‟s Cardiff plate mill.  It put 
Baldwins in a stronger position in relation to GKN with the inevitable rationalisation.  
If the merger unravelled after GKN closed its Cardiff plate mill, Baldwins would have 
a monopoly of South Wales plate production.   
 
During the 1920s the market for rails and sections stagnated.  As a result the 36” 
reversing rolling mill at Margam became surplus.  It was shipped to a steelworks at 
Port Kembla in Australia during the late 1920s276.  This meant that Margam had no 
rolling mill and now simply produced pig iron or steel ingots, further rationalising its 
relationship with Port Talbot.  
 
Between 1926 and 1928 there were a number of approaches from the City with 
regard to amalgamations within the steel industry.  In 1927 F.A. Szarvasy put 
forward a proposal to form a giant holding company to take in Colvilles, Richard 
Thomas, United Steel, South Durham, Cargo Fleet, Baldwins, Bolckow Vaughan and 
Dorman Long.  The idea was that the holding company could evolve into an 
amalgamation.  Within months the idea had petered out277. 
 
In 1929 with the finances of the steel industry in a precarious state the Bank of 
England‟s Montagu Norman, anxious to avoid a call for the steel industry to be 
nationalised, decided to push for the reorganisation of the industry.  He asked 
Charles Bruce-Gardner to draw up a national plan which developed into the Bruce-
Gardner Plan.  The plan called for a regional rationalisation of production through 
mergers and the setting up of a central organisation to co-ordinate sales. 
 
As already described, Baldwins had already undergone a financial and structural 
reconstruction that put them into a better position to take part in a merger.  The 
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outstanding balance of £180,000 on the PTSC‟s 5% Debenture Stock was paid off 
from the 6% first mortgage debenture of £1,000,000 that Baldwins had taken out as 
part of its financial restructuring278.  The assets of the PTSC were then absorbed into 
Baldwins removing a complication to a potential merger.  The formal winding up of 
the PTSC began in 1928 and was completed by April 1930279. 
 
The obvious regional merger partner for Baldwins was GKN as both companies 
produced heavy steel products.  GKN‟s origins date back to 1759 when an iron 
works was established at Dowlais.  In 1767 John Guest became manager and it was 
he and his family who controlled the Dowlais Iron Company for the next century280.  
In 1865 Dowlais started to make steel but because of locational disadvantages 
began to plan for a steelworks in Cardiff from 1887281 (both works will be discussed 
in the next chapter).  The actual formation of GKN was part of a trend between 1900 
and 1914 for steelmaking companies to merge.  It was part of a process related to 
technical innovations which required large capital investment which was easier for 
bigger companies to raise, and also to deal with foreign competition under free 
trade282.  GKN was formed in 1902 with the merger of the Guest‟s interests at 
Dowlais and Cardiff with two Black Country firms, the Patent Nut and Bolt Company 
and Nettlefolds283.  In 1902 GKN absorbed the interests of Crawshay Brothers at 
Cyfarthfa.  Thus a large part of their business was based in South Wales producing 
plate and rail in competition with the PTSC.  In 1920 GKN absorbed the South Wales 
sheet manufacturer Lysaghts to diversify their product range284.  Between 1918 and 
1930 GKN returned a profit each year which never fell below £417,141 in 1919 and 
peaked at £968,698 in 1930285 a striking contrast to Dowlais and Cardiff which both 
lost money throughout this period :- 
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Table 4.5: Profit (Loss) at Dowlais and Cardiff Steelworks 1924-1929 (£)286 
Year Dowlais Cardiff 
1924 (77,538) (24,807) 
1925 (69,268) (18,737) 
1926 (67,210) (40,748) 
1927 (102,559) (64,788) 
1928 14,383 (17,507) 
1929 (14,399) (27,749) 
Total Loss (316,591) (194,336) 
  
During the equivalent period Baldwins also always returned a trading profit but lower 
than GKN (see table 4.3 and Appendix 4) although the PTSC lost £225,204 between 
1924-1928 (see table 4.3).  However, in comparing Dowlais and Cardiff figures with 
the PTSC figures it needs to be remembered that the PTSC figures relate to the 
entire company and may not be fully comparable.    
 
The resulting merger of the heavy steelmaking interests of Baldwins and GKN was 
followed by the closure of Dowlais Steelworks and the end of plate making at Cardiff 
with production of rails and plate being concentrated at Port Talbot.  In return the 
Bank of England ensured that the merged company got support and access to 
resources through the „Bankers Industrial Development Trust‟ to rebuild Cardiff to 
produce bars, billets and light bars287.          
 
It was Charles Wright who approached GKN‟s John Field Beale on 20th December 
1929 suggesting the merger of the two companies‟ heavy steel interests.  Within 3 
days GKN had provisionally agreed to the scheme and on 2nd January 1930 the GKN 
Board ratified the plan.  In February 1930 it was agreed that the merged company 
would be called „The British (Guest, Keen, Baldwins) Iron and Steel Company Ltd‟ 
(GKB)288.  GKB was fully incorporated on 24th March 1930289.  It comprised GKN‟s 
Dowlais and Cardiff East Moors Steelworks and Baldwins‟ Port Talbot/Margam 
Steelworks and Briton Ferry Iron Works.  Raw material supplies were assured 
through the parent companies i.e. Baldwins‟ colliery, limestone and Oxfordshire 
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phosphoric ore interests and GKN‟s interest in Spanish Orconera hematite iron ore 
mines290.   
 
The actual issued capital of GKB was £4,849,166 divided into 1,174,166, 5% 
redeemable cumulative preference shares and 3,675,000 ordinary shares.  
Additionally there was £500,000 of 5% income notes291.  The shares were divided as 
shown :- 
 
Table 4.6: GKB Capital Structure292  
 Baldwins GKN 
5% Income Notes 180,000 320,000 
5% Preference Shares 502,403 671,763 
Ordinary Shares 1,575,000 2,100,000 
 
All other activities of both companies, namely light sheet, sheet and tinplate 
remained in the hands of Baldwins and GKN who continued as independent 
companies293.  Baldwins viewed the merger as an opportunity to reduce capacity by 
closing the less economic steelworks and loading up and modernising the remaining 
steelworks294.  This would ensure a return to profitability.  The merger was a lost 
opportunity as it was not a full merger.  Essentially Baldwins and GKN retained 
ownership of what they considered to be the profitable parts of their companies and 
disposed of their loss making heavy steel interests aided by funding from the Bank of 
England.  In the following decade through rationalisation, reduced foreign 
competition and increased demand these heavy steelmaking interests returned to 
high profitability.  In contrast Baldwins‟ tinplate and sheet interests which had been 
profitable in the 1920s experienced difficulties in the late 1930s when the heavy 
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sector was highly profitable.  A merger of the whole of Baldwins and GKN in 1930 
would have offered greater opportunities for rationalisation and investment.   
 
In summary the 1920s were a very difficult period for the British steel industry.  The 
sector that suffered most was heavy steel following overexpansion during World War 
One, an overvalued pound, a decline in the steel consuming industries and loss of 
export markets.  Despite its modern plant production in the Port Talbot area was 
affected as much as any other region.  Because of the depressed trading conditions 
and failings in managerial control, Baldwins were not in a position to fully exploit the 
integration brought about by the building of Margam Steelworks and its blast 
furnaces.  Nevertheless there was a surprising amount of local investment by 
Baldwins during the 1920s which improved efficiency and put Baldwins in a better 
position for a potential merger.      
 
As the 1920s progressed the problems with their heavy steelmaking interests 
brought Baldwins to the point of company failure.  Their reconstruction involved 
disposing of non core activities, amalgamating subsidiaries into Baldwins, and a 
reduction of shareholders‟ ownership and its replacement with long-term debt.  Once 
restructuring was complete a merger of their heavy steelmaking interests with those 
of GKN was possible.  The fact that it was only a partial merger shows that both 
companies wanted to retain full control of their more profitable interests.  This was 
probably a short-term view.  A full merger would have allowed a modernisation of 
Baldwins‟ tinplate interests and more balanced development of light and heavy steel 
interests.  As will be seen, the restructuring of the companies in 1930 left a legacy of 
problems in the years that followed. 
 
 94 
Chapter 5: The 1930s and World War Two: From Depression 
To Full Capacity 
 
The 1930s were a period of revival in the Port Talbot steel industry‟s fortunes.  Yet 
there was a price to pay for that.  After the formation of GKB in 1930 all the 
company‟s heavy steelmaking was concentrated at Port Talbot.  The result was the 
end of iron and steelmaking at Dowlais and the closure of the plate mill at Cardiff 
East Moors.  Port Talbot became the sole South Wales plate and rail producer.  This 
rationalisation allied to an import tariff, a general economic revival, the joining of the 
European steel cartel and rearmament led to much higher demand from 1933.  From 
the mid 1930s Port Talbot/Margam operated at or near full capacity which was 
reflected in GKB‟s growing profits and a major contribution to Britain‟s war effort 
during World War Two.  Yet problems and tensions were to emerge within GKB.  
The building of tinplate manufacturer Richard Thomas‟ hot strip mill at Ebbw Vale 
exposed Baldwins‟ extensive tinplate interests on both cost and quality grounds.  
Baldwins needed access to their own mill which needed to be attached to iron and 
steelmaking plant.  The problem was that Baldwins had lost control of their own 
steelmaking plant with the formation of GKB and their partners GKN were less keen 
on building a hot strip mill.            
 
Despite a modest increase in trade by the end of the 1920s the British steel industry 
was in a serious financial situation.  Only between one to two million pounds (1-2% 
of the valuation of steel industry capital) was being invested annually in capital 
expenditure.  It was estimated that capital investment of £15 million a year was 
needed to restore full technical efficiency to the industry295.  Yet this was beyond the 
resources of the industry.  One possible method of increasing investment was the 
introduction of a tariff on steel imports.  This would have allowed the steel companies 
to increase production and to generate sufficient funds for the necessary investment.  
The investment would have reduced steelmaking costs, allowing them to compete 
with the continental producers.  The Bank of England‟s fear was that such a policy 
would allow the less efficient firms to continue in production.  As already seen their 
response to the steel industry‟s problems was to promote regional mergers which 
through rationalisation would concentrate production at the more modern and 
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efficient plants.  The Bank of England would then assist the merged companies to 
obtain funds for further investment296.  It feared that the Government would step in to 
prevent bankrupt companies from closing works on employment grounds. 
 
In parallel with the Bank of England the Labour Government set up the Iron and 
Steel Committee of the Economic Advisory Council chaired by Lord Sankey.  It 
reported in May 1930.  Its recommendations were similar to those of the Bank of 
England recommending regional amalgamations and rationalisation of uneconomic 
units.  It recommended rationalisation before a tariff was introduced.  However, after 
the 1931 general election the pound was devalued and tariffs were introduced in 
June 1932.  A general duty of 10% was applied to most goods but for most steel 
products a tariff of 33⅓% was applied and 20% on the rest297.  The aim was to 
produce a more stable environment and to allow the steel industry to reorganise 
itself.  A committee of civil servants, the Import Duties Advisory Committee (IDAC), 
was set up in March 1932 to supervise the steel and other industries to ensure that 
rationalisation took place.  The steel companies estimated that the tariff would allow 
an extra 2 million tons of steel to be produced in Britain.  This would allow a 10 
shillings/ton or approximately a 10% cost reduction298.  The effects of the tariff are 
shown below :- 









Imports as % of 
Consumption 
1929 9,636.2 2,669.3 3,834.4 8,471.1 31.5% 
1930 7,325.7 2,600.0 2843.0 7,082.7 36.7% 
1931 5,202.6 2,538.0 1,777.0 5,963.6 42.6% 
1932 5,261.4 1,441.0 1,759.0 4,943.4 29.1% 
1933 7,024.0 850.0 1,810.0 6,064.0 14.0% 
1934 8,849.7 1,203.0 2,117.0 7,935.7 15.2% 
1935 9,858.7 1,024.0 2,212.0 8,670.7 11.8% 
1936 11,784.6 1,172.4 2,122.8 10,834.2 10.8% 
1937 12,984.0 1,317.4 2,440.1 11,861.3 11.1% 
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As table 5.1 shows production increased from a low of 5.2 million tons in 1931 and 
1932 to almost 13 million tons in 1937.  Not only did imports fall in absolute terms but 
also as a proportion of consumption.  The steel industry‟s recovery was driven by 
domestic consumption not exports300.  Despite a rise in British steel prices they were 
now lower than all the main steel producing countries with the exception of Germany 
where prices were artificially held down.  As a consequence in March 1937 the 
import duty on pig iron was removed.  It was reduced on steel imports from cartel 
countries in July 1937 to 2½% and on others to 12½% to meet the developing steel 
shortage301.  The recovery in the steel consuming industries was uneven.  Output of 
cars rose from 1932, merchant shipbuilding revived in 1933-34 and factory building 
from 1934.  Other uses for steel, such as for furniture, office equipment, domestic pit 
props and colliery arches recovered by 1934302.  
 









Imports as % of 
Consumption 
1929 7,589.3 153 545 7,197.3 2.1% 
1930 6,192.4 312 317 6,187.4 5.0% 
1931 3,772.6 307 202 3,877.6 7.9% 
1932 3,574.0 153 128 3,599.0 4.3% 
1933 4,136.0 121 112 4,145.0 2.9% 
1934 5,969.1 163 133 5,999.1 2.7% 
1935 6,424.1 128 157 6,395.1 2.0% 
1936 7,721.4 311 112 7,920.4 4.0% 
1937 8,493.1 716 167 9,042.1 7.9% 
 
As seen in table 5.2 iron production unsurprisingly fell in the early 1930s but by 1936 
had surpassed 1929‟s output (also see Appendix 7).  Unlike steel, as a proportion of 
consumption, imports returned to their pre-tariff levels.  This reflects inadequate 
production facilities following rationalisation.  Average British blast furnace output 
increased from 48,000 tons/annum in 1929 to 67,000 tons/annum in 1937 (the 
equivalent South Wales figures were 101,100 and 137,400 tons/annum)304.  The 
rationalisation process had reduced the number of British blast furnaces from 394 in 
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1929 to 204 in 1937.  High demand improved efficiency in the production process as 
plant was being operated more consistently and harder.  Other factors included 
closer attention to the preparation of the burden (particularly iron ore), improvements 
in coke use and in charging.  The result was a reduction in coke consumption from 
23.74 cwt/ton of pig iron in 1929 to 22.23 cwt in 1936305.        
 
The outcome of increased steel production during 1936 and 1937 was an increase in 
pig iron imports to make up for the deficiency in British production.  Although the 
rationalisation process undertaken during the interwar period may be classed as a 
financial success for the steel companies it left British iron making unable to supply 
sufficient raw material at a time of high demand.  It will be argued later that some of 
the iron works that were closed during rationalisation in the 1920s/1930s might have 
been profitable at this time.   
 
The introduction of the tariff in 1932, a depreciation of the pound, and a recovery in 
the steel consuming industries gave the necessary boost to British steelmakers.  The 
recovery came against a backdrop of a fall in global demand with world steel ingot 
output down from 68 million tons in 1931 to 49 million tons in 1932306 while British 
steel output even marginally increased in 1932 (see table 5.1).   
 
During 1934 the British Iron and Steel Federation (BISF) was established to 
represent the views of the steel firms and to provide a greater measure of co-
operation between them to the benefit of the whole industry307.  In 1935 the 
Government encouraged the BISF to join the International Steel Cartel which had 
been formed during February 1933 by the leading steelmakers in Germany, Belgium, 
France and Luxemburg.  The cartel‟s function was to regulate export markets by 
apportioning tonnages.  After Britain had joined the cartel British firms were able to 
raise their domestic prices to the German and French levels.  The cartel‟s pricing 
policy was designed to prevent further expansion of national steel industries outside 
their own domestic markets by dual pricing systems and „penetration agreements‟308.   
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As shown previously GKB was formed in 1930 with the merger of Baldwins‟ and 
GKN‟s heavy steelmaking interests in South Wales.  Crucially both companies kept 
their light steel interests separate, including tinplate and sheet production.  The 
merger occurred at a time when British shipbuilding had almost ceased, the railways 
had little money to spend, and there was little chance of export markets for steel 
products309.  It was a merger to consolidate business interests, ensure better access 
to financial resources and to undertake rationalisation310.  By removing regional 
competition it provided an opportunity to rationalise and modernise through 
investment organised by the Bank of England.  The consequences would be the 
closure of at least one steelworks311.  These implications were noted at the time by 
the local press :-   
 
“The main object of the scheme writes our Industrial Correspondent is to put the 
industry on a more economic basis.  Underlying the scheme is the idea of 
concentrating the present work of the two companies in one place.  It is understood 
that this will necessarily entail the closing down of certain sections of the present 
works 312.”  
 
The formation of GKB brought together within the same firm Port Talbot/Margam, 
Dowlais and Cardiff East Moors Steelworks.  As demand was so low only the most 
efficient could survive313.  Of the three steelworks Dowlais was the oldest.  Its origins 
go back to 1759 when an ironworks was established, and the first steel was made 
there in 1865314.  By 1919 Dowlais concentrated on rail and associated production315.  
The downturn in demand during the 1920s exposed its weaknesses.  Over such a 
long period of operation developments had been piecemeal.  That, and the age of 
some of the plant, ensured that production costs were high.  That is not to say that 
there had not been investment at Dowlais.  In 1923 a new railway sleeper plant had 
been installed316.  Rail production was hampered by its inability to store the longer 
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rails now demanded by customers.  Plans to extend its rail bank were abandoned in 
1925317.  By July 1928, for the first time in 50 years, Dowlais failed to secure any 
orders from any British railway company.  Problems increased when a batch of rails 
for the Egyptian Government was of such poor quality that they had to be 
replaced318.   By the late 1920s Dowlais was unable to compete on quality grounds.  
Its other problem was its location.  Once the local economic ore was exhausted 
Dowlais had to absorb the additional costs of transporting ore from Cardiff Docks.  
This put steelmaking at Dowlais at a severe economic disadvantage to the extent 
that between 1924-1928 it lost in total £316,591319.   
 
In early 1930, shortly after the formation of GKB, it was announced that once current 
orders were completed Dowlais would close permanently.  On 4th October 1930 
Dowlais closed.  Any plant and machinery of value was taken to Cardiff or Port 
Talbot320.  The four blast furnaces were demolished in 1937321.  Ironically this was 
the time when Britain was importing large amounts of pig iron to maintain 
steelmaking.  Under these conditions it is possible that Dowlais could have traded 
profitably as an iron works supplying the British steel industry with pig iron as 
between 1931 and 1937 the price of scrap in South Wales had increased by over 
50%322.  During World War Two there would have been a ready market for both 
Dowlais‟ iron and steel.  The Bank of England‟s rationalisation policy made financial 
sense for the companies in 1930 but it missed opportunities in the late 1930s and 
during World War Two and the social costs of the closure of Dowlais had to be borne 
by the Government.  An example of the possibilities for Dowlais was the case of the 
Briton Ferry Ironworks which was owned by Baldwins.  During the late 1920s it made 
a small profit of about 6p per ton of pig iron yet by May 1930 it was making 26p per 
ton.  Despite this Briton Ferry Ironworks closed during the summer of 1930 but 
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reopened in 1932 and operated continuously until 1941 when, because of difficulties 
in obtaining Spanish ore, it closed.  It restarted again in 1947 and closed 
permanently in 1958323. 
 
GKN‟s other main steelworks was Cardiff East Moors built to offset the locational 
disadvantages of Dowlais.  The first of its four blast furnaces was blown in 1891 and 
the first steel was made there in 1895.  It also possessed a 36” slabbing mill and a 
32” plate mill324.  Before World War One its main product was plate for boilers and 
shipbuilding, the very products most affected by the downturn in trade during the 
1920s.  By August 1928 only one blast furnace was in blast and the steel plant was 
operating at about 50% of capacity325.  During the period 1924-1928 Cardiff lost in 
total £194,336 with losses incurred every year326.   After the formation of GKB in 
1930 the melting shop and rolling mill closed.  All plate orders were transferred to 
Port Talbot327.  Yet GKN did not give up on the idea of continuing plate production in 
Cardiff.  They came up with proposals to rebuild Cardiff to produce plate, sections 
and rails, closing Port Talbot instead328.  The Bankers Industrial Development 
Company wanted GKN and Baldwins to provide guarantees for the required capital. 
As the formation of GKB was partly to divorce GKN and Baldwins from direct 
responsibility for their steelworks the scheme was dropped329.  This highlights a 
fundamental problem with the formation of GKB.  GKN were pursuing their own 
interests and trying to avoid the concentration of all plate production at Baldwins‟ 
former Port Talbot site.  They were aware that this would place Baldwins in an 
advantageous position if GKB unravelled back into its component companies as 
Baldwins would have a monopoly on South Wales plate production.  Hence they 
pushed for investment to be focused on their Cardiff Steelworks despite its 
inadequacies. 
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GKB kept one Cardiff blast furnace in operation but eventually rebuilt the steelworks 
to include two other rebuilt blast furnaces, new coke ovens, a new melting shop with 
two open-hearth furnaces and two 250 ton tilting furnaces, a cogging mill, a 
continuous sheet bar and billet mill and a Lamberton 21” light bar mill. Production 
started in January 1936 at a cost of £3,000,000330.  Two of its blast furnaces supplied 
molten iron to the melting shop and a third sold pig iron to other steelworks.  The 
Lamberton mill produced colliery arches, pit props and light sections.  Port Talbot 
was left as the sole producer of plate and heavy rails in South Wales.  GKN‟s 
proposal to rebuild Cardiff to produce plate and heavy rails to replace modern plant 
at Port Talbot/Margam under the early 1930s trading conditions was never realistic.  
It also emphasises the benefit to Port Talbot of Baldwins‟ investment in the late 
1920s to broaden the range of plate production.  However, a new Cardiff plate mill, 
or indeed the old unmodernised plate mill, could still have found a ready market for 
its products in the late 1930s when Britain rearmed and during World War Two.  
During 1938 a fourth blast furnace and two more 250 ton tilting furnaces were added 
to Cardiff‟s melting shop331.  
 
Port Talbot/Margam was the obvious site to concentrate GKB‟s steelmaking.  It was 
more modern than either Dowlais or Cardiff, could produce a wider range of products 
and produce higher quality products.  In addition all products could be produced at 
one site rather than two thereby achieving economies of scale.  The dockside 
location of Port Talbot, and particularly Margam‟s blast furnaces, meant that 
imported ore did not need further rail transport thus reducing operating costs.  With 
production concentrated at just one works capacity utilisation would rise to a level to 
cover both operational and investment costs.  Only at Port Talbot/Margam could this 
be attained.  However, within five years demand had recovered for at least some 
products that Dowlais and Cardiff had produced.  They may well have been able to 
operate profitably in the late 1930s and during World War Two.      
 
For most of the 1930s local production at Port Talbot/Margam mirrored national 
trends.  At the time of GKB‟s formation in 1930 Port Talbot/Margam was working well 
below capacity (approximately 4,000 tons/week at Port Talbot and 5,000 tons/week 
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at Margam332).  The mill most affected by lack of demand was the heavy plate mill.  
Both the light plate mill and the bar mill were working to a higher capacity but still 
working below full capacity.  Steelmaking was restricted to about 4,650 tons/week 
whereas by 1937 it was running at 8,500 tons/week333.  Actual production costs in 
1931 were :- 
 
Table 5.3: Pig Iron Production Costs/Ton 1931334 
 Margam Cardiff 
Burden 62s 3d 54s 2d 
Conversion 18s 5d 15s 3d 
Credits 9s 5d 3s 10d 
Total Net Costs 71s 3d 65s 8d 
 
Table 5.4: Melting Shop Costs/Ton 1931335 
 Margam Port Talbot 
Charge 65s 4d 66s 1d 
Conversion 23s 7d 26s 5d 
Total Net Costs 89s 0d 92s 3d 
 
Table 5.5: Port Talbot Heavy Bar Mill Cost/Ton 1931336 
 Cost 
Charge 93s 6d 
Conversion 32s 3d 
Total Net Costs 125s 9d 
 
Interestingly the cost of pig iron production at Cardiff was less than Margam.  During 
1931 both Margam and Cardiff only operated one blast furnace.  It is unclear if the 
cost differential relates to the cost of ore from different sources.  Certainly GKN used 
Spanish ore from the Orconera Company which by 1933 was 2/- a ton cheaper than 
some other sources337.  Yet by 1931 Margam should have had access to this source.  
It is also unclear whether these figures include interest payments or depreciation.  
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With Margam‟s newer furnaces it is likely that both would be higher.  The cost per 
ton will also depend upon how much iron is produced.  No definitive figures are 
available on this.  The „credits‟ relate to energy savings in the steelmaking process.  
The comparison between the Margam and Port Talbot Melting Shops is also 
interesting.  Costs are very similar but Port Talbot would have had to incur extra 
costs in transporting iron from Margam‟s blast furnaces.  However, extra costs would 
be incurred transporting steel ingots from Margam to Port Talbot‟s rolling mills. 
 
During 1929 both Baldwins and GKN lost money on their heavy steelmaking.  By 
1931 GKB through rationalisation and concentrating production at Port 
Talbot/Margam with its more modern and efficient plant returned a profit of £9,891 
(see table 5.6)338.  The process of concentrating production at Port Talbot/Margam 
was completed in 1932339.  As demand revived during 1933 Port Talbot/Margam‟s 
production increased by over 50% resulting in most departments working full time340.  
From 1933 onwards Port Talbot/Margam operated at or near full capacity341.  GKB‟s 
rationalisation and concentration of production at Port Talbot/Margam allied with a 
revival in demand allowed a utilisation rate sufficient to return a profit which by 1933 
was over £222,000.  In the following years substantial profits were recorded :- 
Table 5.6: GKB’s Financial Results 1931-1937342 
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By 1937 the demand for Port Talbot‟s heavy steel products was such that it 
outstripped supply.  This continued throughout 1938343.  Port Talbot/Margam‟s 
annual steel ingot output was in excess of 400,000 tons.  The general revival in 
steelmaking between 1931 and 1937 pushed up the price of heavy scrap by over 
50%344.  This stimulated demand for pig iron and forced prices up.  It was at this time 
of high demand that Dowlais‟ blast furnaces might have been able to operate 
profitably.  
 
Although Port Talbot/Margam‟s revival was largely due to GKB‟s rationalisation and 
a general increase in demand other factors were at work.  Tariffs, a devalued pound, 
a general economic recovery and rearmament all stimulated demand.  During the 
1930s both the railway construction and shipbuilding industries recovered which 
stimulated demand for plate.  The recovery in merchant shipbuilding from 1935 was 
partly due to the introduction of a „scrap and build‟ scheme.  By the end of 1936, 60 
orders approaching 200,000 gross tons had been secured via the scheme345.  As for 
naval construction between 1930 and 1935 the only major warships ordered were 3 
cruisers each year (during 1934 an aircraft carrier was also ordered).  As 
rearmament began from 1936 to 1939 inclusive, either 2 or 3 battleships were 
ordered each year along with at least one aircraft carrier (in 1939 it was 6) and at 
least 7 cruisers346.  A further stimulus to demand was agreement with the European 
cartel on prices and marketing of heavy plate for shipbuilding and sections.  It was 
agreed that for the first 6 months of 1934, 25% of international trade was allocated to 
British steelmakers347. 
 
By 1937-38 the rationalised steel industry lacked the capacity to fully meet heavy 
steel product demand.  Despite increases in furnace capacities (see later) this was 
insufficient to meet demand.  The flexibilities of the system had been removed and 
                                                          
343
 Anon, „District Iron and Steel Trade Reports–South Wales‟, I&CTR, 12th March (1937), 
505.  Ibid, 19
th
 March (1937), 549; 12
th
 November (1937), 819; 7
th
 January (1938), 21. 
344
 Ibid, „A Comparison of Cast Iron Scrap Prices–Average Monthly Prices of Cast Iron Scrap 
in the Principle Districts in the Years 1931-38‟, 105. 
345
 William Gray, „The Shipbuilding Industry in 1936‟, I&CTR, 15th January (1937), 125-126 
(p.125). 
346
 Lenton, H.T. and J.J. College, Warships of World War 2-Part 1–Capital Ships (London: 
Ian Allan Limited, 1962), p.6. 
347Anon. „Ship Steel Agreement‟, Economist, 13th January 1934, p.63. 
 105 
large upsurges in demand could not be met.  By 1937-38 the rationale for ending 
steelmaking at Dowlais and closing the Cardiff plate mill was no longer so clear. 
 
An aim of the Bank of England‟s merger strategy was to allow greater investment 
either through pooled resources or by making it easier to raise capital.  Through this 
investment the more efficient British firms and steelworks were expected to compete 
with the continental steelmakers.  GKB‟s first major investment at Port 
Talbot/Margam was to reduce fuel costs.  They installed waste heat boilers in both 
melting shops.  During 1933-34 a Klonne waterless gasholder was built at Port 
Talbot to store and use blast furnace and coke oven gas at a cost of £90,000348.  The 




The gas was used as a fuel source at the ingot preheating furnace at the heavy bar 
mill, at the normalising furnace for plates, steam raising and for miscellaneous 
purposes.  Although no figures are available on cost savings, a gasholder of similar 
capacity was built at Normanby Park Steelworks in Scunthorpe349.   Based upon an 
output of 250,000 tons per annum an estimated 10% of extra product could be rolled 
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for the same energy costs.  Similar savings were likely to have been made at Port 
Talbot.    
 
During 1934 the Wellman mixer for molten pig iron at Margam Melting Shop was 
converted into a 140 ton tilting steel furnace using coke oven gas as a fuel350.  A 
tilting furnace works on the principle of a continuous charging and tapping 
process351.  The result of this low cost adaptation was that Margam Melting Shop‟s 
furnaces increased to six.  Until the end of 1934 modernisation focused on reducing 
fuel costs and achieving low cost capacity increases in response to rising demand352.  
Despite the short-term benefits in converting the mixer into a tilting furnace at relative 
low cost it introduced a non standard furnace into Margam Melting Shop which may 
have resulted in slightly higher operating costs.  Yet at a time of rising demand this 




During 1935 the English Steel Corporation (ESC) acquired a 5% shareholding in 
GKB353.  The ESC was formed in January 1929 from the steelmaking interests of the 
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armament firms of Vickers, Vickers-Armstrong and Cammell Laird354.  This merger 
was similar to the formation of GKB in that only parts of the parent companies were 
merged and rationalised355.  The split in the shareholding of GKB became GKN 
54.1%, Baldwins 40.5% and the English Steel Corporation 5.4%.  The aim of the 
ESC‟s parent companies was to guarantee a source of steel for their operations.  
The deal made funding available to GKB for new investment.  Once more the 
customer was funding modernisation.  During 1936 the name of the company was 
formally changed to Guest Keen Baldwins Iron and Steel Company Ltd356.  
 
In the late 1930s, with Port Talbot/Margam working at full capacity, investment 
continued with the emphasis moving from cost reduction to capacity expansion.  In 
1938 plans were drawn up for the building of a third blast furnace.  The foundations 
for a third blast furnace had been laid down when the other blast furnaces were 
built357.  Even so, Number 3 blast furnace was only completed in 1941 with a hearth 
diameter of 16‟ along with a rebuilding of the heating stoves358.  Plans were also 
made to rebuild Numbers 1 and 2 blast furnaces to increase iron making capacity.  
Number 2 was the first to be rebuilt, and was completed in 1943 to the same 
diameter as Number 3359.  In addition the ore bunkers were enlarged by about 30% 
to a 140,000 ton capacity and additional blowers were installed.  At the same time 
new gas cleaning and water pumping systems were installed.  This left Number 1 
unrebuilt.  In 1944 it was decided to rebuild Number 1 blast furnace to a hearth 
diameter of 21‟6” from the previous 14‟.  The new blast furnace was blown in on 8th 
August 1946.  This blast furnace was designed to produce 5,000 tons/week of pig 
iron.  In August 1948 it produced a British record of 5,410 tons/week of pig iron360. 
 
Other than the tilting furnace no additional steelmaking furnaces were added during 
the 1930s but there were gradual improvements and enlargements to the existing 
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furnaces361.  By 1938 these improvements had resulted in 6x75 ton gas fired open-
hearth furnaces at Port Talbot, 5x75 ton mixed gas fired open-hearth furnaces at 
Margam and 1x150 ton coke oven gas fired tilting furnace at Margam362.  During the 
late 1930s a new rail and section mill was built at Port Talbot.  It was a fully 
mechanised continental type unique to Great Britain including a machine for 
straightening rails followed by a machine to cut the rail to the required length.  
Simultaneously it drilled the holes for the fish plates363. 
 
Investment during the second half of the 1930s and during World War Two was 
fundamentally different from that of the early 1930s.  The investment in the early 
1930s was limited to improving the efficiency of the existing plant and mainly 
directed towards fuel economy.  The later investment was to increase capacity and 
modernise the plant.  The stimulus was the high demand for Port Talbot‟s existing 
products and the growing possibility of building a hot strip mill. 
 
The prospect of a hot strip mill came out of fundamental changes in the American 
steel markets during the 1920s.  Similarly, in the UK during the 1920s there was 
growing demand for thin strip steel for the motor industry and for household 
appliances364.  Yet by as late as 1937 this accounted for only 7% of total UK steel 
demand365.  The only method of producing this type of steel was by hand rolling 
which produced sheet of indifferent and variable quality.  In the United States during 
the 1920s the American Rolling Mill Company at Ashland in Kentucky and the 
Columbia Steel Company at Butler in Pennsylvania developed the first hot strip mill 
to produce wide strip steel on the continuous rolling principle.  This allowed the 
production of long lengths of wide strip steel both to higher quality standards and at 
lower cost than hand mills.  By 1938 there were 27 continuous wide strip mills in the 
United States366.  The new mills rendered the hand rolling techniques obsolete and it 
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was clear that the new technology would eventually need to be introduced into 
Britain.  As early as 1930 GKB, when exploring the possibilities of rebuilding Cardiff, 
considered the possibility of building a strip mill at Margam367.  Nothing came of this. 
 
Internal discussions about the feasibility of a strip mill continued at Baldwins under 
Charles Wright.  In 1935 Wright considered the idea of a wide strip mill which would 
link up with Lysaghts‟ cold reduction mill at their Orb Works in Newport.  However, 
the combined Baldwins and GKN requirements for strip steel, even including some 
light plate production, was not reckoned to be sufficient to support a strip mill.  
Contemporary estimates were that between half a million and one million tons were 
the minimum requirements for a modern plant.  Between them Baldwins and GKN 
required c250,000 tons of strip per annum and 125,000 tons of light plate in the late 
1930s.  It was clear that some form of amalgamation was required to achieve 
adequate scale to support a new strip mill.  These issues were set aside by the 
building of the Ebbw Vale strip mill368. 
 
It was Richard Thomas who built Britain‟s first strip mill.  Initially, in 1935, they 
considered locating it at Redbourn in Lincolnshire.  This was close to both cheap ore 
and the motor industry that the mill was intended to serve369.  Due to political 
pressure the mill was built on the site of the old steelworks at Ebbw Vale largely to 
relieve local unemployment.  It had an initial capacity of 300,000 tons, a maximum 
width of 54” and was built between 1935 and 1938.  Production started in September 
1938370.  It was clear that for long-term operating efficiency Ebbw Vale was the 
wrong location as its iron ore had to be hauled up from Newport Dock.  In effect it 
suffered from the same locational disadvantages as Dowlais.  At the time of the 
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building it caused concern in South West Wales in regard to its effect on employment 
in the tinplate industry371.  
 
Richard Thomas, as major tinplate producers, introduced the technology into Britain 
rather than Baldwins for a number of reasons.  William Firth, Richard Thomas‟ 
Chairman, even tried, and failed, to secure co-operation from other tinplate 
producers including Baldwins372.  The problem was that Baldwins, through GKB, 
were fully committed to rebuilding Cardiff East Moors and modernising Port Talbot 
which prevented participation.    
 
With Ebbw Vale‟s hot strip mill starting production and a second strip mill being built 
at John Summers‟ Shotton Steelworks373 Baldwins‟ large tinplate interests were at a 
severe commercial disadvantage on quality and cost grounds.  During 1937 Charles 
Wright claimed that GKB needed a strip mill to supply the coil to Baldwins, GKN and 
their subsidiaries.  Their Cardiff site lacked sufficient space to accommodate a strip 
mill.  Attention then fell onto Port Talbot.  By early 1938 GKB had produced tentative 
plans for a new mill at Port Talbot374.  The problem for Baldwins was that by setting 
up GKB they had lost direct control over their steelmaking plant and needed 
approval from GKN.  As will be seen the latter were less enthusiastic about a strip 
mill.  This was a factor in the merger of Baldwins tinplate interests with Richard 
Thomas in the 1940s.  Certainly by 1938 a strip mill at Port Talbot was a possibility. 
 
From 1938 Port Talbot/Margam rode the tide of the emergency war economy.  
During 1938 the South Wales tinplate industry and supporting steelmaking was badly 
hit by a downturn in trade but Port Talbot/Margam was almost untouched by the 
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downturn375.  Overall utilisation of steelmaking capacity in South Wales fell from 
61.4% in January 1938 to just 41% in May but by October it had risen to 65%376.  Full 
production was maintained at Port Talbot/Margam with both blast furnaces being 
kept in blast during the first half of 1938377.  By 1938 demand from rearmament was 
so high that Port Talbot/Margam had become largely immune to other market 
changes.   
The increase in overall South Wales capacity utilisation rates from mid 1938 
continued into 1939 due to demand stimulated by the approaching war.  By May 
1939, 94% of South Wales steelmaking capacity was being used378.  By July it was 
97% by which time most steelmakers were inundated with so many orders that they 
were unable to cope379.  
 
At the start of World War Two in 1939 the steel industry had an annual capacity of 
about 14.5 million ingot tons380.  Throughout the 6 years of World War Two Britain 
produced approximately 76 million tons of steel381.  Only in two years during World 
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Table 5.7: Iron & Steel Production in Britain & South Wales 1939-1945 (tons)382 
Year British Pig Iron and 
Ferro Alloys 
Production 
South Wales Pig 






1939 7,979,800 1,100,700 13,221,300 2,887,200 
1940 8,204,600 962,200 12,975,300 2,816,400 
1941 7,392,500 805,300 12,312,200 2,564,500 
1942 7,725,600 828,900 12,941,700 2,625,800 
1943 7,186,900 804,300 13,031,200 2,609,500 
1944 6,736,500 777,600 12,142,200 2,417,900 
1945 7,107,400 864,000 11,824,400 2,380,000 
 
Production on this scale was a major achievement as the industry was cut off from 
about 80% of its overseas iron ore sources.  This necessitated the greater use of low 
quality home produced ores and developing new overseas sources383.  As can be 
seen from Appendix 5 imports of ore into Port Talbot were particularly low during 
1941 to 1944.  To maintain high levels of production Margam relied on low quality 
British ore.  This reversed the economic logic of locating steelworks on the coast.  
However, it was production levels rather than economic logic that drove the industry.  
Even a sub-optimal plant like Dowlais could have made a valuable contribution to the 
war effort if it had been retained.  The wider steel industry encountered problems 
with the needs of the blackout, coal shortages and the loss of its younger more 
productive workers to the armed services384.   
 
The Government took control of the steel industry from 1st September 1939.  The 
initial Iron and Steel Order was issued by the Ministry of Supply.  Even before this 
the British Iron and Steel Corporation had been established as a centralised buying 
and selling organisation of the BISF.  The result was that every aspect of the steel 
industry was controlled to such an extent that by 1942 only 7% of British steel 
production was going to civilian use385.     
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Both Port Talbot and Cardiff made notable contributions to the war effort through 
maximising production386.  In 1938 GKB built 102 shelters into the foundations of 
buildings, in tunnels and in open spaces using the colliery arch-cum corrugated 
sheet form of construction that they manufactured.  Each shelter had a capacity of 
about 40.  At both sites a total of 6,000 could be accommodated although only 4,000 
were expected to be on site at the same time.  Other precautions included training 
84 men specifically to fight fires and establishing 10 ambulance stations of which 7 
were underground387.  Although there was no specific air raid on Port Talbot a 
number of isolated bombs fell in the vicinity of Port Talbot/Margam Steelworks during 
the summer of 1940388.  One bomb hit Margam‟s fitting shop but failed to explode.  
More serious was a stick of 9 bombs that fell outside Port Talbot‟s General Offices 
on 29th June 1940 which smashed windows, dislodged slates and damaged some 
rails.  The objective was probably Port Talbot‟s gasholder which GKB had emptied 
earlier in the war389.  No information is available on the effects on production 
although it would appear to be minimal.  On 30th March 1944 King George VI, Queen 
Elizabeth and Princess Elizabeth visited Port Talbot and were escorted in their tour 
by Charles Wright390. 
 
Modernisation and expansion continued during the first half of the war and was 
largely completed by 1943391.  David Brinn argues that by this time although Port 
Talbot/Margam was not the biggest British steelworks it was the most efficient.  By 
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Table 5.8: Port Talbot/Margam Production Early 1944 (tons)392 
 Weekly Production Annualised Production 
Coke  5,600 291,200 
Pig Iron 7,000 364,000 
Steel Ingots 7,500 390,000 
Rails 1,500 78,000 
Sections 1,000 52,000 
Plates 2,300 119,600 
 
Port Talbot/Margam‟s plant at this time is shown below :-  
 
Table 5.9: Plant at Port Talbot Steelworks 1944393 
Plant Date Completed/Installed 
6x75 ton Open-Hearth Furnaces (producer gas fired) Completed 1914 
1 Slabbing Mill  Completed 1914 
1 Heavy Plate Mill  Completed 1914 
1 Medium Plate Mill  Installed 1928 
1 Light Plate Mill Installed 1908 
1x3 Stand Rail and Section Mill    Installed 1939 
 
 
Table 5.10: Plant at Margam Steelworks 1944394 
Plant Date Completed/Rebuilt 
1 Blast Furnace (hearth diameter 16ft 0ins)  Rebuilt 1941 
1 Blast Furnace (hearth diameter 16ft 0ins) Rebuilt 1943 
1 Blast Furnace (hearth diameter 21ft 6ins) Being Rebuilt 1944 
1x400 ton Mixer  Rebuilt 1935 
1x150 ton Open-Hearth Tilting Furnace (coke oven gas 
fired) 
Rebuilt 1934 
5x75 ton Open-Hearth Furnaces (mixed gas fired) Completed From 1918 
 
The war years were the peak of Port Talbot/Margam operating as a plant focused on 
heavy steel production.  Steelmaking in the Port Talbot area was about to shift in a 
different direction.  As will be seen planning continued throughout the war on building 
a hot strip mill at Port Talbot.  After the war production moved away from heavy steel 
products to strip steel production to help fuel the post war consumer boom.  
 
The formation of GKB became a financial success during the 1930s as production of 
plate and rails was concentrated at Port Talbot/Margam.  The introduction of an 
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import tariff, a recovery in the steel consuming industries and rearmament all helped 
to stimulate demand for steel.  Yet even as the financial performance improved it is 
possible to see tension emerging within GKB between Baldwins and GKN over the 
future developments at Port Talbot.  The problem was that Baldwins retained large 
tinplate interests and needed access to a hot strip mill.  GKN had less need of a strip 
mill and were less keen to build one.  This would become a major problem for 
Baldwins who would eventually decide to merge with their rivals Richard Thomas.  
Actual investment at Port Talbot/Margam during the 1930s falls into two categories.  
Initially investment was largely directed towards fuel economy to make production 
more efficient.  Later investment was directed towards increasing output and 
modernisation of the plant.  By the late 1930s investment was taking place with one 
eye on the growing possibility of building a hot strip mill.    
 116 
Chapter 6: Planning And Building Of The Abbey Works:  The 
Move To Strip Mill Production 
 
This chapter looks at the planning and building of the hot strip mill at Port Talbot in 
the immediate post-war years.  It examines the reasons why this site was chosen for 
one of Britain‟s largest ever industrial projects which has been discussed by 
economists, geographers and historians.  The requirement to build the mill at a site 
where iron and steelmaking were already integrated alongside a suitable dock to 
import iron ore meant that this was the obvious South Wales location.  In addition 
there was a large amount of cheap land of little agricultural value available.  The role 
of Hugh Dalton is examined stressing his deep commitment to prevent the return of 
mass unemployment.  He did not choose the site but he ensured that it was in this 
area.  It is argued that the requirements of the tinplate industry stimulated the need 
for this mill but it was the requirements for sheet from the motor industry that largely 
determined the design.  Although incorporated into the BISF‟s plan for the post-war 
steel industry this development was made independently.  Despite the eventual 
technological and commercial success of the project a number of long-term mistakes 
were made.  These included the grafting of the mill onto the older steelworks and the 
failure to locate a tinplate works at the site.  It shows that the formation of the Steel 
Company of Wales (SCoW) resulted from the sheer scale of the development which 
was beyond the resources of its constituent companies.  Without the pooling of the 
resources and the new mill these companies would have been driven from the 
market. 
 
As previously noted GKB began to make tentative plans to build a strip mill in 
1938395.  That planning process was complicated by the differing views of Baldwins 
and GKN as to their requirements396.  Charles Wright was the driving force to build 
the new mill as Baldwins had extensive tinplate interests.  That need became greater 
once their main competitor in tinplate production, Richard Thomas, opened their 
Ebbw Vale strip mill.  The latter and its tinplate works were largely responsible for 
Baldwins losing 26.5% of the tinplate market between 1937-1944397.  The problem 
for Baldwins was that with the formation of GKB in 1930 they had lost full control 
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over their former steelmaking plant at Port Talbot which was essential for the strip 
mill.  The steelworks had even been expanded and modernised.  They now needed 
GKN‟s support to build the mill.  GKN owned the sheet manufacturer Lysaghts, 
which also required access to a strip mill but most of GKN‟s other interests were 
mainly concentrated in engineering.  As a result they were less enthusiastic about 
the strip mill.  The irony was that the Bank of England‟s policy of encouraging 
regional mergers to help stimulate investment was now actually preventing 
investment.  
 
As the strip mill needed to be attached to an integrated iron and steelworks there 
were only two possible South Wales sites.  The first was Cardiff which was too 
cramped to accommodate a strip mill398.  This left Port Talbot/Margam.  By March 
1938 GKB had produced plans for a combined plate and sheet operation here399.  It 
included a 4 high reversing plate mill with room at the end for a 4 stand hot strip mill 
to be added later.  The reversing mill would have acted as a roughing section and 
would have had a 300,000 ton capacity400.  World War Two prevented any 
development but planning continued401. 
 
At this time, Briton Ferry Steel, Lysaghts and The Llanelly Associated Tinplate 
Company all produced tentative plans for hot strip mills.  Of more significance was 
Richard Thomas‟ plan to build a second South Wales strip mill to support their West 
Wales operations.  The problem was that none of their West Wales steelworks 
included iron making plant nor were located near a suitable dock402.  Richard 
Thomas commissioned two experts, Latham and James, to recommend the most 
suitable South Wales site for a strip mill.  Their 1943 memorandum, „The Future of 
the Tinplate Trade‟, recommended that the best site was adjacent to Margam 
steelworks.  It envisaged a melting shop, slabbing mill and hot strip mill403. 
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Latham and James tried to reconcile efficient centralised hot rolled coil production at 
an integrated coastal steelworks with dispersal of output to different firms for 
finishing.  Their solution involved the existing tinplate firms jointly owning the hot strip 
mill and allocating output in proportion to their tinplate production at a uniform price.  
In many ways this was the significance of the memorandum.  It recognised that the 
only viable way forward was a regrouping of companies to make use of Port Talbot‟s 
large and valuable existing plant at a coastal site using imported ore.  Although there 
is no direct evidence to support this it must have been clear to Baldwins and Richard 
Thomas that they would need to collaborate on this.  It also proposed that there 
should be 5 new cold mills each with an average output of 70,000 tons/annum 
located near existing tinplate works404.  They unrealistically estimated that the whole 
scheme would cost just £7,000,000 :- 
 
Table 6.1: Estimated Cost of the Latham-James Reorganisation Scheme405 
Facilities Cost (£m) 
Melting Shop & Strip Mill (516,000 ton ingot capacity) 3.5 
5 Cold Reduction Mills (c390,000 ton capacity)  1.4 
Electrolytic Tinning Lines c1.25 
Annealing Plant 0.35 
Working Capital & Starting Expenses 0.50 
Total 7.00 
 
For a second time a steelmaker had recognised that Port Talbot was the best site in 
South Wales to locate another hot strip mill and for the first time it envisaged the 
need for joint ownership.  Yet it failed to fully appreciate the structural changes 
needed within the tinplate industry.  These included the replacement of the old hand 
mills with electrolytic tinning and the concentration of production at fewer sites.  To 
remain internationally competitive concentration of tinplate and sheet production was 
essential.   This required some form of collaboration between the producers.  During 
1941 the Board of Trade set up a committee chaired by Lord Essenden to review the 
tinplate industry.  His report delivered in October 1941 recognised the need for some 
sort of collaboration to develop hot strip mills and cold mills to support tinplate 
production406.  It recommended that up to 30% of existing tinplate capacity should be 
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closed and that Ebbw Vale would only be able to deal with a fifth of post war 
demand.  As a result it recommended immediate planning for more strip mills407.  It 
was this report that initiated Richard Thomas commissioning Latham and James to 
determine the best South Wales site for the strip mill in January 1943.  By World War 
Two maintaining the existing structure of the South Wales tinplate and sheet 
industries was not an option.  Technological change was rendering current 
production obsolete and the scale of necessary change required joint action. 
 
In May 1944 GKB‟s Chairman, Charles Wright, presented the board with 
Development Scheme „J‟ a minutely detailed plan for the construction of a strip mill 
and steelworks called „Margam 2‟ near the existing Margam Steelworks.  Both 
steelworks were envisaged as working in conjunction with each other.  This was the 
same site identified by Richard Thomas408.  Scheme J recognised that if Britain was 
to remain internationally competitive in tinplate and sheet production this strip mill 
was essential.  It envisaged a strip mill 72” wide to meet the motor industry‟s 
requirements.   This was considerably wider than the existing mills at Ebbw Vale and 
Shotton.  Output was to be about 13/14,000 tons/week of which 3,000 tons would be 
sold to non GKN and Baldwins South Wales firms409.  By September 1944 the 
proposed plant included :- 
Table 6.2: Proposed Scheme J Plant410 
1,000 ton Mixer (coke oven gas-fired) 
9x200 ton Fixed Open-Hearth Furnaces (producer gas-fired) 
Stripping and Soaking Pit Plant (100% blast furnace gas-fired) 
2 High Universal Slabbing Mill 
4 Mixed Gas Fired Slab Furnaces 
Roughing Scale Breaker 
1x4 High 80” Reversing Universal Roughing Mill 
Finishing Scale Breaker 
6x4 High 80” Continuous Strip Mill 
Plate Handling Department, with Cooling Tables, Levellers and Shears 
Flying Shears for Sheets in Multiple Lengths 
Coilers for Strip Coils 
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It was estimated to take 2 years to build and would cost £12 million.  The mill width 
had now been increased to 80” to meet the future likely needs of the motor 
industry411. Interestingly, Warren claims that it was March 1945 that a United 
Engineering report to Lever concluded in favour of an 80” strip mill.  Certainly by 
September 1944 Scheme J included an 80” strip mill.  Warren also claims that the 
80” strip mill was suggested by the „Iron and Steel Control‟ as early as 1943412.  
Despite some consideration of a 100” wide mill it was recognised that demand would 
not support this413.  
 
There is evidence of a change in priority here.  The strip mill had initially been 
conceived primarily to meet the needs of the tinplate industry but the design was 
being dictated by the needs of the motor industry for sheet.  There is an inherent 
problem here.  A wider mill requires more capital investment yet a substantial 
proportion of its output was destined for the tinplate industry with a narrower strip 
requirement.  Thus a substantial proportion of its production could have been 
produced on a mill requiring less investment.  An element of inefficiency was built 
into the mill from the start.  As will be seen several unsuccessful attempts were 
made to build a second narrower strip mill at Port Talbot primarily to supply the 
tinplate industry.  No British steelworks ever had a second strip mill.  Thus the capital 
investment could never be utilised to optimum efficiency. 
 
Towards the end of World War Two Baldwins still felt very exposed with regard to 
their tinplate interests.  With rivals Richard Thomas having access to a strip mill and 
GKN still being lukewarm about building one at Port Talbot they felt that GKB could 
not be fully relied upon.  As such Baldwins began an informal dialogue with Richard 
Thomas on a merger to gain access to Ebbw Vales‟ strip mill and to build the strip 
mill at Port Talbot if GKB decided against the new mill414.  The negotiations between 
Wright and Richard Thomas‟ Chairman, Ernest Lever, produced an agreement 
whereby Baldwins would receive an apparently advantageous share of a merged 
company based upon 1937 output levels rather than their reduced 1943 output415. 
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During November 1944 Richard Thomas‟ directors agreed to merge from 1st January 
1945 despite opposition from the former Chairman and Managing Director, William 
Firth.  Lever understood that the merger would link Richard Thomas with the all 
important steelmaking plant at Port Talbot416.  It also brought 340 of the 500 South 
Wales tinplate mills under the control of one company417.  Baldwins transferred all 
their assets, including those of their subsidiaries (including GKB) and £300,000 in 
cash to Richard Thomas418.  In exchange Richard Thomas allotted Baldwins 
8,500,002 ordinary shares credited as fully paid.  The name of the company was 
changed to Richard Thomas and Baldwins Limited (RTB) and Baldwins became 
Baldwins (Holdings) Limited419.  An earlier merger along these lines might have 
allowed an earlier rationalisation of the tinplate industry, greater access to capital 
and possibly even avoided the financial problems that engulfed Richard Thomas with 
the building of the Ebbw Vale hot strip mill.  Richard Thomas recognised that to 
maintain post war tinplate markets another strip mill was essential.  They also 
recognised that this was beyond the resources of any one company and that pooling 
of resources was essential420.   
 
The newly merged RTB sent two experts, Fred Cartwright from GKB and S.E. Graeff 
from Richard Thomas to the United States to examine the latest American strip mill 
practices.  They reported back to the RTB board on 30th April 1945 making a number 
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Table 6.3: Recommended Plant422 
2x800 ton Mixers 
10x200 ton oil fired Open-Hearth furnaces 
Stripping and Soaking Pit plant 
High lift Slabbing Mill 
4 Slab Reheating Furnaces 
Fully Continuous 10 Stand 80” Hot Strip Mill 
 
They recommended that the new 18,000 tons/week capacity mill should be operated 
in conjunction with Ebbw Vale‟s strip mill to ensure optimum utilisation of both plants.  
The minimum economic output was now considered to be 1,000,000 tons/annum423.  
These recommendations formed the basis of the strip mill and steelmaking plant that 
was built424. 
 
GKB and Richard Thomas had independently identified Port Talbot as the best 
South Wales location to build a new hot strip mill.  The location held many 
advantages.  Firstly South Wales had the largest reserves of UK coking coal425.  In 
addition limestone, dolomite, silica bricks and abundant water were all available 
locally426.  The only raw material absent was iron ore but Port Talbot had a 
developed iron ore wharf capable of handling large amounts of imported low 
phosphorous ores thought necessary to produce higher grade strip steel427.  
Adjacent to Margam Steelworks were 1,700 acres of cheap and flat land 
unencumbered by any buildings and of little agricultural value428.  The location also 
had direct access to the national rail network, a nucleus of trained personnel, 
available support services and fuel oil available from the nearby Llandarcy Oil 
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Refinery429.  Finally, and of significance Port Talbot/Margam already possessed 
integrated and modernised iron and steelmaking plant.  There were also good 
reasons to build the strip mill here on employment grounds.  The tinplate industry 
was heavily concentrated in West Wales and would inevitably create large numbers 
of redundant workers which could be absorbed at the new steelworks430.  Kenneth 
Warren claims that a location to the west of Newport held similar advantages to Port 
Talbot but lacked crucial iron and steelmaking plant.  It would also not alleviate the 
resulting West Wales unemployment resulting from the inevitable closures of the 
local small steelworks and tinplate works.  As a result the Newport site offered 
nothing to Government regional development concerns431.  Thus for both political 
and industrial/financial reasons the site was never realistic. 
 
Cartwright identified two fundamental problems with Port Talbot namely the 
limitations imposed by the dock on the size of ore carriers and that the coke ovens 
were close to a residential area432.  The problem with the dock was two fold.  Firstly 
the lock was just 450‟ in length and 60‟ wide433.  This restricted the deadweight of 
ships to around 9,500 tons.  It could have been enlarged but the approach channel 
could not have been sufficiently deepened to allow larger ore carriers.  The 
restriction on the size of ore carriers meant that it was uneconomic to transport ore 
from the richer southern hemisphere ore fields.  Despite this a fleet of 24 small 
specialist ore carriers was built during the 1950s to supply ore to Port Talbot434.      
 
In January 1946 GKB had approached Port Talbot Dock‟s owner, the GWR, as to 
how to increase imported iron ore tonnages.  The GWR proposed importing all ore 
through Swansea‟s Kings Dock.  As Swansea could handle larger ore carriers they 
estimated reduced costs of 6/- per ton discharged and rail transport costs to Port 
Talbot of 2/4d a ton.  GKB rejected these figures and estimated a saving of 2/1d a 
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ton by importing all ore through Port Talbot Dock.  During 1947 the GWR agreed to 
spend £900,000 improving Port Talbot Dock435.  Thus by using Port Talbot Dock, and 
accepting its limitations, steelmaking was freed from additional rail transport costs.     
In reality the new strip mill was being grafted onto the old Port Talbot/Margam 
Steelworks.  This was not ideal436.  If sufficient funds had been available all existing 
plant would have demolished and new plant built but the funds were not available437.  
It is this that is the vital factor as to the location of the new strip mill.  If the strip mill 
had been built at another location the limited funds would need to have covered the 
building of plant already existing at Port Talbot.  Thus the scale of the remaining 
plant would have been less which would have reduced profits. 
 
Duncan Burn argues that Port Talbot was not an ideal site as an immense amount of 
pile driving was necessary even though there was some suitable existing plant438.  
Yet Burn acknowledges that Richard Thomas‟ board concluded that Port Talbot was 
the right site for the strip mill439.  He claims that an alternative site near Barry was 
strongly, though not publicly advocated, where the largest envisaged ore carriers of 
up to 20,000 tons could be docked.  Unfortunately Burn does not state who 
advocated this site.  In producing this work no evidence has been found of any 
suggestion to use Barry as an alternative site.  Warren argues that the Barry site 
might have been flat and had good rail facilities but was not large and had no 
existing steel plant440.  It appears that it was never a realistic alternative.  Burn also 
raises the possibility of locating the mill on Humberside to use Yorkshire coking coal 
near to home ore and deep water for imported ore441.  This reveals a certain 
prejudice towards home produced ore.  Burn was writing during 1960-61.  Apart from 
any technical requirements to use higher quality foreign ore by this time it must have 
been clear that the cost of foreign ore was falling as it peaked at 123 shillings/ton in 
1957 and by 1960 had fallen to 98 shillings/ton as the price of home ore increased 
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by 20% between 1957 and 1962442.  Yet even Burn begrudgingly accepts that home 
ores were difficult to use for high grade steel as the Americans had never succeeded 
in making strip from low grade ore443.  Port Talbot may not have been a perfect 
location but it was through a combination of factors the most suitable site.  However 
compromised, Port Talbot took British steelmaking to a new level in terms of scale 
and technology. 
 
Employment factors were also important in deciding to locate the strip mill at Port 
Talbot.  In particular they influenced the drive and determination of Hugh Dalton, the 
wartime President of the Board of Trade.  He had a deep commitment to avoid a 
return to pre-war unemployment levels444.  In the first Welsh Affairs debate on 17th 
October 1944 he stated that the Welsh tinplate industry needed new strip mills and 
cold reduction plants but he had not received any information from the tinplate 
manufacturers nor the BISF as to where the plants would be built.  He added that he 
would not participate in the dislocation of the Welsh tinplate industry445. 
 
Dalton resisted any opposition to locating the strip mill in South Wales.  He publicly 
stated that the Government would not support locating the mill on Humberside446.  In 
February 1944 he refused a request by the Tinplate Association to pay 
compensation of £500,000 to shareholders in closed tinplate works to ensure that 
they never re-opened.  This was of course an essential element of the requirement 
for tinplate rationalisation.  Once he received assurances that Port Talbot would be 
the location of the strip mill he gave approval and announced its location in a speech 
to Swansea Chambers of Commerce on 23rd April 1945447.  Yet John Vaizey states 
that it was October 1945 before RTB and GKB agreed to build the strip mill at Port 
Talbot448.  Even some Whitehall Ministries were unaware of the decision449.  In an 
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internal Ministry of Town and Country Planning memo Herbert Morrison stated that 
Dalton was determined to build the mill at Port Talbot and that his own ministry was 
unaware of the precise site450.  Although the steel companies had identified Port 
Talbot as the most suitable South Wales location it was Dalton‟s drive and 
determination that added the political impetus to avoid the large scale unemployment 
resulting from the inevitable closure of the now obsolete South Wales hand mills.  
Burn argues that in some respects the steelmakers and politicians could do no more 
than to come to compromises within frustrating constraints and broadly speaking he 
accepted that Port Talbot did this451.  Heal, an industrial geographer, starts from the 
assumption that all location and investment decisions are historical compromises 
made at one time and imposing a weighty legacy on those who inherit them452.   He 
views Port Talbot as “the best compromise solution for the existing set of 
problems453”.  That problem he accepts was the modernisation of the tinplate 
industry but the impetus for continued growth was sheet454.  As will be seem the 
growth in tinplate demand was also to be an important factor in future developments.  
Warren also views that the location of the strip mill as a compromise455.  Yet the 
evidence suggests something different.  Two steelmakers had independently 
determined this as the best South Wales site for another strip mill.  That coincided 
with the political need to locate the mill in the area on employment grounds.  Rather 
than being a compromise it was a meeting of interests between the steelmakers and 
politicians.  
 
During World War Two the BISF were asked to forecast Britain‟s post-war steel 
requirements and plan on how to meet them.  The Iron and Steel Control Board and 
the BISF were very clear that a third strip mill would be an essential part of post war 
modernisation and they had no doubt that its large capacity would necessitate an 
amalgamation of companies and the elimination of much old capacity.  An Iron and 
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Steel Control Board technical study in 1943 defined the desirable parameters as 
wider than the 56” mill at Ebbw Vale and 60” at Shotton456.  In May 1946 the Ministry 
of Supply published the BISF‟s 5 year modernisation plan457 a year after Dalton had 
announced that Port Talbot would be the site of Britain‟s third hot strip mill.  
Therefore it had very little influence on the Port Talbot development.  It did not even 
specifically mention Port Talbot.  Its significance was that it put the development 
within the wider plan for the British steel industry.  
 
The report estimated that between 1950 and 1955 the UK needed a steel capacity of 
approximately 16,000,000 ingot tons/annum.  With a 94% utilisation rate Britain was 
capable of producing 15,000,000 ingot tons458.  To raise capacity to the required 
level and to modernise the following expenditure was needed :- 
 
Table 6.4: Summary of District Expenditure459 
District Proposed Expenditure (£) 
South Wales 41,000,000 
North East Coast 35,000,000 
Scotland 29,000,000 
North West Coast 1,300,000 
Sheffield 5,500,000 





The report for South Wales concentrated on the modernisation of the predominating 
tinplate and sheet sectors460.  Although not mentioning Port Talbot the report 
incorporated the planning already undertaken by stating that South Wales‟ hot rolled 
strip capacity would increase by 1,000,000 tons/annum.  It envisaged annual output 
of 1,650,000 tons/annum including 100,000 tons of plate up to 0.75” in thickness.  
Production of thicker plate would move out of South Wales altogether.  This meant 
the end of heavy plate production in Port Talbot.  To support this level of South 
                                                          
456
 Ibid, p.202, p.218. 
457
 Great Britain. Ministry of Suppy. Iron and Steel Industry-Reports By The British Iron And 
Steel Federation And The Joint Iron Council (Cmnd 6811). London: HMSO, 1946. 
458
 Ibid, p.10. 
459
 Ibid, p.13. 
460
 Ibid, p.14. 
 128 
Wales steelmaking large quantities of imported low phosphorous iron ore were 
required461.  To keep production costs down the mill needed to be located at a 
dockside location.  Port Talbot was such a location.  It stated that nationally the new 
hot strip mill should be given top priority.  It would substantially lower tinplate and 
sheet production costs and improve the quality essential for export markets462.  
Despite adding little that was new the BISF report was important as it incorporated 
the existing planning and political decision within the national plan. 
 
As noted earlier, RTB had concluded that no single steelmaker could independently 
fund the new mill.  They took the lead in lengthy and detailed discussions with GKB, 
Llanelly Associated Tinplate and John Lysaght Ltd to pool resources to build the strip 
mill463.  This reduced the financial risk to any one company.  The Briton Ferry Steel 
Company was involved in the initial discussions but later withdrew.  Between 1946 
and 1952 it was involved with rebuilding Briton Ferry Steelworks and decided to 
concentrate on billet production which did not require a strip mill as a result of the 
large billet mills mentioned in the 1946 report not being built464.   
 
Agreement between the remaining companies was reached and in March 1947 the 
formation of the SCoW was announced.  It was registered as a public company on 
1st May 1947 with Ernest Lever, the Chairman of RTB, as Chairman.  Each company 
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Figure 6.1: Constituent Companies of the SCoW 1947466 
 
Also in March 1947 Lever officially announced that the SCoW would build the new 
strip mill adjoining Margam Steelworks467.  On 27th September 1947 the SCoW 
officially took over the running of Port Talbot/Margam468.  Fig 6.1 shows that the 
various takeovers had resulted in complex relationships between the firms.  
Fundamentally the SCoW was owned by GKN, Baldwins, Richard Thomas and 
Llanelly Associated Tinplate through various subsidiaries.  The complex inter 
company relationships that had emerged during the 1930s and 1940s actually 
helped with the formation of the SCoW.  Once mergers started to take place it made 
sense to look beyond the parent companies to spread the financial risk.  As the size 
of the mill increased this approach became essential.  The reality was that to stay in 
tinplate and sheet manufacture the scale of investment was beyond any of these 
companies.  They had little option but to merge.  
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The proposed funding for the development was agreed by the Treasury‟s Capital 
Issues Committee in 1947 :- 
 
a) “£15 million 3% First Mortgage Debenture Stock (5-10 years) – to be issued 
at 98½ to a group of 7 merchant banks, who will offer the debentures for sale 
to the public at par. 
b) £5 million of Ordinary Shares to be subscribed in cash at par by the 
promoting companies or their nominees.  A further amount of Ordinary 
Shares of not less than £10 million to be issued to the promoting companies 
in exchange for assets which they will transfer to the new company. 
c) Up to £35 million will be borrowed over the next five years from the Finance 
Corporation for Industry, to whom an equivalent amount of 3½% Convertible 
Mortgage Debenture Stock (repayable in 20 years) will be issued as 
collateral.  The F.C.I. will have the rights (1) (before 16th July 1947) to convert 
30% into 4½% Cumulative Preference Shares and 30% into Ordinary Shares; 
and (2) to market the collateral at any time at not less than par and to use the 
proceeds to repay the loan. The loan will carry 3¾% interest until the 
Debenture under (a) are repaid, and 3½% thereafter469.”    
 
The £15 million 3% Debenture stock was issued on 16th July 1947 but was not a 
successful issue despite being kept as short-term and at a high rate of 3%. 
Applications totalled £10,573,625, of which only £4,073,225 was raised from the 
public with £6,500,400 being covered by the underwriters.  This failure was attributed 
to uncertainty about the future course of interest rates, the prospect of nationalisation 
and the number of other recent issues470. 
 
At registration the SCoW had an authorised nominal share capital of £40,000,000 in 
£1 shares.  Exactly 5,000,000 shares (1/- paid) were subscribed by the 4 founding 
companies (RTB, GKB, John Lysaghts and the Llanelly Associated Tinplate 
Companies Limited) and 1,400 shares (fully paid) went to the directors.  The 4 
founding companies also received £10,000,000 worth of shares, credited as being 
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fully paid, in proportion to the amounts of assets and working capital transferred to 
the SCoW471.  The assets transferred to the SCoW were472 :- 
 
• RTB: 14 tinplate and blackplate works (114 mills), land and house property in 
South Wales and Gloucestershire. 
• GKB: a limestone quarry, coke ovens, blast furnaces, melting shops, rolling 
and finishing plant for rails, sleepers, sections and plates, land and house 
property in Port Talbot. 
• John Lysaghts: sheet works in Newport consisting of a 3 stand cold reduction 
mill, hand and mechanised mills, land and house property. 
• Llanelly Associated Tinplate Companies Ltd: 4 tinplate works (28 mills), land 
and house property in South Wales, and 11,167 shares of £1 each in 
Galbraith, Campbell and Co Ltd, a merchandising company with an issued 
share capital of 21,500 ordinary shares of £1 each, all fully paid.  
 
A Finance Corporation for Industry (FCI) loan was also made available to be drawn 
upon up to 16th July 1952473.  The FCI was heavily involved in financing the post-war 
development of the steel industry.  It consisted of insurance companies, investment 
trusts and the Bank of England474. 
 
As the detailed planning proceeded Scheme J evolved into Development Scheme 
„K‟.  It was this that was actually built.  The new steelworks was renamed the „Abbey 
Works‟ in recognition of the nearby Cistercian Margam Abbey475.  Planning started 
from the assumption that a certain tonnage needed to be produced476.  This 
determined the tonnage of ingots, scrap and pig iron needed which determined the 
amount of ore, coke, and coking coal required.  As noted earlier the minimum 
economic output was calculated to be 1,000,000 tons/annum of steel product.  It was 
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built with a 1,500,000 tons/annum capacity but with planning already underway to 
increase capacity to 2,000,000 tons/annum because of rising demand.  As previously 
noted there was a tension between producing strip for the sheet and tinplate markets 
as although mill requirements were similar they were not identical.  That tension 
manifested itself in strip mill width.  The mill produced strip up to 80” in width.  A 
narrower and less costly mill could have satisfied tinplate requirements but the wider 
mill gave the SCoW a number of commercial advantages including the widest strip 
mill in Europe477.  However, as a sizeable proportion of output could have been 
produced on a narrower less costly mill the capital investment was not being utilised 
in the most efficient manner.  In addition Warren claims that an increase in mill width 
from 54” to 72” increases the cost of strip by 12½%478.  The mill design followed 
standard American practice of a conventional 10 stand strip mill479.  This was a 
cautious and safe approach but considering the scale of investment undoubtedly the 
correct one. 
 
A cold mill was not part of the original proposal, but was added following wider 
consideration of modernising the existing cold reduction plant at Lysaght‟s Orb 
Works in Newport or building it at Llanelli on employment grounds.  The Iron and 
Steel Board (ISB) rejected both sites on cost grounds480.  Building the cold mill at 
Margam instead of Newport saved 11/- a ton on sheet production481.  The decision to 
locate the cold mill at Margam was made by the „Cabinet Distribution of Industry 
Committee‟ on 12th December 1947482.  The problem related to both employment 
issues regarding the site of the new tinplate works and GKN‟s attempt to protect their 
subsidiary, Lysaght‟s, Orb Works in Newport.  They initially resisted incorporating 
this into the SCoW and according to Vaizey even contemplated buying out the RTB‟s 
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shares in GKB and building the strip mill themselves.  In the end their lack of 
experience with strip mills forced them to abandon the idea and GKN merged 
Lysaghts into the SCoW483.  The Orb Works became an integral part of the SCoW 
producing electrical sheet484. 
 
The existing ore wharf, Margam Wharf, was extended with 3 transporter cranes 
being installed in 1950, 1952 and 1953 to bring the number up to 5.  Each was 
capable of lifting 12½ tons and had a discharge rate of 500 tons/hour485.  New 
railway sidings and tipplers to discharge coal were built at Margam in 1949.  At the 
same time a new coal washery was built capable of handling 20,000-22,000 
tons/week of coal486.  Two new batteries of coke ovens consisting of 90 coke ovens 
and a by-product plant were built during 1950-51.  This brought total coke making 
capacity to 14,000 tons/week.  These batteries went into production in March 1951 
and October 1951487.   
 
It was originally planned that the open-hearth furnaces would use a charge of 50% 
scrap and 50% pig iron488.  Numbers 2 and 3 blast furnaces would have been rebuilt 
like Number 1 blast furnace with hearth diameters of 21‟6” but were rebuilt with 
hearth diameters of 25‟9” because of difficulties in obtaining scrap which meant that 
more pig iron was needed.  They were completed in November 1950 and June 1952 
and were each capable of producing 1,000 tons/day of iron489.  To support the 
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Table 6.5: Required Blast Furnace Raw Materials490 
Raw Material Tonnage 
Limestone 3,000  
Coke 14,000  
Home Ore 7,000  
Imported Ore 28,000  
 
The limestone came from the nearby Cornelly Quarry.  A sinter plant was completed 
in 1954491.   
 
Both Port Talbot and Margam Melting Shops‟ 75 ton open-hearth furnaces were 
rebuilt as 100 tons furnaces492.  Production in each melting shop was planned to be 
4,000 tons/week493.  A new open-hearth melting shop, the Abbey Melting Shop, was 
built during 1951-52.  It contained 8x200 ton fixed American designed but British built 
open-hearth furnaces and two 800 ton mixers which would produce 16,000 
tons/week of Scheme K‟s planned 24,000 ingot tons/week494.  The plan to use 3 
melting shops, each with different requirements, added to production costs and was 
far from ideal.  A lack of funding prevented the closure and replacement of the older 
melting shops495.   
 
Twenty soaking pits were built to handle up to 25,000 tons/week496.  In conjunction 
with these a 45” slabbing mill was built capable of handling ingots weighing up to 
55,000 lbs which along with three reheating furnaces was completed in 1950.  This 
slabbing mill was built with too small a capacity and had to be replaced in the late 
1950s in order to handle the greater tonnages then needed. 
 
The main feature of Scheme K was the 10 stand continuous 80” wide hot strip mill 
with two downcomers (see Appendix 8 for details).  Part of the mill is shown below :- 
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The mill was supplied from the USA by United Engineering under the terms of the 
Marshall Aid Scheme (the SCoW received $27 million in total, the equivalent of £9.5 
millions of Marshall Aid funding).  It was completed during 1950-51497.  Strip mill 
output was planned to be :- 
 
Table 6.6: Planned Weekly Strip Mill Production498 
 Weekly Production (tons) 
Hot Rolled Coil  7,000  
To Cold Mill  7,000  
Hot Finished Shoots 3,000  
Plates 2,500  
Total 19,500  
   
 
Finally during 1951 the continuous pickling line, the 3 stand cold reduction mill, the 
annealing bay with 12 furnaces, and 2 temper mills were completed499.  It was 
planned to produce approximately 6,200 tons/week of sheet in the cold mill500.  An 
improved power plant was also completed in 1951501.   
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To support production internal road and railway systems were built502.  The Abbey 
Works railway system was worked exclusively by diesel locomotives with 43 
eventually being purchased503.  Diesel power gave a 5/- hourly saving over steam 
power and more economical maintenance504. 
 
The plant installed under Scheme K at the Abbey Works was unquestionably of a 
high standard which meant buying American plant.  Despite the high standard of the 
plant the layout was not ideal.  The blast furnaces, the Abbey Melting Shop and the 
strip mill were not ideally located relative to each other.  The additional internal 
transport added to production costs.  Margam and Port Talbot Melting Shops were 
located even further away from the strip mill.  Partly because of the extra transport 
costs involved and their small size furnaces both melting shops were vulnerable if 
the market ever tightened.  As will be seen this happened.   
 
The planning application to build the Abbey Works was made on 6th June 1945505.  
Building work started in 1947.  The main contractor was George Wimpey and Co 
Ltd506.  Approximately 500 acres of land were leased for the steelworks itself from 
Margam Estate with an additional 1,200 acres to the seaward side of the works507.  
The building process required raising the whole site by 10‟ and this involved adding 
over 5 million tons of material508. 
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During May 1945 the Ministry of Town and Country Planning anticipated difficulty in 
supplying sufficient numbers of skilled builders509.  The ISB estimated 2,500 builders 
would be needed during 1947-48 but later rising to 5,400510.  The workforce peaked 
at 7,700511.  They were housed at the former RAF base at nearby Stormy Down512.   
 
The first part of Scheme K to be completed was the slabbing mill.  It first produced 
slabs on 27th November 1950.  In March 1951 the Abbey Melting Shop produced its 
first steel and in June 1951 the hot strip mill produced its first commercial strip 
steel513.  The Abbey Works by its sheer size was a milestone in British steelmaking.  
At completion it was twice the size of Britain‟s largest steelworks in 1945.  The 
Abbey Works‟ official opening ceremony was performed by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Hugh Gaitskill, on 17th July 1951.  King George VI was due to perform 
the ceremony but deteriorating health prevented him from attending514.   
 
By the middle of 1952 the majority of Scheme K projects were completed and 
commissioning difficulties overcome.  Only two major problems were encountered.  
The first was the national problem of a scrap shortage.  Construction of enlarged 
blast furnaces partly overcame this problem.  The second was the poor quality of pig 
iron produced due to low quality iron ore515.  With experience production figures 
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Table 6.7: Weekly Production After Scheme K Completion516  




Coke  14,400 13,440 
Pig Iron  19,000 19,300 
Crude Steel  30,000 32,360 
Coiled Strip/Plate  25,500 28,230 
 
In the early 1950s the SCoW introduced a 3 divisional structure :- 
 
Table 6.8: Early 1950s SCoW Divisional Structure517 
Division General Manager 
Steel (Port Talbot/Margam/Abbey Complex) Fred Cartwright (and director) 
Newport R.P. Perry 
Tinplate Leighton Davies 
  
In parallel with building the Abbey Works the SCoW built a cold mill and an 
electrolytic tinplate works at Trostre near Llanelli.  The ISB favoured a site near 
Swansea which was nearer the strip mill and the main tinplate markets in the 
Midlands.  The new strip mill was also likely to cause 10,000 redundancies in the 
area.  Llanelli was chosen as it was felt that it would be easier to bring new industries 
to the Swansea area518.  The cost of transporting coil the 21½ miles to Trostre from 
Port Talbot and finished product to Swansea Dock for export was estimated in 1953 
to add 5/- a ton or £60,000/annum on production of 250,000 tons519.  On economic 
grounds building the tinplate works at any location other than Port Talbot was a 
mistake as it added to the cost of production.  
 
                                                          
516




 Kew, NA, Ref HLG 79/583 223474, internal minute to Regional Controller, Ministry of 
Town and Country Planning, 5
th
 May 1947.  Ibid, internal minute from D.I. Williams to 
S.W.C. Phillips, 13
th
 May 1947; minute from the Board of Trade to the Cabinet–Lord 
President‟s Committee–Distribution of Industry Sub-Committee, May 1947. 
519




Various different amounts were quoted for the cost of building the Abbey Works 
(shown above).  The Ministry of Town and Country Planning estimated that the cost 
of building the Abbey Works without the cold mill would be £29 million and that the 
latter would cost an additional £5,228,000520.  By 2nd October 1948 £45 million of 
expenditure had already been put in hand of which £9,168,845 had been spent521.  
The SCoW Chairman, Ernest Lever stated that the full cost of Scheme K would be 
about £60 million522.  This figure included Trostre and 3 cold mills of which 2 were 
finally built.  David Brinn quotes the actual cost of Scheme K as £73 million523.  
Corus claimed that the full cost of building the Abbey Works was £56 million524.  As 
already noted the SCoW received $27 million of Marshall Aid funding in relation to 
Scheme K525.  A figure of £60-70 million seems most likely for Scheme K.      
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In parallel with Scheme K came the political debate over ownership of the steel 
industry.  The Labour Party‟s 1945 manifesto included a commitment to nationalise 
the steel industry but it was not until October 1948 that the Labour Government 
introduced a bill to nationalise the steel industry526.  The Minister of Supply, George 
Strauss who introduced the Bill, stated that the reason it was introduced was that it 
was felt that the industry was disorganised and consisted of independent warring 
units who made no effort to ensure that work was done in the most efficient plants.  It 
was an effort to introduce efficiency into steelmaking to meet national needs527. 
 
As a result the Iron and Steel Corporation of Great Britain (ISC) under the 
chairmanship of Steven Hardie was formed in October 1950 and the shares of 96 
nationalised steel companies were vested on 14th February 1951528.  The SCoW was 
one of the companies nationalised.  Compensation was related to Stock Exchange 
values taken during the month of October 1948 or six mid-monthly dates before the 
1945 General Election529.  The Government kept the company structures and the 
individual companies continued to trade under their old names.  This made de-
nationalisation much easier, a mistake that was not repeated at the second 
nationalisation.    
 
The stimulus to build the hot strip mill at Port Talbot was technological change which 
rendered the older methods of making tinplate and sheet uneconomic.  Tinplate 
demand stimulated the building but sheet requirements determined the final design.  
The location was not perfect for a strip mill but no other site in South Wales offered 
such favourable factors as this site.  The sheer scale of what was being attempted 
necessitated the merger of those firms with interests in producing tinplate and sheet 
products in order to gain access to a strip mill.  Without this they faced the prospect 
of being driven from the market.  Thus the drive for the merger came from the firms 
themselves to reduce their financial risk and to remain in the market.  
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Two major mistakes were made during this period.  Firstly the lack of funds meant 
that some old steelmaking plant was retained giving a far from ideal plant layout and 
secondly locating the tinplate works away from Port Talbot added to tinplate 
production costs.  Despite these shortcomings a large and technologically advanced 
steelworks was built at Port Talbot just as the demand for its products was taking off.     
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Chapter 7: Expansion and Challenges 1951-1960 
 
The 1950s was a period of expansion and rising profits for Port Talbot which was 
well placed with its new strip mill to service a rising demand for strip steel to satisfy 
the European wide post war consumer boom.  The partial merger of the SCoW and 
RTB that occurred after nationalisation was reversed in order to facilitate resale to 
the private sector recreating the old rivalries and overlapping and incompatible 
strategies in South Wales.  Political choices continued to dominate issues of 
industrial location in the strip mill sector and strategic decisions on major 
investments were compromised.  Port Talbot was one of Britain‟s biggest industrial 
projects, it flourished in this period, despite becoming the sector leader it never 
became the dominant player in the industry.  The SCoW concentrated on boosting 
output and profits and for most of this period was a technological and innovative 
leader.  By the 1960s the failure to deliver its full development strategy and the 
development of more complex technical issues had came to the fore.  In the late 
1940s Government policies had assisted Port Talbot in becoming the leading strip 
mill in Britain and Europe but in the late 1950s the tide of policy moved against them.  
Prevention of further development at Port Talbot and the Government inspired, and 
partly financed, building of two new strip mills by Colvilles and RTB prevented the 
SCoW from taking full commercial advantage of its position.  As it transpired 
Government support for the new mills proved to be a poisoned chalice for both 
Colvilles and RTB but also severely constrained and impeded the further 
development of Port Talbot.  By re-nationalisation in 1967 Port Talbot was facing 
serious problems. 
 
This chapter sets out the contextual background of British and European steel 
production and demand over the period between 1945 and 1967.  It then discusses 
the period of prosperity and rather rudderless developments of the 1950s.  Chapter 8 
looks at how patterns of drift and decline began to come to the fore in the 1960s.  
 
(i) Key features of production and profits in British steel 1950-1967 
UK steel production increased between 1950 and 1966 but both West Germany and 
France increased output much faster but starting from a much lower base as they 
recovered from World War Two :-  
 143 
 
Table 7.1: UK, French and West German Steel Production 1945-1966 (million 
tons)530 
 UK France W.Germany 
1945 11.82 1.63 1.52* 
1946 12.70 4.34 2.71* 
1947 12.72 5.64 3.12* 
1948 14.88 7.12 5.47 
1949 15.55 9.01 9.01 
1950 16.29 8.52 11.93 
1951 15.64 9.68 13.29 
1952 16.42 10.70 15.56 
1953 17.61 9.84 15.18 
1954 18.52 10.46 17.16 
1955 19.79 12.39 21.00 
1956 20.66 13.19 22.82 
1957 21.70 13.87 24.12 
1958 19.57 14.39 22.43 
1959 20.19 14.98 28.97 
1960 24.31 17.01 33.56 
1961 22.09 17.29 32.93 
1962 20.49 16.97 32.05 
1963 22.52 17.28 31.10 
1964 26.23 19.47 36.75 
1965 27.01 19.29 36.24 
1966 24.32 19.28 34.76 
* Includes East Germany 
 
In 1946 the Allies restricted German output to 5.8 million tons and a capacity of 7.5 
million tons.  Their only strip mill at Dinslaken was shipped to the USSR as war 
reparations.  Only in 1955 did Thyssen start Germany‟s second wide strip mill.  In 
1956 a cold mill was added.  Thus the German car industry was initially forced to 
import large amounts of French sheet531.  This allowed France to fully exploit the two 
post war strip mills built at Denain and Seremanges532.  Neither was as large as Port 
Talbot nor integrated with a cold mill.  Geoffrey Owen argues that the establishment 
of the European Coal and Steel Community after 1950 was to break down the 
parochialism of the French steel industry and forced it to plan for a wider European 
market533.  It allowed France to take advantage of Germany‟s defeat and in the 
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process to build up its own industrial strength534.  The British steel industry did not 
have the same stimulus to break down its own parochialism although it continued to 
export substantial amounts but not to what would become the Common Market. 
 
Despite this parochialism between 1945 and 1966 UK liquid steel output increased 
from 11.82 to 24.32 million tons (see table 7.1).  UK iron output increased from 7.1 to 
15.7 million tons in 1966.  The average number of blast furnaces in blast fell from 99 
in 1945 to 60 in 1966 but output per furnace increased from 71,700 to 260,400 
tons/annum (see Appendix 10).     
 
Between 1954 and 1964 UK sheet consumption increased from 1.8 to 2.8 million 
tons/annum.  This increase was attributable to a growth in consumer goods 
manufacture and an increase in car production.  By 1963 the latter accounted for 
45% of UK sheet consumption535.  In 1946 the UK produced 18,300 cars/month 
which by 1964 had increased to 155,600 (commercial vehicle production increased 
from 12,200 vehicles/month to 38,700)536.  Tinplate consumption increased from 
552,000 tons in 1954 to 765,000 tons during 1963-64 despite an annual 1% 
decrease in the amount of steel per container after 1958.  Most of the tinplate was 
used in various forms of containers537.  Additionally large amounts of sheet and 
tinplate were produced for export.  Between 1954 and 1956 on average 391,000 
tons of sheet and 307,000 tons of tinplate were exported.  During 1963, 1,051,000 
tons of sheet and 459,000 tons of tinplate were exported538.  This demand for strip 
mill products increased throughout the 1950s but that growth slowed in the 1960s 
just as a surge of new capacity came online. 
 
The post war profits of the leading steel companies rose steadily to peak at £141 
million in 1960 before declining to £23 million in 1967539.  That decline was steady 
particularly when expressed as a percentage of capital employed :-   
 
                                                          
534
 Ibid, p.43. 
535
 Iron and Steel Board (henceforth ISB), „Development In the Iron and Steel Industry–
Special Report‟ (London: HMSO 18th November 1964), p.54. 
536
 Economic Trends–Annual Supplement (London: HMSO, 2006), p.213. 
537
 ISB, p.57. 
538
 Ibid, p.29. 
539
 Heal, pp.102-107. 
 145 
Table 7.2: Combined Results of 14 Largest Steel Companies 1958-1967 (£ 
million)540 
 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
Profits Before 
Depreciation 
138 143 181 148 115 114 148 145 115 93 
Profits After 
Depreciation 
108 109 141 104 67 59 87 80 47 23 
Capital 
Employed 
624 696 750 840 1010 1238 1189 1194 1230 1228 




17.2 15.7 18.8 12.4 6.6 4.8 7.3 6.7 3.8 1.9 
 
By nationalisation in 1967 the leading British steel companies were in serious 
financial decline.  At the root of this lay a lack of economy of scale in the British 
industry.  In 1945 the British steel industry consisted of 9 major firms with works on 
more than one site and 14 single works companies accounting for 95% of output.  
Britain‟s largest steelworks at Appleby-Frodingham (Scunthorpe) had a capacity of 
700,000 tons/annum541 (Port Talbot/Margam‟s capacity was 400,000-500,000 
tons/annum).  US Steel had 12 steelworks with capacities of over one million tons542.  
This highlights the relatively small size of British steelworks at this time.  Even by 
1966, the last full year under private ownership, the four Welsh strip mill steelworks 
only produced an average of 1.67 million tons543.  Warren, quoting Cartwright, 
argues that in 1970 the entire British strip mill tonnage should have been produced 
at two steelworks not four (this ignores Ravenscraig as it produced steel for other 
sectors)544.       
 
The problem for the British steel industry was that the steel companies were too 
small to raise sufficient capital needed to concentrate production at larger, better 
located sites using newer technology.  One solution was for firms to merge but with 
the exception of the formation of the SCoW and a brief period of nationalisation this 
did not occur.  The failure to restructure and the inability to relocate and concentrate 
production at larger more modern plants in itself would lead to financial decline. 
                                                          
540
 BSC, Annual Report and Accounts 1967-68, p.7.   
541
 Heal, p.12. 
542
 Kenneth Warren, Big Steel–The First Century of the United States Steel Corporation 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001), p.364. 
543
 Warren, British Iron and Steel, p.6.  
544
 Ibid, pp.6-7. 
 146 
Several other factors put the steel companies under financial pressure.  The ISB, re-
established under the Iron and Steel Act of 1953, determined steel product maximum 
prices.  Prices were determined based upon production costs plus a standard margin 
for depreciation and interest545.  The BISF repeatedly complained that prices were 
too low546.  After 1954 UK prices were generally lower than continental prices547.  At 
a time of technological change fewer funds were generated to reinvest in the 
industry.  
 
The cost of raw materials also became a problem for British steelmakers.  
Traditionally British steelmakers had cheaper coal than continental steelmakers.  
Between 1950 and 1957 this cost advantage was gradually eroded548.  This was 
partly offset between 1953 and 1957 by lower blast furnace coke consumption per 
ton of iron smelted549 but crucially, the industry was prevented by the Government 
from importing cheaper, better quality foreign coal to protect the British coal industry.   
 
Until 1958 British domestic ore was cheaper than ore produced in France, Belgium 
and Luxembourg.  From 1957 the price of foreign ore began to fall550.   By 1964 the 
British steel industry used more foreign than home produced ore551.   The problem 
was that to fully benefit from cheaper foreign raw materials the steelworks needed to 
be located on the coast to reduce transport costs inland552.   The 1966 Benson 
Report recognised this and recommended a relocation of the industry.  However, this 
was beyond the resources of most steel companies.   
 
A further problem for the steel companies was a fundamental change in steelmaking 
technology.  A new steelmaking technique known as the Linz-Donawitz or Basic 
Oxygen System/Steel process (BOS) was developed in Austria.  It consisted of basic 
oxygen top blown converters which eventually displaced the open-hearth method of 
steelmaking.  By 1956 BOS steel cost just 55% of the cost of open-hearth steel.  It 
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needed less fuel, labour and capital investment553.  By 1965 the cost differential was 
between $2-$10/ton in favour of BOS steelmaking554.  Yet it was 1964 before British 
commercial BOS production really got underway.  By 1966 26.1% of British steel 
production was by the BOS process.  Britain had caught up with the USA and most 
continental producers but remained someway behind Japan555.  Britain‟s first BOS 
plant was commissioned at Ebbw Vale in 1960 followed by Llanwern (1962), 
Ravenscraig (1964), Consett (1964) and Scunthorpe (1964)556.  At a time of declining 
profits the steel companies continued to invest in new steelmaking technology but 
most of this investment was made at inland sites.  Investing at these sites reinforced 
the steel industry‟s locational problems. 
 
Another significant technological change was the introduction of continuous casting 
(concast).  This is the process of pouring molten steel into a casting machine where 
it is cooled and emerges as a continuously moving slab or billet.  It eliminates the 
need for primary rolling and reduces energy, labour and capital costs, saves space 
and increases yield.  The British steel industry, like most Western countries, but 
unlike Japan, was slow to widely adopt continuous casting.  Other technological 
changes such as screened sinter, fuel oil and oxygen injection in the iron making 
process and using oxygen in the steelmaking process were all introduced. 
 
The British steel industry was faced with growing foreign competition as continental 
producers recovered from the war, depressed prices, relatively more expensive raw 
materials which favoured new sites, the need to invest in new technology and a 
levelling off in demand.  With companies too small to undertake the necessary 
structural changes a fall in profits was inevitable.    
 
(ii) Expansion under nationalisation, 1950-1954 
During the early 1950s planners at both the SCoW and RTB forecast further growth 
in tinplate demand.  The table below is a combination of their forecasts throughout 
the 1950s along with actual tinplate production. 
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Home 500,000 700,000 605,000 675,000 570,000 700,000 - 
Exports  250,000 400,000 303,000 440,000* 322,000 328,000** - 
Totals 750,000 1,100,000 908,000 1,115,000 892,000 1,028,000 1,234,000 
*   excludes Australia 
** based upon reduced exports due to increased foreign production 
In 1952 James Steele of the ISC recommended that a second tinplate works linked 
to the new Port Talbot strip mill, should be built to meet the likely growth in demand 
and to replace the remaining hand mills :-   
 







Continuous Mills    
Ebbw Vale 202,813 311,500  
Trostre 5,322 390,000  
New Mill Nil 345,000  
Total 208,135 1,046,500  
Hand Mills    
RTB 47,464 Nil  
SCoW 264,864 Nil  
Others 236,423 53,500  
Totals 548,751 53,500  
Grand Total 756,886 1,100,000 1,043,000 
 
Steele estimated that Ebbw Vale‟s Tinplate Work produced tinplate that was 5/11d 
per box cheaper than the old hand mills567.  He also claimed that a third modern 
tinplate works (alongside Ebbw Vale and Trostre) was essential to retain the 
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overseas markets.  As the hand mills were largely located in West Wales there was 
pressure to build the new tinplate works there.  The SCoW chose Llangyfelach for its 
second tinplate works.  It was 7 miles from Swansea and 13 miles from Port Talbot 
and was named Velindre Tinplate Works. This site was originally favoured by the 
SCoW over Trostre.  King‟s Dock Swansea, Trostre and the Abbey Works were 
alternative sites considered and rejected568.  The Ministry of Supply and the SCoW 
concluded that Port Talbot was the most economic site for the tinplate works.  There 
would be a 5% saving on construction costs and a ¾% production cost advantage569.  
Nevertheless the location was rejected by the SCoW and that decision approved by 
the ISC because570 :- 
 
a) The workforce would need a substantial number of new houses. 
b) The SCoW‟s operations in the Port Talbot area were as large as could be 
managed efficiently. 
c) Labour relations at the Abbey Works would be too complex. 
d) Dirtier operations at Port Talbot could adversely affect tinplate production. 
e) It would interfere with other Port Talbot construction. 
f) The site at Llangyfelach was partly prepared. 
g) Separating the tinplate works and strip mill would be advantageous for 
defence purposes. 
 
These reasons do not appear to be particularly convincing.  There were certainly 
employment reasons to site the tinplate works near Swansea.  Land available at the 
Abbey Works may have been earmarked for other uses.  As will be shown later 
several unsuccessful attempts were made to build a second strip mill at the Abbey 
Works and even as early as 1951 the SCoW may have wanted to keep the available 
land for this.  The outcome was that for the second time a strategic mistake was 
made in not integrating the strip mill with a tinplate works at Port Talbot. 
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To supply the new tinplate works additional steel was needed.  The planning for this 
was set out in Development Scheme „L‟ in 1952 (see table 7.5).  The strip mill was 
producing 23,000 tons/week but with sufficient slabs available was capable of 
producing 37,000 tons/week.  This required the production of 44,000 tons/week of 
ingots.  
 
Table 7.5: Scheme L: Planned Weekly Output & 1957 Actual Output (tons)571  
Product Planned Weekly Capacity  Average 1957 Weekly Output  
Coke 23,400 22,350 
Pig Iron 29,000 30,000 
Ingot Steel 44,000 48,000 
Coil/Strip/Plate 37,000 40,000 
 
The Abbey Melting Shop would increase production to 30,000 tons/week of ingots 
with Port Talbot and Margam Melting Shops each providing 7,000 tons/week.  To 
release 3,500 extra tons/week of ingots for the strip mill Port Talbot‟s bar mill closed 
in June 1952572.  As Port Talbot‟s plate mill had already closed the scheme reduced 
Port Talbot to exclusively producing ingots for the strip mill.  To raise production in 
the Abbey Melting Shop 4x200 ton open-hearth furnaces were added to the existing 
eight573.  This increased level of steelmaking required an estimated 2 million tons of 
imported ore, 0.75 million tons of home ore and 0.4 million tons of purchased scrap 
annually.  The imported ore would come largely from Sydvaranger via Narvik and 
Sierra Leone in the form of concentrates.   
 
Scheme L included a new large Number 4 blast furnace with a hearth diameter of 
29‟9” and a capacity of 10,000 tons/week574.  The existing blast furnace site was too 
restricted, so a new site was developed to the south.  It was a similar design to 
Numbers 2 and 3 but larger.  By mid 1956 it was operating above planned 
capacity575.  It is shown below in the 1950s together with its relationship to the future 
Number 5 blast furnace :- 
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Scheme L was approved by the Ministry of Supply and the ISC on 29th November 
1952576.  Construction took place during 1953-1956 (see Appendix 11 for details).  It 
increased ingot output from 37,000 tons/week in 1952 to approximately 48,000 
tons/week and strip mill output to 40,000 tons/week in 1957577.  In 1952 the initial 
cost of the expansion was estimated to be £32.97 million (see Appendix 12).  The 
final cost of Scheme L was £54 million578.  
 
In parallel with Scheme L the British Oxygen Company built Britain‟s first bulk 
oxygen production plant at Margam producing 100 tons/day.  It was used in the 
Abbey Melting Shop‟s open-hearth furnaces to speed up and increase output and for 
removing surface scale on the slabs in the slabbing mill.  The SCoW estimated that 
after Scheme L the use of oxygen would increase the Abbey Melting Shop‟s output 
by 160,000 tons/year.  Oxygen was then introduced into the Margam and later into 
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Port Talbot Melting Shops.  Margam Melting Shop could now produce high silicon 
steel for sheet used in the electrical industry and special quality deep drawing sheets 
for the motor industry579.   
 
Scheme L was a logical extension of Scheme K and primarily designed to meet 
increased tinplate demand.  The decision not to build the second tinplate works at 
Port Talbot perpetuated the lack of integration.  The new steelmaking plant built at 
the Abbey Works was generally just an extension of existing plant but it was 
successful in allowing ingot production to increase from 1.3 million tons in 1953 to 
2.1 million tons in 1957 (see Appendix 13).  In practical terms by 1957 production 
had reached full capacity. 
 
(iii) Break up of SCoW/RTB and denationalisation 
The Conservative Government of 1951 was committed to returning the steel industry 
to the private sector.  The Iron and Steel Act of May 1953 introduced two new 
organisations.  „The Iron and Steel Holding Realisation Agency‟ (ISHRA) assumed 
ownership of the companies and had responsibility for their resale.   „The Iron and 
Steel Board‟ (ISB) had the power to fix maximum prices and to prevent (but not 
compel) proposed developments.  It was hoped, incorrectly, that this would maintain 
a level of public control sufficient to prevent further nationalisation580. 
 
The equity sale of several large formally publicly quoted companies started in 
October 1953 with the sale of United Steel.  By January 1955 Stewarts and Lloyds, 
John Summers, Colvilles, Dorman Long and Lancashire Steel had been sold.  United 
Steel, John Summers, Consett and Dorman Long reappeared in their pre-
nationalisation form581.  In 1952 just before denationalisation, the state owned ISC 
had eliminated the crossholdings of shares between RTB, SCoW and GKN.  The 
SCoW and RTB were now administered as one company (the RTSC) with identical 
boards (except for one member each) although both the SCoW and RTB retained 
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separate identities582.  During the sell-off GKN repurchased Cardiff East Moors 
steelworks through a private sale583.  The ISB unsuccessfully argued against splitting 
the RTSC back into the SCoW and RTB on economic and financial grounds584.  In 
October 1955 the ISHRA announced that as a preliminary step to sell off RTB and 
the SCoW, the RTSC would be split and separate Boards re-established585.  The 
SCoW‟s Chairman, Ernest Lever, left to remain with RTB.  Despite the split the 
„RTSC Sales‟ company, which sold the products of both companies, remained in 
place586.  
 
There were a number of reasons for the split.  Firstly it was apparent that the 
markets could handle the sale of the individual companies more easily than as a 
single entity587.  Secondly, as will be seen, RTB was about to embark on building a 
new strip mill.  A sale involving a company with so much debt would be difficult.  In 
fact, RTB was never sold.  In the context of denationalisation the decision to sell the 
SCoW separately was realistic.  It is unlikely that the RTSC could have been sold as 
an entity.  Yet the decision helped to prolong the fragmented nature of the steel 
industry which could not be sustained in the long-term.  An important opportunity for 
long-term reconstruction of the steel industry was missed. 
 
On 14th March 1957 the public were offered 40 million SCoW £1 ordinary shares.  
The offer was over subscribed with applications for 45.7 million shares so larger 
applications were scaled down.  Metal Box bought one million shares and GKN two 
million shares588.  The SCoW was now totally separate from RTB.  Thus 
denationalisation further fragmented the South Wales steel industry.  This made 
restructuring more difficult particularly once profits started to decline.  The 1966 
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Benson Report recognised the steel industry‟s flawed structure and tried to promote 
mergers but within the private sector.  At the time of the SCoW sale an 8% yield was 
forecast.  This was higher than other companies at denationalisation :- 
 
Table 7.6: Steel Share Prices and Yields589 
 Issue Price Forecast % Yield 1957 Price 1957 % Yield 
Colvilles 26s 0d 6.9 30s 7½d 7.2 
Dorman Long 22s 6d 7.1 24s 6d 6.5 
Lancashire Steel 22s 0d 7.3 29s 3d 7.5 
Stewarts & 
Lloyds 
17s 6d 7.1 28s 9d 6.1 
John Summers 24s 6d 7.3 32s 3d 7.4 
United Steel 25s 0d 7.2 30s 9d 8.1 
SCoW 20s 0d 8.0 - - 
 
The SCoW offer was the largest amount raised to date in a single day by the City of 
London in an issue of one class of shares590.  It produced 29,000 SCoW 
shareholders.  This included one in twelve employees as a result of the company 
setting up an employee share purchase scheme591.  The share price peaked at an 
average price of £1-4s-1½d in 1963.  By early 1964 it had fallen to £1-0s-9d due to 
declining profits and concerns over a new Labour Government‟s probable 
renationalisation592.  
 
The SCoW‟s denationalisation came relatively late in the process.  The disentangling 
of the SCoW from RTSC caused some delay and, unlike many steel companies, the 
financial structure of the SCoW that emerged from denationalisation was different to 
that at nationalised.  It was no longer fundamentally a holding company for other 
steelmakers.  In that sense denationalisation created a company with a different 
financial structure but it retained ownership of the same works.  What 
denationalisation failed to do was to address the problem of the British steel 
industry‟s fragmented ownership.  In South Wales it even fragmented it further.   
 
 




 Brinn, p.12. 
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(iv) The Coming of the 4th and 5th strip mills, 1957-1960 
The late 1950s saw the Government make a major mistake that handicapped flat 
steel product production for three decades and would prevent Port Talbot from 
reaching its full potential.  In 1957 the ISB published the third post war development 
plan which envisaged a demand for 29 million ingot tons by 1962 including 5 million 
tons of exports593.  Actual steel production in 1962 was 20.49 million tons (including 
4 million tons of exports) (see table 7.1)594.  Although a year of relatively low 
production it highlighted the gap between the forecast and actual production.  The 
problem was that the underpinning assumption was that wider industrial output 
would increase by 3¾% per annum595.  Burn, writing in 1961 was correctly sceptical 
about the assumptions behind the plan of growth in the working labour force from 
½% to 1% a year and a yearly rise in productivity of 3% underpinning the 
forecasts596.  The plan called for the building of a fourth strip mill, but many within the 
industry were sceptical about the need for it597.  The logic behind this was that there 
would be an increase of 88.8% in steel consumption in car production for the home 
market from 430,000 to 812,000 tons between 1954 and 1962598.  Total car 
production increased from 64,100 units/month in 1954 to 104,100 in 1962599 i.e. a 
62% increase.  Although 1962 was a year of low car production, and it would 
increase above this, growth was not as strong as forecast.  
 
RTB was the first to put forward a proposal to build the fourth strip mill which they 
proposed to locate near Newport in South Wales.  Burn attributes this to the 
termination of the joint administration of RTB and the SCoW in 1955 prior to 
privatisation of the SCoW.  He argues that it undid the benefits of the merger of 
Richard Thomas with Baldwins in 1945 as it left RTB with much of the obsolete 
capacity and in need of modernisation.  Their initial plan was for a slab making 
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steelworks at Newport to be fully integrated later600.  This would alleviate the need for 
RTB to bring slabs in at Ebbw Vale from Redbourn and West Wales601.    
 
However, strong pressure was also exerted to locate the mill in Scotland.  In May 
1957 Sir Robert MacLean, a Scottish industrialist, spoke at a meeting of MPs 
arguing for the strip mill to be located in Scotland.  He argued that the new mill was 
needed as Scotland‟s proportion of Britain‟s steel output was falling and that it would 
relieve the area‟s high unemployment.  MacLean even argued that it was not just a 
question of the economics of the strip mill but a question of attaining a balanced 
economy throughout Britain602.  If built in Scotland the mill would be built by Colvilles.  
Colvilles‟ Chairman, Sir Andrew McCance, argued that the scheme was not viable603.  
As Heal argues, of the parties directly involved, Colvilles were the last to be 
persuaded as to the merits of the project.  They were persuaded largely by a £50 
million Government loan604.  As for location Grangemouth was proposed.  Burn 
argues that this site would give access to relatively cheaply imported Swedish ore 
but had no access to cheap home ore605.  Although suffering from the same paucity 
of suitable coking coal as the rest of Scotland the ore argument is spurious as the 
economics were shifting to foreign sourced ores.  Grangemouth was a coastal site 
that would have made more economic sense than the site chosen.  The site chosen 
was Ravenscraig, an inland site which already had some iron and steelmaking plant.  
Heal describes Ravenscraig as an example of a major development whose 
causative factors lay in economic and social factors of the community as a whole 
rather than in the economic forces of the industry606.     
 
On 18th November 1958 the Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, announced, largely to 
maintain Conservative support in Scotland, that there would be not one but two new 
strip mills.  One was to be built in Scotland and the other in South Wales.  Almost all 
the industry including the ISB and BISF were opposed to building a fifth strip mill.  
They recognised that demand did not exist to support it but were overruled by the 
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Government.  The minimum economic steelmaking capacity for a new plant was 3 
million tons but steelmaking plants of only half this capacity were built attached to 
larger capacity strip mills.   
 
Llanwern was built by RTB near Newport and Colvilles built Ravenscraig near 
Motherwell.  The Government agreed to loan £60 million to RTB for a project 
estimated to cost £100 million in 1959 and £50 million to Colvilles607.  By 1961 
Llanwern‟s estimated cost had risen to £134 million, RTB was returning a loss and 
unlikely to make a profit608.  As for Ravenscraig, because of adverse trading 
conditions during 1961-62, Colvilles had to turn to the Government and the banks for 
an additional £23 million of funding609.  Payne argues that, without nationalisation, 
the building of the strip mill cast doubts over Colvilles‟ long-term prospects610.  
Vaizey states that Colvilles were virtually bankrupt by 1961611.  Therefore of Britain‟s 
five strip mills only Port Talbot‟s did not cause the parent company serious financial 
problems.  That was attributable to a pooling of resources at Port Talbot.  Llanwern‟s 
hot strip mill went into production in August 1962 and Ravenscraig‟s in December 
1962 just as the rate of growth in demand slipped below forecast612. 
 
Ravenscraig stimulated some investment with car and vehicle plants being built at 
Linwood and Bathgate but less than anticipated.  Both Llanwern and Ravenscraig 
lacked the locational advantages of Port Talbot as steelmaking sites i.e. they lacked 
an attached ore port.  The fact that they were built with uneconomic steelmaking 
capacities meant that there would be pressure to increase capacity to an economic 
level.  This would prevent Port Talbot from reaching its full economic steelmaking 
potential and exerted downward pressure on the SCoW‟s profits.  Their very 
existence and the need to expand their steelmaking capacity marginalised and 
exposed Ebbw Vale‟s locational disadvantages and Shotton‟s obsolete plant.  By 
nationalisation in 1967 the British steel industry faced severe problems.  The strip 
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mill sector was particularly exposed to unexpected downturns because of its 
overcapacity. 
 
(v) Compromises in expansion and modernisation 
On 1st May 1956 the SCoW announced its third development scheme, Development 
Scheme „M‟613.  It was intended to increase output and modernise all the Steel 
Division‟s departments.  Planning had started in September 1954 primarily as a 
response to increasing forecasts for strip steel and particularly sheet614.  Between 
1953 and 1954 steel exports had increased from 2.75 to 2.89 million tons/annum 
even though exports of sheet were restricted to meet home demand615.   
 
To satisfy this increased demand for sheet at the Abbey Works the key was to 
increase hot strip mill output.  Building the slabbing mill and hot strip mill with 
different capacities was a mistake in the initial planning of the strip mill which needed 
to be addressed.  With modifications the slabbing mill could handle a maximum of 
about 60,000 tons/week of ingots which was equivalent to about 50,000 tons/week of 
slab but the strip mill could produce about 60,000 tons/week of coil616.  
 
An increase of approximately 10,000 tons/week of hot rolled coil from 40,000 
tons/week after the completion of Scheme L required 14,000 extra tons/week of steel 
ingots and 9,300 tons/week of extra pig iron.  This required a new blast furnace 
which in turn required an additional 4,400 tons/week of coke617.  This was achieved 
by building the Grange Coke Ovens.  To increase sheet production it was proposed 
to install a 56” 4-stand cold mill in addition to the existing 3-stand mill.  These mills 
alone needed up to 24,000 tons/week of hot rolled strip618.  Therefore Scheme M 
would raise output to:- 
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Table 7.7: Scheme M: Planned Weekly Output619 
Product Weekly Capacity (tons) 
Coke 30,000 
Pig Iron 40,000 
Crude Steel 









The SCoW and the ISB met on 22nd July 1955 to discuss the development scheme.  
The ISB‟s main concern was whether Port Talbot Dock could handle the required 
120,000 tons/week of imported iron ore and whether sufficient shipping was 
available620.  They went to considerable lengths to confirm this.  On 2nd December 
1955 BISC (Ore) Ltd confirmed that the existing ore carriers plus 9 new vessels on 
order would be sufficient to support the higher level of production envisaged.  
However, the limitations of Port Talbot Dock‟s small lock and difficult approach 
channel were beginning to be felt.  The cost per ton of iron ore discharged at Port 
Talbot using 8,000 ton ships was 30/- per ton whereas for 15,000 ton ships at other 
ports it was only 25/- per ton.  Port Talbot‟s Harbour Master reassured the ISB that 
with adequate ore carriers available Margam Wharf could discharge about 115,000 
tons/week621.  It was also confirmed that Swansea was not a realistic alternative622.  
In January 1956 the ISB met senior management of the Dock Section of the British 
Transport Commission.  They confirmed that 3.5 million tons/year of ore could be 
imported through Port Talbot Dock.  They also confirmed that a new lock could be 
built to dock 15,000 ton vessels and that the entrance channel widened at a cost of 
£14 million but it could only be deepened from 21‟ to 23‟.  This would restrict the 
docking of 15,000 ton vessels to only a third of the tides which was not cost 
effective623.  Even the 8,000 ton ore carriers when fully loaded were unable to enter 
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the dock on all tides.  The result was that the old lock continued to be used and the 
SCoW had to rely on the smaller ore carriers.  A direct cost disadvantage of 5/- per 
ton on imported ore meant that based on imports of 3.5 million tons/year there was 
an additional production cost of £875,000 a year.   
 
The ISB evaluated the financial aspects of Scheme M through a report by Thompson 
McLintock.  This confirmed the SCoW figures of £47.3 million for fixed assets and 
£4.6 million for current assets in Scheme M624.  The report estimated that the 
additional profit generated by Scheme M would be £7.75 million before depreciation 
i.e. a 15% return on their investment of £51.9 million.  This was the same as overall 
investment by the SCoW to date :- 
 
Table 7.8: SCoW Return on Capital Employed625 
Scheme % Profit On Capital 
Scheme „K‟ 17% on £95,700,000 
Additional Profit on Scheme „L‟ 12% on £52,600,000 
Total Profit At End of Scheme „L‟ 15% on £148,300,000 
Additional Profit On Scheme „M‟ 15% on £51,900,000 
Total Profit At End Of Scheme „M‟ 15% on £200,200,000 
 
There were several important developments within Scheme M.  Firstly, a new larger 
blast furnace, Number 5, similar to Number 4 but with a larger 31‟ hearth diameter626.  
Blown in during May 1959 by September it was producing over 11,800 tons of 
iron/week and by 1960 14,000 tons/week627.  Alongside this the Very Low Nitrogen 
(VLN) Melting Shop was built.  The VLN was designed to produce an extra 12,000 
tons/week of steel628.  It consisted of 3 bottom blown converters charged with lime, 
scrap, and molten iron blown by a mixture of oxygen-steam through the charge for 
10 minutes.  Unlike a Bessemer system where air is blown through the charge there 
was little nitrogen contamination of the steel.  The improved steel quality allowed 
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strip steel to be produced.  „Demag‟ in Germany designed and built the three 50 ton 
capacity converters629. 
 
The VLN process was introduced mainly because it met quality requirements and 
required a lower capital investment than open-hearth furnaces630.  It was a quick and 
cheap solution to met urgent demand pressures but it added to the complexity and 
hence cost of steelmaking.  By this time it was apparent that oxygen would play a 
bigger role in steelmaking yet it was unclear whether VLN, BOS or the Kaldo system 
would become the dominant system.  The SCoW did not choose the system that was 
to prove the most successful and become dominant in the industry, but it was not too 
damaging a decision as the capacity was relatively low in relation to works capacity.  
With the addition of the VLN Melting Shop steelmaking now took place in 4 melting 
shops each with separate requirements.  The VLN process required pig iron with 
between 1.0% and 1.6% phosphorus content.  As a result Number 1 blast furnace 
was used exclusively to supply the VLN plant631.  The plant remained in production 
for only 10 years before being replaced by a BOS plant. 
 
The third critical development was the replacement of the slabbing mill with a new 
Davy-United universal mill with greater capacity to bring it in line with strip mill 
capacity and remedy the shortage of slabbing capacity that was now hampering 
production.  Installation of the new slabbing mill caused a major interruption to 
production.  Starting in August 1958 the SCoW had purchased and stockpiled 
58,000 tons of slabs from Consett, RTB and Shotton to supply the strip mill during 
the changeover.  The changeover took place in November 1958 and cost £1¾ 
million632.  The new slabbing mill is shown below :-  
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Finally a Davy-United 4 stand cold mill was added to the existing 3 stand cold mill to 
increase cold mill capacity633 (see Appendix 15 for details of Scheme M).   
 
If Scheme L was a logical extension of Scheme K, Scheme M was the result of 
pressure to expand output as quickly and cheaply as possible to meet increasing 
demand.  The new slabbing mill rectified the shortage of slab capacity in Scheme K.  
Building the VLN plant was a mistake.  It was a poor choice of technology and 
needed to be replaced within ten years.  It also further complicated an already 
complex steelmaking and control operation.  The Abbey Melting Shop contained its 
maximum number of open-hearth furnaces and no others could be added.  The 
SCoW had to find new solutions but it stored up problems for future efficiency of 
production by pursuing short-term solutions.   
 
Some of the improvements within Scheme M, as will be seen, were essentially short-
term compromises.  There were other compromises at this time.  When the capacity 
of Number 1 blast furnace was increased in 1959 by relining its hearth diameter to 
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23‟9”, a ¼ mile long 60” wide conveyor belt was installed at Margam Wharf to take 
ore away for crushing and screening634.  This improvement to burden preparation 
was advantageous but taking the ore away from Margam Wharf, processing it and 
returning it to the blast furnaces there was inefficient.  It was a price that the SCoW 
paid for its cramped inherited plant at Margam Wharf.  The cramped site can be 
seen in the photograph of the site below.  The building of Numbers 4 and 5 blast 
furnaces meant that there were 4 different sizes of blast furnaces.  Number 5 needed 
a higher percentage of sinter and tapped into a difficult type of ladle which further 




Until 1960 the SCoW‟s production process was relatively inefficient.  This was due in 
part to the inherited plant, restrictions imposed by the size of the dock, lack of access 
to the best overseas coking coals and errors in the 1950s expansion programmes.  
Control within such a large and complex steelworks was difficult.  The method 
adopted was known as the „ingot controller‟ (it was a function rather than an 
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individual) (similarly, iron supply was coordinated by the „hot metal controller‟).  The 
ingot controller coordinated all melting shops, soaking pits, ingot stripper bay and all 
movements by radio.  By 1960 there were 27 furnaces of varying size and 18 
different sizes of ingot mould all needing control and coordination635.  Control was 
made more difficult with dispersed production units as shown below (taken c1956).  
Port Talbot Steelworks is at the bottom, Margam at the quayside and the Abbey 
Works in the distance.  The distance involved considerable internal movements 




One of the biggest control problems related to raw material stocks.  During the first 
half of 1959 the SCoW received 105 different grades of South Wales coal636.  All 
attempts to reduce the number of different coal grades from the NCB failed.  In 1961 
the SCoW applied to the Government to import 250,000 tons of American coking 
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coal637.  The President of the Board of Trade, Reginald Maudling, wanted to give 
approval but was overruled by the Cabinet in order to maintain UK mining jobs638.  
Yet the SCoW still made considerable improvements in coke consumption.  Between 
1952 and 1966 coke consumption per ton of pig iron produced fell by almost a half 
as coal prices rose (see Appendix 22).  This was attributable to a number of factors 
such as new and larger blast furnaces, richer ores, better burden preparation and oil 
injection.   Between 1953 and 1957 average UK coke consumption fell from 21.2 
cwt/ton of pig iron to 18.9 (the equivalent German figures were 20.2 to 19.2 
cwt/ton)639.  Port Talbot‟s figures were 22.0 to 18.0 cwt/ton640.  This indicates a 
greater increase in efficiency at Port Talbot than the wider UK industry.  By 1963 the 
average UK figure was 14.4 cwt/ton of iron641 but Port Talbot was 13.9 cwt/ton (see 
Appendix 22).  
 
A similar problem existed with iron ore.  During 1959 the SCoW received 24 different 
types of ore.  Each had to be stocked and treated separately.  The sheer number of 
different ore types reduced steelmaking efficiency642. 
 
Yet with high demand these complexities were not critical issues.  The crucial factor 
was maximising production as cheaply as possible.  By 1960 Scheme M had 
substantially increased production of coke, iron, ingots and rolled products643 (see 
Appendices 13 and 16 for details).  The SCoW accounted for a quarter of the 
increase in British ingot production between 1957 and 1960.  It enabled the strip mill 
to meet rapidly expanding demand for sheet and coil :- 
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Table 7.9: Strip Mill Output Distribution in Schemes L and M (tons/week)644 
 January 1955 Post Scheme L Post Scheme M 
Trostre 8,500 8,500 9,500 
Velindre - 8,500 9,500 
Newport (Orb) 1,200 2,000 1,394 
Cold Mill 9,000 13,000 22,406 
HR Sheets & 
Plates 
7,000 6,200 5,300 
Sale of Coils 1,800 1,800 2,000 
Total 27,500 40,000 50,100 
  
Until 1960 little appears in the SCoW literature relating to product quality.  The 
emphasis was on increasing output, often resulting in indifferent quality.  After 1960 
as competition increased quality started to become an issue.  With surplus capacity 
emerging customers demanded better quality which increased the cost of 
production645.  Within the SCoW demands for greater product quality was seen as an 
inconvenience in the production process646.  The required shift in mindset from 
maximising output of an indifferent quality to basing production around quality of 
product was slow to develop.  
 
The period 1951-1960 was one of expansion and increasing profits (see next 
chapter).  This was primarily driven by growing demand for tinplate and sheet fuelled 
by increasing demand for consumer goods and particularly sheet from the car 
industry at a time when the European steel industry was still being rebuilt.  These 
factors hid the structural problems of the British steel industry i.e. too many 
companies and steelworks of suboptimal size.  High demand also delayed the full 
impact of the shift in the relative cost advantage of raw materials from domestic to 
overseas sources.  Port Talbot was particularly well suited to benefit from this 
change.  As will be seen later the SCoW undoubtedly exploited the commercial 
opportunities of the 1950s but this in itself caused problems.  The pressure to 
generate profits led to investment in plant that was inappropriate, overmanning and a 
failure to address poor working practices.  In the 1960s it also became clear that the 
biggest blow to the SCoW in the 1950s had been the decision to build the two new 
strip mills.  
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Chapter 8: Strategy, Technology and Corporate Performance 
1961-1967 
 
The Government decision to build the two new strip mills at Llanwern and 
Ravenscraig shifted the competitive ground around Port Talbot and challenged its 
role as the leading strip mill.  It introduced large amounts of new capacity that, as 
many had feared, exceeded demand and it brought new competitors with modern 
plants into the strip mill sector.  At first, the SCoW attempted to get their own scheme 
for strip mill expansion at Port Talbot approved, even though this meant proposing a 
sixth strip mill not long after having questioned the need for even a fourth strip mill.  
When this failed, the emphasis shifted from running a plant with few competitors that 
could focus on the maximisation of output to improving the efficiency and cost of the 
existing plant to take on the new competitors in a more difficult market.  The result 
was significant technical progress including the resolution of Port Talbot‟s serious 
limitations imposed by the dock and a transition to best practice BOS steelmaking 
technology.  These changes provided the platform for the long-term survival of 
steelmaking at Port Talbot into the twenty-first century.  The corporate performance 
of the SCoW and Port Talbot was broadly in line with that of the wider industry in the 
1960s.  The high levels of profits of the 1950s were gradually eroded during the 
1960s.  Consolidation and modernisation replaced expansion. 
 
(i) The SCoW‟s Proposal for a 6th Strip Mill, 1958 
The continuous expansion of Port Talbot‟s strip and coil capacity in the successive 
development schemes of the 1950s was fuelled by the booming demand for sheet 
steel in the car industry which was reaching its peak at this time.  The approval of the 
two new strip mills at Llanwern and Ravenscraig in November 1958 was followed by 
an expansion of Llanwern‟s planned capacity in 1959 from 1 million to 1.4 million 
tons647.  The SCoW fully realised that RTB‟s new strip mill at Llanwern would shortly 
become a highly modern best practice competitor.  During 1957, the SCoW, along 
with many other steelmakers had been sceptical about the need for a fourth strip 
mill.  In 1957 the SCoW had argued that hot strip mill expansion would be unwise as 
Australia, which took between 120,000-130,000 tons/annum of British tinplate, was 
                                                          
647
 Warren, British Iron and Steel, p.280.  
 
 168 
developing its own productions facilities648.  In May 1958 the SCoW argued that 
three strip mills would be quite adequate to meet likely demand levels in 1965649.  
But as their competitors stole a march on them and demand from the car industry 
remained high they made a belated attempt to persuade the ISB of their own case to 
build a second strip mill at Port Talbot which would have been Britain‟s sixth strip 
mill.   
 
During the debates on the fourth strip mill in 1958, the SCoW had proposed a „half-
size‟ semi continuous strip mill (together with a new steelworks) at Swansea.  This 
would be a narrow 48” wide mill concentrating on strip production for tinplate which 
would free the 80” mill at the Abbey Works to concentrate on long runs of wide strip 
for the car industry650.  It would produce 10,000-12,000 tons/week of coil 
(approximately 500,000 tons/annum) with potential to be expanded to a million tons 
plus in the future.  This was rejected by the ISB in July 1958 during the negotiations 
over Llanwern and Ravenscraig651, but the SCoW brought back the proposal in an 
alternative form in 1959.  
 
Scheme M had added a 4-stand cold mill to the existing 3-stand mill and given the 
existing constraints imposed by the capacity of Port Talbot Dock and the capacity of 
the strip mill, this would fully load the existing strip mill.  However, Cartwright argued 
that the Abbey Works could accommodate a further 5-stand cold mill that could roll 
an initial 12,000-13,000 tons/week of hot strip, with a capacity to increase sheet 
production to 35,000 tons/week within 5-10 years652.  The steel coil for this mill could 
either be supplied from a new SCoW steelworks at Swansea or the RTB‟s new strip 
mill at Llanwern, though the SCoW disliked the latter option because “it would not be 
very desirable to have the hot strip mill in one ownership and the cold mill in 
another653.” 
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Cartwright and the SCoW continued to press proposals for a Swansea scheme in 
1958-59.  This developed into the unrealistic Development Schemes „S‟ and „T‟.  
Under Scheme S ore unloading and crushing plant would be built at Swansea Dock 
(which would ease the ore bottleneck at Port Talbot Dock).  The ore would then be 
moved by rail to Port Talbot and the resulting liquid steel would be cast into slabs in 
a continuous casting plant operating alongside the slabbing mill which would 
produce 4,000-5,000 tons/week.  The slabs would then be returned to Swansea for 
rolling in a new strip mill in Swansea before being sent to Trostre and Velindre 
Tinplate Works654.  The practicality of this scheme with its elaborate cross-freighting 
is open to question and would have had much higher costs than rolling the strip in a 
second Abbey Works strip mill at Port Talbot, and there is a suspicion that the plan 
might have been advanced in order to be rejected while increasing the chances of 
approval for a second narrower strip mill at Port Talbot.  Scheme S was expected to 
cost £40 million.  Scheme T was larger and would cost £60 million but was more 
robust and more ambitious.  In addition to the ore dock at Swansea a blast furnace, 
electric arc steelmaking and a cold mill would also be built at Swansea to enable it to 
make some of its own slabs while sourcing the remainder through Port Talbot.  The 
SCoW claimed that it could fund Scheme S from its own resources if it was 
guaranteed against renationalisation but would need Government investment for the 
larger project655.   In November 1958 the SCoW asked the ISB for permission to buy 
land in Swansea for the project656.  Thereafter the project dropped out of sight. 
 
Instead, in 1959 the SCoW‟s emphasis shifted to what was probably their preferred 
project, to build a second narrower 48” hot strip mill to the south of the Abbey 
Works657.  To support this mill, it was proposed to expand steel production by 
enlarging the Abbey and VLN Melting Shops and to replace Port Talbot and possibly 
Margam Melting Shops with BOS and electric furnaces.  A sixth blast furnace would 
be built to increase pig iron production to 55,000-60,000 tons/week658.  The plan did 
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not include an explanation as to how the additional ore required would be obtained, 
given that Port Talbot Dock was already stretched to capacity. 
 
The hot strip mill was part of Development Scheme „V‟ submitted to the ISB by the 
SCoW.  It was costed at £33.1 million659 (see Appendix 17).  The SCoW‟s Pode and 
Peake met with the ISB in October 1959.  The mill would initially produce 8,000 
tons/week (400,000 tons/annum) but would have a potential capacity of up to 1.2 
million tons/annum.  This would bring overall strip mill output levels at Port Talbot to 
57,000 ton/week or close to 3 million tons/annum, comparable to major plants in the 
USA660 :- 
 
Table 8.1: Scheme V: Weekly Output and Allocation (tons)661 
Facility Maximum Output 
Scheme M  
Maximum Output 
Scheme V  
Blast Furnace Coke 30,000 30,000 
Pig Iron 40,000 44,600 
Open-Hearth Furnaces 47,000 54,200 
Bessemer 12,000 14,000 
Total Steel Production 59,000 68,200 
Hot Strip Mills 49,000 57,000 
Allocation   
Tinplate 23,000 23,000 
Newport 2,400 2,400 
Cold Reduced Sheet 18,600 26,000 
Hot Rolled Sheets & 
Plates 
5,000 5,600 
Total Allocated 49,000 57,000 
 
The narrower mill would concentrate on strip for tinplate leaving the 80” mill free to 
focus on wide strip for the car and domestic appliance industries.  Despite their 
optimistic forecasts, the ISB could not be persuaded that there was sufficient 
demand to justify the construction of a sixth strip mill at the same time as Llanwern 
and Ravenscraig.  The Port Talbot scheme would require the cancellation of at least 
one of the two mills already commissioned and that was out of the question in view 
of Government commitments to those schemes.  If all three went ahead the Port 
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Talbot plant would simply serve to undermine the RTB mill at Llanwern662.  Instead, 
as already noted, Llanwern was permitted to further increase its planned capacity 
during 1959663. 
 
(ii) Strategic Shifts from Expansion to Efficiency, 1960-1967 
The ISB did approve most of Scheme V‟s proposals apart from the strip mill in 
February 1960664 (see Appendix 18 for details).  The omission of the strip mill 
reduced costs to £20 million.  Annual ingot capacity was to increase by 650,000 tons 
to 3,650,000 tons665.  Without the new strip mill steelmaking capacity now exceeded 
rolling capacity.  This put the future of the older less efficient Port Talbot and 
Margam Melting Shops in doubt.   
 
Under Scheme V, 4x200 ton open-hearth furnaces in the Abbey Melting Shop were 
replaced, not with BOS furnaces, but with 4x400 ton Maerz Boelens open-hearth 
furnaces while a fourth VLN converter was added to the VLN Melting Shop666.   One 
of the Maerz Boelens furnaces is shown below :- 
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Thus the Abbey Works continued to use two different steelmaking methods, each 
with separate requirements, and neither of which was the cutting edge technology 
(BOS) of the time.  Their more ambitious scheme to introduce a continuous casting 
machine to produce 4,000 tons/week of slabs was unfortunately premature.  
Technical problems with casting rimmed steel could not be overcome and the caster 
was abandoned after five years development667. 
 
Steelmaking in the Port Talbot Melting Shop had become uneconomic and the 
SCoW decided to concentrate production at the more efficient and enlarged Abbey 
and VLN Melting Shops668.  Port Talbot Melting Shop closed in June 1961.  Its 600 
workforce was absorbed into the rest of the works669.  Margam Melting Shop was 
closed in March 1963 resulting in a reduction in steelmaking capacity from 3,650,000 
to 3,250,000 tons/annum670.  These measures marked a fundamental shift in the 
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SCoW‟s operating strategy.  Until this point rising demand had required maximising 
steel production as cheaply as possible, but the new strip mills shifted the balance 
between supply and demand for hot rolled strip products towards a surplus in supply.  
To maintain market share and profits the SCoW was forced to improve efficiency and 
reduce production costs.  The closure of the two melting shops was part of that 
process.  But while Llanwern was about to start production using the newer and 
more efficient BOS process, the SCoW‟s approach to technological modernisation 
was confused. 
 
The change in operating strategy meant that between 1961 and 1967 investment 
tended to be directed towards improving efficiency and in particular improvements in 
iron making.  Between 1961 and 1964 the SCoW introduced fuel oil injection into its 
blast furnaces.  It reduced coke consumption by 15% and removed the need for 
additional investment in coking capacity671.  In 1961 automatically operated 
pneumatic drills were installed to tap Numbers 4 and 5 blast furnaces.  This 
improved the quality of iron, minimised delays in preparing the casting house 
between casts and increased output672.  During 1960 experiments were undertaken 
at Number 2 blast furnace with oxygen injection.  Regarded as a success it resulted 
in the building of a second oxygen plant in 1962.  Oxygen enrichment of between 
21% and 25% was then introduced operationally at Numbers 1, 2 and 3 blast 
furnaces.  Numbers 4 and 5 were similarly modified during 1964673.  These and other 
incremental changes resulted in lower coke consumption per ton of iron produced 
(see Appendix 22) at a time of increasing coal costs.  These changes were 
incremental in nature and paralleled the main development schemes.  Most 
investment tended to focus on iron and steelmaking and improvements at the rolling 
end were delayed until the late 1960s.   
 
During 1961 the SCoW instigated a feasibility study to improve strip mill efficiency 
and quality.  It revealed that major mechanical and electrical modifications were 
required before modern sophisticated controls could be installed.  In late August 
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1965 improvements to the roughing stand, finishing stands and exiter were made 
along with installation of new instrumentation at a cost of £3 million.  During 
November 1965 automatic gauge control in the form of a GE Model 412 computer 
was brought into use to improve quality consistency.  It was highly successfully in 
producing strip within +/- 0.002” of requirement674.  This was a year after a similar 
model was installed at Llanwern‟s hot strip mill675.  
 
Early in 1962 investigations took place into applying automatic gauge control to the 4 
stand cold reduction mill.  In mid 1962 an order was placed for a TRW 330 computer 
to satisfy growing customer demand for greater uniformity of gauge and temper and 
to increase yield by reducing breakages.  Installation began early in 1963 with 
commissioning in early 1964.  Considerable difficulties were encountered particularly 
with light-gauges676.  The system was modified in 1967 when the mill was converted 
to 5 stand with the result that light-gauge performance was improved.  In late 1966 
the SCoW began to investigate the possibility of applying computer control to the 
blast furnaces.  By June 1967 a specification was drawn up and early in 1968 
Number 5 became the first British blast furnace to be computerised677.  
 
(iii) Technology Catch-Up and Problem Solving: the New Harbour and BOS 
In 1965 the SCoW once again put forward a proposal to the ISB for a second strip 
mill at the Abbey Works in Development Scheme „A‟678.  However, the other main 
elements of Scheme A had profound effects on the future of Port Talbot.  They 
resolved the long-running weakness of Port Talbot Dock and instigated the transition 
to BOS steelmaking679.  The successful accomplishments of these changes in the 
period before re-nationalisation ensured the long-term survival of steelmaking at Port 
Talbot. 
 
                                                          
674
 Ibid.  Anon. „Hot Strip Mill Automation‟. The Dragon, No95, April 1964, p.1.  
675
 Jonathan Aylen. „Natural experiments in innovation: radical adoption of computers and 
changes to „physical‟ and „social technologies‟ at Llanwern steelworks, South Wales‟. 
Manchester Institute of Innovation Research, 2010. 
676
 Brinn, p.15. 
677
 Ibid, p.14 
678
 Anon. „Company‟s £60m Plans–Proposed development for 1965-70 include a new strip 
mill‟. The Dragon, No107, April 1965, p.1. 
679
 Ibid.  Brinn, p.16. 
 175 
As noted earlier, the limitations of Port Talbot Dock had caused problems with the 
development plans in the 1950s.  Restrictions on the size of ore carriers made it 
uneconomic to use the richer more distant ores.  During 1963 the SCoW and the 
British Transport Docks Board (BTDB) established a joint working party to consider 
building a new harbour at Port Talbot.  Agreement was reached in the spring of 1964 
and approval was received from the ISB in March 1966.  The cost was estimated to 
be approximately £17 million680.  At the same time the ISB rejected the SCoW‟s 
second proposal to build a second strip mill but gave approval to construct a BOS 
plant to replace the Abbey and VLN Melting Shops681. 
 
Despite the second rejection of a second strip mill, this development scheme, 
Development Scheme „A‟, was of immense importance.  It eliminated the bottleneck 
of the inadequacies of the dock and replaced it with modern harbour facilities that 
gave Port Talbot a huge commercial advantage, and changed the steelmaking 
method to the more modern BOS process.  The overall cost of Scheme A was 
estimated to be £50.75 million (see Appendices 19 and 20).  Because of their 
significance it is appropriate to look at them in some detail. 
 
The first attempt to improve the efficiency of importing ore was for British 
steelmakers to operate their own fleet of purpose built ore carriers.  Eventually there 
would be 73 such ore carriers of which 24 were specifically built to use Port Talbot 
Dock682.  The small size of these ore carriers put the SCoW at a cost disadvantage 
per ton of ore discharged compared to other steel companies.  Of the other ports that 
discharged iron ore 13 could handle larger ore carriers.   Despite this during 1963 
Port Talbot Dock discharged more ore than any other UK port (3,058,000 tons)683.  In 
the 1960s a proposal was put forward to import all of Port Talbot and Llanwern‟s ore 
through an enlarged lock at Cardiff Dock, but the Ministry of Transport rejected the 
scheme as uneconomic684.  An alternative proposal was to use Milford Haven to 
import all of Port Talbot and Llanwern‟s ore.  As Milford Haven is 80 miles from Port 
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Talbot and 130 miles from Llanwern the cost of rail transport made the idea 
uneconomic685.  Surprisingly, the SCoW and the Guest Keen Iron and Steel Co 
jointly formed the Angle Ore and Transport Company and even acquired a site at 
Milford Haven before abandoning the idea686.  
 
During 1965 the Government published a White Paper on South Wales iron ore 
imports.  It recommended two terminals with a total capacity of 10 million 
tons/annum capable of handling ships of up to 65,000 tons.  One was a harbour at 
Port Talbot and the other a 4½ mile jetty into the Bristol Channel near Llanwern.  
Costs were estimated to be £17.7 million for Port Talbot and £16.4 million for the 
Llanwern jetty.  Ore costs at both steelworks were expected to be reduced by about 
10s/ton.  RTB rejected the idea of a jetty on cost grounds and because of political 
opposition from Portishead in Somerset687.  It appeared to be a less crucial decision 
for Llanwern as Newport Dock could handle larger ore carriers than Port Talbot Dock 
but the harbour was later to give Port Talbot a production cost advantage over 
Llanwern which ultimately led to the end of steelmaking at Llanwern. 
 
By 1966 the planned size of ore carrier capable of using Port Talbot Harbour had 
increased to 88,000 tons with the possibility of further increases up to 100,000 
tons688.  The SCoW and the BTDB reached and signed an agreement in August 
1966.  Construction of the harbour was the responsibility of the BTDB with the SCoW 
responsible for the unloading equipment.  The latter cost was now estimated to be 
£4 million.  At the signing Cartwright stated that the harbour was the keystone to the 
success of the local steel industry689.  A problem that they encountered was the 
requirement to pay an additional £800,000/annum in rates, which could have made 
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the scheme unviable.  After negotiations with the Government this figure was halved 
to guarantee the development690. 
 
Construction of Port Talbot Harbour began in September 1966691.  It consisted of a 
2¾ mile approach channel leading to a 400 acres area protected by two 
breakwaters.  Within this a jetty was located with a dredged basin alongside.  On the 
2,500‟ long jetty were located two Arrol built, Dravo designed, transporter unloaders 
which were each rated at 2,000 tons/hour.  Fully laden vessels of up to 100,000 tons 
could be berthed compared to ore carriers of less than 10,000 tons using Port Talbot 
Dock692.  The actual cost of building the harbour was £20 million693.   The harbour 
changed the whole economics of making strip steel in Britain in Port Talbot‟s favour.  
Not only were costs per ton of ore discharged at Port Talbot reduced but unlike 
Llanwern and Ravenscraig the ore required no rail haulage to the steelworks.  Richer 
ores which reduced the cost per ton of iron produced from Australia and Brazil were 
now within economic reach.   
 
Building the BOS plant was the other main feature of Scheme A.  Cartwright had 
visited Japan in 1963 and was impressed by their BOS steelmaking plants.  Although 
their converters were only 150 tons they were well laid out and efficiently operated 
giving a 6-10% cost advantage over open-hearth steel694.  He became convinced of 
the need to convert to BOS steelmaking695.  In 1965 it was proposed to convert the 
VLN plant to 2x90 ton BOS converters.  The Abbey Melting Shop was to be retained 
with the remaining 200 ton open-hearth furnaces converted to 400 tons696.  In the 
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light of Cartwright‟s arguments, this proposal was considered to be unviable and it 
was decided to fully convert to BOS steelmaking. 
 
The initial proposal was for 3x270 ton vessels.  This would allow steel output of 
between 60,000 to 75,000 tons/week in 1970.  If the second strip mill had been 
permitted output could have increased to 90,000 tons/week in 1972697.  The BOS 
plant that was built was designed to contain two BOS converters but with the 
potential to add a third converter later.  Each had a nominal capacity of 300 tons.  
Construction began in November 1966698.  The rated capacity of the BOS plant, as 
built, was the same as the existing steelmaking capacity of 65,000 tons/week 
(3,250,000 tons/year)699. 
 
The conversion to the BOS process was significant at a number of levels.  It 
reflected the fact that Port Talbot which had led in strip mill technology in the 1940s 
was now having to catch up with the best international steelmaking practice and 
technology in the 1960s.  The SCoW now built on others‟ experiences.  The BOS 
converters at Port Talbot were bigger and fewer than at Llanwern and Ravenscraig.  
Port Talbot avoided others‟ mistakes.  In doing so, it wrote off large amounts of 
relatively new plant in the form of 400 ton open-hearth furnaces in the Abbey Melting 
Shop and the VLN plant.  With growing competition it were left with little option.  
Failure to convert to the BOS process would have led to decline and 
uncompetitiveness.  It was in effect a survival strategy. 
 
In summary Scheme A was immensely important.  It totally modernised the 
steelmaking process allowing production costs to be reduced at a time of growing 
competition and falling profits.  Building the harbour gave the SCoW steelmaking 
cost advantages over their British rivals and meant that the SCoW could more than 
compete with the new strip mills on cost.  Although some improvements in the strip 
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mill and cold mill were made in Scheme A, much more investment was needed in 
rolling to satisfy growing quality demands.  This was soon to develop into a critical 
issue.   
 
(iv) Corporate Performance and the Question of Overmanning  
Port Talbot was the leading steelworks in terms of output in the British steel industry 
in the 1950s and 1960s.  In 1948 the SCoW produced 416,000 ingot tons in Port 
Talbot and Margam Melting Shops.  Port Talbot‟s steel production peaked at 
2,777,000 ingot tons (2,814,000 tons of liquid steel) in 1960700, greater than at any 
other UK steelworks, and with the exception of United Steel, the SCoW‟s output was 
greater than any UK steel company701.  Between 1960 and 1967 production 
remained within the range 2,419,000 to 2,736,000 ingot tons/annum (see Appendix 
13), running close to full capacity.  Port Talbot‟s share of national steel ingot output 
steadily increased throughout the 1950s to peak at 12.3% in 1962 (see Appendix 
21).  When Llanwern and Ravenscraig went into production Port Talbot‟s share fell 
below 12%. 
 
The SCoW‟s sales increased from £22,167,000 in 1948 to peak at £143,096,000 in 
1960.  After 1960, with the exception of the strike affected year of 1964, it remained 
within the range £133,040,000 to £141,015,000 (see Appendices 14 and 23).  
Between 1962 and 1966 the proportion of sales revenue from exports fell from 26% 
to 21%.  The main fall was in the Tinplate Division largely because of growing foreign 
production702.  During 1965 the SCoW exported to 75 countries.  The top three 
countries were South Africa (£5,308,000), Argentina (£3,974,000) and Spain 
(£2,032,000).  The main export was tinplate703.   
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In 1960, the SCoW returned the highest gross profit of any British steel company704.  
The SCoW followed the same pattern as the wider steel industry with profits peaking 
in 1960 before entering a steady but serious decline, though at a slower rate of 
decline than the wider industry.  Its trading profit grew from £1,514,000 in 1948 to 
peak at £30,479,000 in 1960 before steadily falling to £17,646,000 in 1966 (see 
Appendix 14).  Trading profits as a percentage of turnover fell from 21.3% in 1960 to 
10.7% in 1967.  Similarly trading profit compared to the value of the company fell 
from 16.5% in 1960 to 8.2% in 1967 (see Appendix 23).  If trading profit is adjusted 
for depreciation and interest, the adjusted profit as a percentage of turnover fell from 
12.2% in 1960 to 2.2% in 1966 (see Appendix 24). 
 
The broader reasons for the decline in profitability of the wider UK steel industry 
certainly applied to the SCoW, though the SCoW faced certain sector specific factors 
such as increased domestic competition in strip steel and slowing of growth of 
demand for flat products.  Export opportunities declined as overseas strip mill 
production increased.  When the SCoW‟s financial performance is compared to the 
wider industry it reveals that once depreciation is stripped from the trading profit and 
compared to employed capital between 1958 and 1960 the SCoW was returning a 
lower figure than the wider industry.  After 1960 the position is reversed (see 
Appendix 25 for details).  Before 1960 high demand ensured that older steelworks 
paying less interest on older capital investments could still make profits.  After 1960 
when the gap between demand and supply narrowed quality considerations became 
more important and older steelworks had more difficulty in meeting these quality 
requirements.  By nationalisation the SCoW was in financial decline.  Despite the 
steady fall in trading profits dividend payments remained constant.  By 1966 dividend 
payments exceeded the balance left from trading profits after other deductions (see 
Appendix 14).  How long this could have continued is open to question.    
 
As quality and productivity started to become more important issues after 1960, 
manning levels at Port Talbot became an increasingly controversial issue.  To 
understand the SCoW‟s manning levels at Port Talbot it is necessary to return to the 
                                                          
704
 Heal, pp.103-104. 
 181 
planning stage.  In 1945 it was expected that Port Talbot would employ 5,050705.  By 
1947 this figure had increased to 5,427 (including 1,196 for the hot strip mill) plus 
700 for the cold mill706.  In January 1948 the SCoW revised the manning requirement 
to 6,900 including 2,000 for the strip mill707.  The increase was due to a reduction in 
working hours, provision of welfare services and higher production708.    
 
It was anticipated that the growing workforce would be drawn from redundant tinplate 
workers and the construction force709.  By December 1952 actual manning was 
9,071 and it peaked at 18,352 in 1960 (see Appendix 26).  By 1960 there was 
considerable overmanning at Port Talbot710.  Every craftsman had a mate to 
undertake each job which doubled the number of workers required to do a job711.  At 
Port Talbot Steelworks the locomotive drivers did their own minor repairs.  At the 
Abbey Works the fitters removed the spanners from the locomotives claiming that 
repairs were their job712.  This type of demarcation spread throughout the works.  In 
Port Talbot Steelworks the personnel department had only 6 staff.  Each Abbey 
Works section had its own personnel department which numbered over a hundred 
staff713.  Overmanning was more significant in the auxiliary functions than in the 
production process714.  This view was expressed in a SCoW 1955 internal report 
comparing Port Talbot to a similar steelworks in the Chicago area of the USA715. 
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Why did this overmanning arise and why was it not tackled?  It has to be realised 
that everyone at one time or another benefited from it.  The Government had helped 
the SCoW build the Abbey Works and they expected the SCoW to absorb the 
unemployment resulting from the inevitable steelworks and tinplate closures.  The 
SCoW‟s management freely admitted that they were overmanned in the early 1960s.  
They attributed this to the need to produce sheet as quickly as possible during the 
early years716.  But there were also more complex managerial reasons for it.  
Throughout the 1950s the Abbey Works was rapidly expanding to meet growing 
demand.  That expansion was reliant upon gaining approval from the various 
ministries and the ISB.  They inevitably asked whether the necessary extra 
workforce was available.  In a tight labour market there was pressure on the SCoW 
to hoard labour.  With overmanning mainly built up in the ancillary functions it was a 
pool of labour that could be moved into the production process.  Thus management 
were in effect strategically utilising the overmanning that they had created.   
 
The unions resisted any reduction in the workforce.  Whether they were instrumental 
in causing the overmanning is less clear.  They certainly brought some outdated 
labour practices to the Abbey Works from Port Talbot and Margam Steelworks717.  
Yet it is unfair to hold them fully responsible for the overmanning.  Evidence exists 
that union wage claims were rejected in order to increase the workforce718.  Even the 
demarcation that occurred, which management tolerated, can be interpreted as a 
means of utilising and occupying the overmanning.  The unions certainly abetted in  
the overmanning but in certain respects management and unions collaborated in it.  
Both sides had endured the difficult interwar years and it was felt that both sides 
should benefit from a boom market.  Overmanning also served management‟s 
interests in that they could demonstrate the advantages of the private sector to the 
workforce at a time of political debate about whether the industry should be 
nationalised or not.  
 
The most important factor regarding manning is not the number of employees but the 
cost.  Burn shows that proportionately in 1957 average cost per hour shows the UK 
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at 88, Germany 86, France 89, Belgium 92 and the USA as high as 275719.  Despite 
lower manning levels the American steel industry did not have lower labour costs.  
The British steel industry was profitable and profits were growing.  Labour costs per 
ton were only between 17-20% of costs at Port Talbot720.  To hold out against a 
strike would have destroyed far more profits than would be gained721.  These points 
go some way to explain the reluctance of management to address the issue.   
 
As competition grew and profits began to fall in the 1960s management hardened 
their attitude to manning722.  Yet it was 1965 before they made serious efforts to 
reduce overmanning.  Agreement was reached with the unions to reduce the 
workforce in 1966 by 650 with several hundred more to follow later.  Craftsmen‟s 
mates were redeployed to fill arising vacancies723.  From December 1965 the SCoW 
enforced a retirement age of 65 for all operatives.  These changes helped reduce the 
workforce by 1,000.  In addition the conversion to BOS would reduce manning by a 
further 2,000724.  Yet by 1967 the workforce was still as high as 16,754 (see 
Appendix 26). 
 
Throughout the SCoW era production was disrupted by various industrial disputes.  
Some of the major disputes included :- 
 
 A national overtime ban by maintenance workers during 1955-56 reduced 
profits by £4 million725. 
 In September 1961 a strike by the bricklayers brought the Steel Division to a 
standstill from 12th to 29th October726. 
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 Early in 1962 the bricklayers struck again culminating in a 16 day plant 
shutdown727. 
 On 23rd December 1963, 1,000 AEU members and other craftsmen struck 
over pay.  It reduced the trading surplus by at least £8 million728. 
 In February 1967 all 278 bricklayers came out on strike over leaving work 
early729.   
 
There were also numerous minor disputes.  This occurred in an industry not known 
for bad industrial relations.  Most major disputes involved the craftsmen.  The 
problem partly stemmed from the pay differentials between them and the process 
unions largely represented by the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation (ISTC).  The 
craftsmen believed that they were the industry‟s key workers but their wages lagged 
behind the process workers, partly because craft wages related to those of 
craftsmen outside of the steel industry which were generally lower than those of 
process workers.  Craftsmen therefore wanted parity with the highest paid process 
workers.  The SCoW argued that their skills were transferable but the process 
workers‟ skills were not730. 
 
In 1957 the SCoW withdrew from the Iron and Steel Trade Employers Association 
which negotiated wages across the industry.  They were then faced with the problem 
of negotiating with a large and diverse labour force.  This resulted in a very liberal 
wages policy for both the craftsmen and process workers.  The problem was that the 
craftsmen saw the gap between their wages and the higher paid process workers 
widen731.  Competing unions were keen to enforce demarcation to protect their 
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members‟ jobs.  The SCoW management gained a reputation for an “inability to say 
„no‟ to the unions732.” 
 
A further complication was the issue of ownership.  Management may have been 
less inclined to take a tough attitude towards the unions, and particularly the ISTC, 
for fear of hardening their lukewarm attitude towards nationalisation.  But this only 
stored up problems that would eventually need to be addressed.  It also gave an 
impression of weak management.   
 
After nationalisation, with the exception of Fred Cartwright, no ex-SCoW manager 
reached senior positions within the British Steel Corporation (BSC).  Yet this was the 
same management who were returning such high profits.  During the 1960s 
managerial leadership in the SCoW was dominated by two figures.  In February 
1962 Julian Pode became Chairman and Fred Cartwright Managing Director733.  
Both were part of the new class of professional steel manager that emerged between 
the wars734.  Pode was a chartered accountant from Sheffield.  He began working for 
GKN at Dowlais in 1926, became GKB Company Secretary in 1938 and SCoW 
Managing Director in 1947.  Cartwright was born in Northamptonshire, the son of a 
clergyman who was educated at Rugby and Cambridge where he obtained an 
engineering degree.  He joined GKN at Dowlais as an engineer in 1929, became 
assistant to Port Talbot‟s Works Manager in 1931, technical assistant to GKB‟s 
Managing Director in 1935, a Director in 1940 and a SCoW Director and Steel 
Division General Manager in 1947735.  It was Cartwright who was instrumental in 
determining the SCoW‟s technological direction.  He was a leading figure in technical 
debates on innovating the steel industry and published widely on these matters.  
Perhaps he over relied on technology to address the problems that they faced.  
However, he understood how to delegate and was an inspiring leader to those who 
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worked for him736.  The relationship between Pode and Cartwright is interesting.  
Cartwright was particularly keen to introduce both BOS and continuous casting737.  
His thrust for technological change was tempered by the more pragmatic 
accountant‟s caution over the financial consequences.  Certainly Cartwright made 
mistakes.  The decision to go with VLN steelmaking was clearly a mistake yet even 
this worked in the SCoW‟s interests.  It allowed the time to benefit from others‟ 
experiences and to install state of the art BOS plant.  The failure of the continuous 
casting plant must rest with Cartwright yet the principle was correct.  It failed 
because of engineering problems.  On 14th February 1967 Julian Pode retired.   Fred 
Cartwright became Chairman, David Young Deputy Chairman and Lord Layton 
Managing Director738. 
 
Despite the denationalisation of the bulk of the steel industry the Labour Party 
remained committed to re-nationalisation during the 1950s and the early 1960s.  As 
the steel industry‟s profits declined from 1960 it argued that the industry was 
incapable of restructuring itself739.  The October 1964 General Election brought the 
return of a Labour Government set on renationalising the steel industry.  With only 
an overall majority of four, and two MPs, Desmond Donnelly and Woodrow Wyatt, 
opposed to nationalisation little was done until the General Election of March 
1966740.  The main opposition came from the Conservative Party, the steel firms and 
the BISF.  Julian Pode, as SCoW Chairman and President of the BISF, was in the 
forefront of that opposition.  He argued against nationalisation on the grounds that it 
was a distraction from the working of the company; that it would harm a productive 
and competitive industry; that control could be obtained without state shareholding; 
that the Labour Party had not analysed the situation objectively to maximise steel‟s 
contribution to the national economy; and that it would divide the country741. 
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After the Labour victory in the March 1966 General Election with a big majority 
legislation to renationalise the steel industry was introduced in July 1966 and the Iron 
and Steel Act became law on 22nd March 1967742.  The SCoW was one of 14 
companies to be nationalised743.  The compensation paid was :- 
 
Table 8.2: Compensation Paid to the SCoW at Nationalisation744 
Security Unit Compensation Value 
Ordinary Shares £1 £1-5s-3d 
5½% 1st Debenture stock 1980-1985 £100 £83-13s-11d 
5½% 2nd Debenture stock 1964-1987 £100 £83-10s-2d 
 
The compensation was based upon a 61 month average stock market price from 
April 1961.  Bryer et al argue that the companies were over compensated resulting in 
the nationalised industry carrying too high a burden of debt from the start745.  Vesting 
day was on 28th July 1967746. 
 
By the time of nationalisation the SCoW, like the rest of the British steel industry, 
was in financial decline.  They were beginning to address some of the fundamental 
issues that they faced such as building a deep water harbour and converting 
steelmaking to the BOS process.  These reduced the cost of steelmaking and 
allowed the SCoW to compete with the new strip mills.  Only tentatively were they 
beginning to address their overmanning. 
 
The period 1961-1967 was one of consolidation, modernisation and financial decline.  
That decline was serious but proportionately less than the wider steel industry.  The 
building of the two new strip mills increased competition and the slower than forecast 
growth in demand put pressure on the SCoW.  The new mills prevented the building 
of a second strip mill at the Abbey Works which meant that the full potential of the 
site could not be realised. 
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During the 1950s the SCoW made some strategic mistakes.  It opted for VLN 
technology that proved inferior to BOS and needed replacing by the latter within a 
decade.  Arguably not locating the second tinplate works at Port Talbot was a bigger 
mistake which was more difficult to rectify.  Unquestionably the SCoW was correct to 
push for a second strip mill at the Abbey Works.  Yet it only made sense without the 
new strip mills at Llanwern and Ravenscraig.  Once they were built a second strip 
mill only became a means to undermine them.  If this second specialised mill had 
been built, and the problems of ore supply overcome, Port Talbot with adequate 
support from Ebbw Vale and Shotton would have met the UK‟s foreseeable demands 
for flat steel products.  It is clear that the Ravenscraig strip mill should not have gone 
ahead.  As regards Llanwern it is tempting to speculate that RTB‟s proposal to build 
a plant producing slabs to be rolled at Ebbw Vale with a strip mill to be added later if 
demand materialised may have been the way forward.  If that argument is taken 
further, and that demand did not arise, it might have been feasible to replace 
steelmaking at Ebbw Vale but to have maintained the strip mill or even expanded it.  
Whether this would have been politically acceptable is questionable but it is 
intriguing.   
 
A further complicating factor for the industry in South Wales was the relationship 
between the SCoW and RTB.  Certainly tentative steps were taken after 
nationalisation to merge the two under RTSC but it never developed into a full 
merger largely because of the change of Government.  A full merger between the 
two would have allowed unified control of the South Wales strip mills and tinplate 
sector.  That would have made commercial sense as long as the strip mill at 
Llanwern did not go ahead.  In the private sector the latter may well have brought 
down the merged company.  Concentration of control and co-ordination of 
development of strip steel in South Wales was lacking between 1955 and 1967 and 
overcapacity, lack of strategic development and destructive competition was the 
outcome.  This was the difficult historical legacy that the nationalised industry was to 
struggle with after 1967.      
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Chapter 9: From Nationalisation to 1978: The Oil Crisis and 
Frustrated Expansion 
 
Between nationalisation in 1967 and 1978 the British steel industry experienced a 
difficult period.  Stimulated by forecasts of rapid growth in steel demand both the 
traditional steelmaking countries and developing countries‟ steelmakers planned to 
increase steelmaking capacity.  After the 1973-74 oil crisis and ensuing recession 
these forecasts for demand failed to materialise just as the new capacity came 
online, resulting in worldwide overcapacity.  BSC, moreover, was faced with the 
additional problems of coal strikes and the opening up of the home market to 
increased continental competition following Britain‟s entry into Europe.  These 
pressures exposed the flawed structure of the British steel industry with too many 
steelmaking sites of sub-optimal size in less than ideal locations.  No sector suffered 
as much as the strip mill sector.  Britain simply had too many strip mills.  Despite 
this, before the oil crisis, BSC had embarked on a major expansion in capacity 
including the strip mill sector.  This included a substantial increase in Port Talbot‟s 
capacity, linked to ending steelmaking at Shotton.  Much of this period was spent 
arguing on the merits of expanding Port Talbot or retaining Shotton.  The resulting 
stalemate, largely arising from the obstinacy of BSC Chairman, Monty Finniston, 
meant that BSC failed to exploit the opportunities of Port Talbot‟s conversion to BOS 
steelmaking and its new harbour.  Not only did the stalemate mean that Port Talbot 
failed to meet growing customer quality requirements in a shrinking market but the 
less well located steelworks at Llanwern and Ravenscraig were expanded and 
modernised.  Only after Port Talbot‟s expansion was abandoned did a new local 
strategy begin to emerge focussing on improved quality and efficiency and becoming 
more customer focussed.  
 
For the thirty years after World War Two global steel production grew on average by 
6.16% per annum.  This pattern of growth changed abruptly in 1974 when average 
steel production in the established Western steel producing countries declined by 1% 
per annum as world consumption grew by an average of 2%747. 
 
                                                          
747
 Howell et al, Steel and State–Government Intervention and Steel’s Structural Crisis 
(London/Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), pp.15-19. 
 190 
The catalyst for change was OPEC‟s quadrupling of oil prices in 1973.  It caused 
massive recessions in Europe and the United States which badly affected the car, 
chemical, heavy machinery and textile industries.  Their decline reduced steel 
demand748.  Between 1974 and 1978 the British steel industry operated against a 
background of a major recession, changing patterns of world steel production and 
increasing import penetration following Britain‟s entry into Europe.  After 1974 supply 
outstripped demand both domestically and internationally.  It exposed the British 
steel industry‟s structural problems of too many poorly located steelmaking sites of 
sub-optimal size.  
 
(i) Port Talbot under BSC reorganisation, 1967-1976 
At formation in 1967 BSC‟s crude steel output of 23.2 million tonnes was the second 
largest in the Western World behind only US Steel.  Only US Steel ($4,006 million) 
and Bethlehem Steel ($2,594 million) exceeded its sales of $2,571 million.  At 
nationalisation BSC was grouped into 4 regional divisions (Midlands, Northern and 
Tubes, Scottish and North-West, and South Wales)749.  The SCoW along with RTB 
and Guest Keen Iron and Steel formed the South Wales Group.  It had capital of 
£413 million, a capacity of 6.1 million tons/annum and a workforce of 57,000.  Fred 
Cartwright became Managing Director with C.E.H. Morris as Director, SCoW 
Division750.   
 
The idea was to encourage competition between the divisions.  Yet competition for 
the South Wales Group was limited as it produced a large proportion of the UK‟s 
sheet and all its tinplate and electrical sheet751.  Additionally, the retention of former 
company identities ensured that the old rivalries persisted752.  Thus customer choice 
was reduced but full cooperation was not achieved.  
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The unsatisfactory nature of this structure soon became apparent.  BSC Chairman, 
Lord Melchett, recruited Monty Finniston as a Deputy Chairman to review it.  
Finniston produced two reports in 1969 recommending a new structure based upon 
product grouping753.  The new groups were introduced on 23rd March 1970 (General 
Steels, Special Steels, Strip Mills, Tubes, Constructional, Engineering and 
Chemicals).  Each Division was to be a complete business engaged in making and 
selling its own defined products754.  They would allow rationalisation of sales, employ 
plants to their maximum efficiency and plan capital investment755.  In order to make 
any future privatisation more difficult all the assets of the former companies where 
transferred to the Corporation756.  As a result the SCoW disappeared. 
 
Port Talbot became part of BSC‟s Strip Mills Division757.  Fred Cartwright was 
appointed as a BSC Deputy Chairman and Stephen Gray became Strip Mills 
Managing Director.  During 1968-69 the Division produced 7.6 million tonnes of liquid 
steel with an estimated £500 million turnover and 70,205 employees on 30th June 
1969758.  Port Talbot became the Port Talbot Group, Strip Mills Division, BSC.  In 
September 1972 Bob Scholey became Strip Mills Division Managing Director.  He 
was replaced by Philip Bromley in December 1973 when he became BSC Chief 
Executive.  In November 1972 Peter Allen became Director, Port Talbot Group759.   
 
But no sooner was the reorganisation initiated than the strategy changed again.  On 
29th June 1975, Monty Finniston, now BSC Chairman following Lord Melchett‟s death 
in 1973, submitted proposals to the Secretary of State for Industry for a further 
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reorganisation760.  This envisaged returning to a regional organisation.  It was felt 
that a more centralised commercial operation with dispersed production areas was 
needed761.  In reality the multi-product plants then envisaged made it impractical to 
group plants into Product Divisions762. 
 
On 4th April 1976 the main iron and steel activities were reorganised into 5 
Manufacturing Divisions (Scottish, Scunthorpe, Sheffield, Teesside and Welsh).  
Additionally four Product Units were established for Billet, Bar and Rod Products; 
Plates; Sections and Strip Mill Products.  These were responsible for sales and plant 
loading within the Manufacturing Divisions.  Port Talbot became part of the Welsh 
Division with the Product Unit being Strip Mill Products based at Newport.  The rest 
of BSC was organised into 14 Profit Centres.  Trostre and Velindre became part of 
the Tinplate Profit Centre763.  This complex structure allowed BSC to load up the 
lower cost plants and to isolate plants it wanted to close.  At Port Talbot BSC‟s 
changing structure made little practical difference.  Yet nationally a constantly 
changing organisation created uncertainty and inefficiency.  
 
Throughout most of BSC‟s history it was a loss maker (see Appendix 27).  Several 
factors contributed to this including a declining steel market; the poor financial state 
of the firms nationalised; delays in rationalisation and modernisation resulting in 
higher costs; and Government price control policies up to 1974764.  Additionally BSC 
inherited debts of at least £342 million from overcompensation of the security holders 
of the former private companies and debts of £271 million765.  These factors 
significantly contributed to their initial capital debt of £834 million766.   
 
BSC returned trading deficits of £19 million in 1967-68 and £23 million in 1968-69.  
They were not generating enough to repay their debts.  In 1969 BSC proposed to the 
Government that £700 million of the £834 million debt be converted into Public 
Dividend Capital (PDC) allowing larger repayments when business was good but 
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little or none when business was bad.  It brought BSC‟s financial structure more in 
line with ordinary commercial undertakings767.  BSC wanted a PDC debt ratio of 
70:30 but Treasury imposed 55:45.  Their borrowing limit was increased from £400 
million to £500 million768.  In 1976 the Treasury worsened the formula to 45:55.  
BSC‟s financial performance and ability to invest was always undermined by the debt 
that it carried. 
 
(ii) Strategy & Technological change at Port Talbot 
By 1970 BSC‟s management was convinced that to make it internationally 
competitive and profitable capital investment of £73 million in 1967-68 and £74 
million in 1968-69 was insufficient769.  They were heavily influenced by the Benson 
Report.  This argued that the British steel industry should be concentrated on large 
coastal steelworks using BOS steelmaking and imported high quality coal and iron 
ore770.  BSC‟s early development strategy, the „Heritage Programme‟, concentrated 
on exploiting the potential of its major steelworks at Port Talbot, Llanwern, Teesside, 
Scunthorpe and Ravenscraig771.  BSC believed that by 1975 these sites could 
produce between 30-34 million ingot tons/annum772.   
 
At Port Talbot the late 1960s involved completing the BOS plant, harbour and other 
features of Scheme A.  The first commercial ship to use the harbour early in 1970 
was the „Forth Bridge‟ delivering 46,410 tons of Canadian iron ore773.  Using 100,000 
ton ore carriers resulted in cost savings of 25p/ton on Norwegian ore, 80p/ton on 
Brazilian ore and £1-80/ton on Australian ore774.  The harbour‟s jetty is shown 
below:-  
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The BOS plant cost £42 million and produced its first steel on 26th October 1969775.  
These changes resulted in the closure of the VLN Plant in July 1969, the Abbey 
Melting Shop in November 1970 and Port Talbot Dock in December 1971.  Problems 
with the BOS plant were not resolved until the end of 1970776.  By May 1972 weekly 
production exceeded the combined record output of the Abbey Melting Shop and the 
VLN Plant777.   
 
The BOS process needed a continuous supply of good quality iron.  This required 
further modernisation to the blast furnaces, including an increase in the working 
capacity of Number 2 blast furnace, installation of a second tap hole in Number 4 
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and improvements in the burden preparation778.  These changes resulted in a steady 
improvement in blast furnace performance.  Number 4 became the first UK blast 
furnace to achieve an output of over 3,000 tonnes/day and 20,000 tonnes/week.  
Other changes included the completion of the SCoW‟s strategic computerisation.  
Computer control was established on the 5 stand cold mill at a cost of £544,000 in 
1968779.  In 1971 the commercial department introduced a computerised method of 
„order acceptance‟ allowing quicker checking of orders780.   
 
These changes largely revolved around the conversion to the BOS process, but 
other essential investment was also needed at Port Talbot.  It was perhaps 
symptomatic of wider issues across BSC.  Major investment tended to be 
concentrated on the steelmaking end rather than on rolling operations.  Port Talbot‟s 
strip mill was nearly 20 years old and was beginning to fail to fully satisfy growing 
quality demands.  If more attention had been devoted to this issue BSC and Port 
Talbot might have lost less market share during the 1970s.  It was not a case of 
replacing the strip mill but upgrading the existing mill to improve quality.  A plan of 
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Fig 9.1: Port Talbot Steelworks 1970-71 
 
 
A decision of immense strategic importance taken during 1971-72 was to import 
Llanwern‟s iron ore through Port Talbot Harbour.  It required a third unloader at the 
ore jetty, extensions to the stockyard and rail loading equipment782.  Llanwern, unlike 
Port Talbot, now had to absorb the rail transport costs.  Nevertheless importing the 
ore through Port Talbot still gave Llanwern cost advantages over Ravenscraig.  It 
also reduced the costs per ton of discharged material for Port Talbot.  In 1976 BSC 
signed a £19 million contract with British Rail to move up to 59 million tons of iron ore 
to Llanwern from Port Talbot over 12 years involving up to 7 trains daily, 6 days a 
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week783.  The additional transport costs weakened Llanwern economically in relation 
to Port Talbot and made it more vulnerable. 
 
(iii) BSC Development Plans: Ambition and Reality 
BSC‟s Ten Year Development Strategy can be traced back to their 1970-71 
Development Plan.  This envisaged eventual BSC production of 43 million 
tonnes/annum of steel with 32-33 million tonnes/annum by 1975 and 40 million 
tonnes/annum by 1980784.  It included the creation of a new „greenfield‟ steelworks 
producing about 15 million tonnes/annum with Teesside, Scunthorpe, Ravenscraig, 
Llanwern and Port Talbot producing the rest785.  
 
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) set up a Joint Steering Group (JSG) to 
examine the proposal.  It reported after the consultants, McKinseys, forecast 1980 
demand to be just 23 million tonnes786.  In May 1972 the Minister for Industry, Tom 
Boardman, announced that investment would be concentrated on the 5 main plants 
without the greenfield site.  The JSG recommended a 1980 capacity of between 28-
36 million tonnes787.  In the event, during the strike affected year of 1979-80 BSC 
produced just 14.1 million tonnes788.  
 
In February 1973 the Government published a White Paper „British Steel 
Corporation: Ten Year Development Strategy‟789 which committed £3 billion to the 
development strategy.  Despite overall growth in steel demand of only 1.7% per 
annum between 1955 and 1970 it forecast overall growth of 50% during the 1970s 
attributed to rising demand for investment goods, consumer durables, cars, 
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equipment for North Sea oil exploration and Britain‟s entry into Europe790.  It 
recognised that BSC had to minimise costs and meet growing quality requirements.  
To minimise costs it was essential to use richer foreign ore transported in large bulk 
carriers, large blast furnaces, and large-scale BOS steel production.  Costs would be 
lowest at integrated steelworks with capacities of 6 million tonnes/annum and ready 
access to a deep-water ore terminal.  The subsequent economies of scale would 
yield significant savings.  Consequently steelmaking in older, smaller, technically 
obsolete open-hearth plants and less favourably located plants would be phased out 
during the 1970s.  BSC was set the objective of achieving an average annual return 
on net assets of 8% to March 1977 and at least as high thereafter791. 
 
The Ten Year Development Strategy underpinning forecasts were wildly optimistic.  
However, faced with the available evidence at the time it made some sense.  For 
forty years to the early 1970s demand and global production had generally moved 
upwards.  All other major steelmaking countries were also planning to increase 
capacity.  It was correct in concentrating production at large coastal sites using the 
BOS steelmaking process.  However, it failed to fully appreciate the political 
resistance that developed to the closure programme.  It was based upon Japanese 
experience, but unlike Britain, Japan was on the edge of a rapidly industrialising area 
with a growing steel market.  Britain and Europe were mature industrial areas where 
growth was always going to be less.    
 
Fred Cartwright, just before retirement as a BSC Deputy Chairman in 1973 was a 
surprising voice of caution792.  He argued that the large scale of the new steelworks 
envisaged would ensure a loss of flexibility in operations which would lead to a loss 
of profits.  Instead, he argued the case for mini mills located near customers using 
scrap to produce bars, rods, light sections etc with lower capital costs and more 
flexible operating practices. 
 
Under the Ten Year Development Plan BSC‟s Welsh steelmaking capacity was to be 
modernised and expanded to about 10 million tonnes/annum at a cost of around 
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£900 million (March 1972 prices).  Port Talbot was to be expanded from 3.25 millions 
tonnes/annum capacity to about 6 million tonnes creating some 1,300 new jobs to 
produce high quality, competitively priced, strip products to feed the Trostre, Ebbw 
Vale and Velindre Tinplate Works and the finishing end at Shotton793.  Doubts about 
the creation of new jobs at Port Talbot were raised within the DTI even before the 
White Paper was published as simply being a „shot in the dark‟ by BSC794. 
 
It was also planned to increase Llanwern‟s capacity from about 2 million 
tonnes/annum to 3.8 million tonnes and Ravenscraig to about 3.2 million tonnes795.  
Port Talbot was chosen for the largest expansion because of its newer and larger 
BOS plant which could accommodate an additional third converter and had its own 
deep water tidal harbour.  BSC planned to exploit Port Talbot‟s locational 
advantages to reduce production costs. 
 
However, BSC created a major strategic complication by linking the Port Talbot 
expansion directly with ending steelmaking at Shotton and the consequent loss of 
6,500 jobs.  Modernising Shotton would cost £200 million.  Even then production 
costs for hot rolled coil would still be more than at an expanded Port Talbot796.  The 
DTI believed that modernised liquid steel production at Shotton would cost £30 a 
tonne and an expanded Port Talbot £29.5 a tonne797.  Internally the DTI raised the 
important point that although Shotton‟s costs had been compared to Port Talbot 
there was no comparison to Ravenscraig, Llanwern or South Teesside.  Surprisingly 
this was never raised in the ensuing debate by the DTI or by the pressure groups at 
Shotton and Port Talbot.  When Shotton steelmaking ended in 1979 BSC claimed 
that it was to load the expanded and modernised facilities at Ravenscraig not Port 
Talbot798. 
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Committing to Port Talbot‟s expansion and ending steelmaking at Shotton was too 
high a political price for the politicians to accept.  During 1973 the Secretary of State 
advised Lord Melchett that the Government would delay Shotton‟s run down if 
recommended by the task force set up to examine the closure799.  This would delay 
the start of the Port Talbot expansion.  The 1973-74 oil price rise and subsequent 
recession undermined the White Paper‟s optimistic demand forecasts.  It called into 
question the need for Port Talbot‟s expansion even with the closure of Shotton.  
Despite the delays in starting Port Talbot‟s expansion the increases in Llanwern and 
Ravenscraig‟s capacity went ahead.  Not only was strip mill capacity being increased 
as demand fell but it was carried out at what BSC had perceived to be less 
favourable locations.   
 
In 1972 a review of Port Talbot‟s plant requirements concluded that it was essential 
to improve ore handling facilities, increase sinter production and upgrade iron 
making still further800.  Over the next few years investment was largely confined to 
these areas.  During 1973 a third ore unloader was installed at Port Talbot Harbour 
and new stockyard facilities constructed for £7.5 million.  By early 1975 the rail 
loading bunker complex for transporting ore to Llanwern was completed.  In August 
1973 construction of a new sinter plant designed to produce 76,000 tonnes/week of 
high grade sinter started.  It cost £28.1 million.  Due to a manning dispute it was not 
commissioned until the summer of 1978801.   
 
Further modifications to the blast furnaces were made.  During 1973-74 Number 5 
and Number 3 were relined and enlarged so that the former could produce 23,000 
tonnes/week and the latter 12,000 tonnes/week.  Number 1 was also relined and 
began its fifth, and last, campaign in August 1975802.  Between mid 1975 and 1977 
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£13.6 million was spent on improving the raw materials handling system to support 
the new sinter plant and enlarged blast furnaces803.  These improvements allowed 
output of approximately 2 million tons of steel during 1978-79 using three rather than 
four blast furnaces804.  In February 1975 BSC announced a £70 million scheme for 
the construction of a new coke oven complex to be built in two phases.  The first 
involved building 84 new 6 metre high coke ovens, a by-product plant and coal 
handling facilities to the south west of the steelworks.  It was not part of the 
expansion but was intended to replace Margam Coke Ovens.  The second phase 
involved building a new coal stockyard with a 700,000 tonne capacity805.  The 
problem with these investments was that they were largely restricted to iron making, 
especially to support the conversion to BOS steelmaking.  There was a lack of 
investment at the crucial value added rolling end at a time of increasing customer 
quality requirements, and quality issues resulted in loss of market share.   
 
As already noted the linkage of the Port Talbot expansion to the end of steelmaking 
at Shotton caused BSC political problems.  In May 1974 the new Labour 
Government‟s Secretary of State for Industry, Tony Benn, set up a committee 
headed by Lord Beswick to review BSC‟s entire closure programme806.  The Beswick 
Report was published on 4th February 1975.  It accepted BSC‟s closing date of 1975-
1977 for Ebbw Vale but deferred the decision on Shotton807.  BSC were clearly 
frustrated at not being given the Port Talbot go-ahead claiming that the features of 
Port Talbot and Shotton were separate issue808. 
 
Contrary to their claims, however, the Ten Year Development Strategy had linked 
Port Talbot and Shotton.  BSC‟s frustration in failing to get approval for the 
expansion was apparent in correspondence with Beswick.  Yet the Department of 
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Industry (DoI) and ministers complained about the time taken to get information from 
BSC on cash flow, market forecasts for hot rolled coil and other information to 
evaluate the development809.  BSC also had to deal with the Shotton trade unions 
and local authorities attempting to retain steelmaking.  It made the political price too 
high for the Government, particularly a Labour Government with a small majority, to 
sanction. 
 
Even before the White Paper was published Flintshire County Council (FCC) had 
submitted a paper to the Prime Minister arguing for the retention of steelmaking at 
Shotton.  The paper assumed that Shotton‟s hot strip mill would remain in production 
and be supplied with slabs from Redcar rather than Port Talbot.  It argued that 
Shotton needed a new blast furnace, replacement of open-hearth furnaces with a 
BOS plant and a continuous casting plant to produce between 2-2½ million 
tons/annum at a somewhat unrealistically low cost of £50 million810 (the Development 
Strategy claimed that £200 million was needed to modernise Shotton).  In addition 
the ore port of Morpeth Dock would be enlarged to take 100,000 ton vessels811.  FCC 
also argued that the £7-£10 million/annum cost of transporting slabs from Redcar or 
Port Talbot made production at what remained at Shotton to be uneconomical812. 
 
BSC never publicly responded to Flintshire County Council but Finniston in a 
confidential letter to Beswick stated that BSC were already planning to increase Port 
Talbot‟s capacity beyond 5.75 million tonnes/annum to 6.8 million tonnes813.  Instead 
of adding a third vessel to the BOS plant, this involved building a second BOS plant 
with 2 converters.  It was intended to exploit the advantages of Port Talbot‟s new 
blast furnace and to fully load its mills.  This would further extend Port Talbot‟s cost 
advantages over Shotton.   
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In late 1974 Shotton‟s branch of the Steel Industry Management Association (SIMA) 
put forward a proposal to expand Shotton‟s capacity from 1.85 million tonnes/annum 
to 2.25 million tonnes/annum and Port Talbot‟s to 3.5 million tonnes/annum but 
without a second strip mill814.  BSC responded that the second hot strip mill was 
needed on quality grounds particularly for the tinplate industry815.  This was the first 
time that quality was used in BSC‟s arguments.  Finniston further argued that 
retaining steelmaking at Shotton was not the most economic strategy for BSC816.  
BSC estimated that SIMA‟s proposals would cost nearly £10 million/annum more 
than expanding Port Talbot and ending steelmaking at Shotton.  Finniston stated that 
Shotton‟s suggestion to develop Port Talbot to 6 million tonnes/annum but to 
produce blooms and billets would mean that Scunthorpe and Redcar‟s full potential 
would not be realised.  He also claimed that the Shotton report failed to take account 
of Port Talbot‟s cost advantages in producing hot rolled coil for tinplate production.  
The figures that he produced are shown below :- 
    
Table 9.1: Expanded Port Talbot and Shotton Production Costs817 
 Port Talbot at 5.75 mtpa: 
Costs/Tonne 
Shotton at 2.25 mtpa: 
Costs/Tonne 
Cost of 2.05 mpta Hot 
Rolled Coil for Shotton 
£80.73 (with transport)  £80.51 (with Port Talbot at 
3.5 mtpa) 
Cost of 2.85/2.75 mtpa 
other purposes 
£76.88 n/a 
Port Talbot At 3.5 mtpa n/a £81.63 
Average £78.51* £81.15 
     * excluding £6.1 million closure costs  
 
Finniston dismissed Clwyd County Council‟s (successor to Flintshire County Council) 
proposals to develop Shotton‟s ore port, Morpeth because :-  
 
“Port Talbot would be very much cheaper-£1.83/tonne against £3.38/tonne818.” 
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Beswick acknowledged the value of BSC‟s comments on the need for a new strip 
mill to produce higher quality strip.  Finniston correctly claimed that quality 
considerations were an increasingly important factor influencing BSC‟s competitive 
strength particularly with the automotive industry819.  As tinplate was finished to one 
fifth the thickness of auto body sheet a high degree of strip mill sophistication was 
required.  Although not all the quality problems originated in Port Talbot‟s strip mill, 
half of the technical difficulties did820.  The new mill would improve product quality but 
not eliminate all defects.  Finniston never mentioned improvements in quality by 
investment in the existing strip mill and Beswick never challenged him on this.  Even 
with a second strip mill BSC would have faced a quality issue with the first mill.  BSC 
were originally so focussed on increasing capacity that the developing problems with 
quality were overlooked until it became their major commercial problem.  Ford (UK) 
refused to buy any strip products from BSC for use in certain outer car body parts as 
the steel was not continuously cast.  Ford (Germany) refused to purchase any BSC 
strip until it was continuously cast.  By 1977 BSC supplied only 46% of the British 
automotive industry‟s steel needs.  Before 1974 it had supplied 80%.  By improving 
quality through continuous casting it was hoped to regain at least 65% of the 
market821.    
 
Finniston was also aware that BSC‟s tinplate quality rating for surface quality and 
finish had fallen behind the German producers and concluded that BSC urgently 
needed to improve its strip mill quality standards.  He claimed that installing the new 
strip mill at Port Talbot was essential to achieve that.  Finniston was correct in 
highlighting the seriousness of the lack of quality but improvements could have been 
with the existing mill.  By focussing exclusively on the new strip mill BSC failed to 
tackle their quality issues by the other means available and actually prolonged their 
commercial decline.  Once BSC claimed that the new mill was essential on quality 
grounds it meant that they could not openly acknowledge that other means existed to 
improve quality without undercutting their own arguments for the expansion.  
Finniston‟s personality was a problem for BSC.  A forceful and determined man he 
was not prepared to give ground over BSC‟s development strategy.  He tenaciously 
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fought for it for too long resulting in BSC continuing to lose market share and 
remaining at loggerheads with the Government over it. 
 
BSC clearly supplied information to the pressure groups in Port Talbot and the wider 
West Wales area to bolster their case for approval for the expansion.  West 
Glamorgan County Council produced a paper in April 1975 which lent heavily on the 
original White Paper.  It argued that the expansion would save £9-£10 million/annum 
and claimed that labour costs at Port Talbot were £40 million/annum.  Labour costs 
to produce 3 million tonnes of liquid steel were £13 a tonne but to produce 6 million 
tonnes would be £7 a tonne.  It acknowledged that other factors would reduce the 
overall savings to £1-50 a tonne822. 
 
A more detailed case for the Port Talbot development was put forward in September 
1975 by the West Wales Steel Development Committee (WWSDC), a very broad 
organisation of local authorities, county councils, various trades councils, MPs and 
the Port Talbot Steelworks Development Committee (PTSDC).  This stated that in 
the year to August 1975 the costs of the Port Talbot development had increased by 
£119 million to £550 million823.  It specifically argued against the alternative 
strategies.  Like Finniston it argued that only a second Port Talbot hot strip mill would 
meet the increasing tinplate quality requirements.  It also claimed that on the cost per 
tonne of steel produced there was an advantage of £2.80/tonne in favour of the Port 
Talbot development over Shotton.  This was similar to Finniston‟s figures (see table 
9.1).  Overall it claimed that the Port Talbot option would save BSC about £9 
million/annum.  It accepted that due to transport costs coil produced at Shotton 
would be 22p a tonne cheaper for use at Shotton (the same as in table 9.1).  Like 
BSC it argued that this did not take into account the economies of scale generated 
by Port Talbot for the Tinplate Group.  Similarly it argued that to expand Shotton to 
2.25 tonnes/annum and Port Talbot to 3.5 million tonnes would create 2 sub-optimal 
sized plants which would become uneconomic.  It also addressed the issue of 
maintaining Shotton and expanding Port Talbot.  It concluded, correctly, that there 
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was no market for the extra products824.  Yet this is precisely what the Government 
would shortly give approval for.  What is surprising in the debate over Shotton is that 
no one ever suggested building the proposed new Shotton strip steel colour coating 
complex at Port Talbot.  This would have strengthened Port Talbot‟s advantages still 
further.  The complex was built at Shotton. 
  
Despite the arguments developed by Finniston, BSC and external evaluations 
Beswick concluded that there was a case for retaining steelmaking at Shotton825.  
The Government accepted this.  BSC made a strategic mistake in initially linking the 
Port Talbot development and the closure of Shotton.  They later tried, 
unsuccessfully, to separate the issues.  Surprisingly, BSC did not raise the quality 
issue until relatively late and only then as a means of getting approval for the full 
development.  By doing this they had boxed themselves into a corner and neglected 
improving quality by other means.  The DTI undercut BSC‟s arguments for closing 
Shotton by claiming that its retention would allow BSC to meet likely demand for hot 
rolled coil in the early 1980s826.  The significance of the campaign to retain 
steelmaking at Shotton is that it prevented the start of the Port Talbot development 
but did not prevent investment at Llanwern and Ravenscraig.  BSC then faced the 
problem of modernised and expanded steelmaking capacity at Llanwern and 
Ravenscraig but with their most favourably located strip mill now technologically 
lagging behind.     
 
As already noted the underpinning forecasts that justified Port Talbot‟s expansion 
never materialised.  Yet it is unfair to totally write off the scheme.  By the mid 2000s 
Port Talbot‟s capacity would increase to over 5 million tonnes/annum but at the cost 
of ending steelmaking at Ravenscraig and Llanwern as well as Shotton.  In a sense 
Port Talbot now has a second strip mill but it is based at Llanwern.  Closing one of 
the modern mills was never suggested at the time.  
 
A major part of the reason why BSC took so long to conclude that demand had been 
permanently reduced was Monty Finniston‟s leadership.  As late as July 1976 he 
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was still talking of the next steel boom despite evidence of falling demand827.  
Finniston had seen the success of the Japanese steel industry which had 
concentrated production at large coastal plants and believed that this was the way 
forward for BSC.  He did not fully appreciate the differences between the expanding 
East Asian steel markets and the more mature European markets.  As the ISTC 
leader, Bills Sirs, remarked he could be headstrong828.  He made public statements 
about redundancies and publicly clashed with ministers which alienated his political 
support to such an extent that his contract was not renewed.  Finniston was replaced 
as BSC Chairman by Charles Villiers in September 1976829.  Initially Villiers‟ views 
differed little from Finniston‟s830.  That would change.    
 
(iv) From Expansion to Contraction: The 1977 Plan and its Aftermath 
In March 1977 the Government finally announced that it had approved BSC‟s plan 
for Port Talbot‟s expansion at a cost of £835 million but was also retaining 
steelmaking at Shotton831.  Even the Ten Year Development Strategy had 
recognised that demand would never justify both and BSC had, via the WWSDC, 
reaffirmed this view in 1975.  Yet this is exactly what the Government now proposed.  
It appears that for reasons of political expediency the minority Labour Government 
was trying to shore up its core support at Shotton and Port Talbot.  To increase Port 
Talbot‟s capacity to 6 million tonnes now required an additional blast furnace, a third 
BOS converter, a continuous caster with a second to be added later, a second strip 
mill and new coke ovens.  The latter two would be paid for out of the £350 million 
preliminary allocation announced by the Secretary of State for Industry, Eric Varley, 
in July 1976832.  Port Talbot‟s capacity would reach 4 million tonnes/annum by 1981-
82 and 6 million tonnes by 1985-86 (see Appendix 29 for costings).  The first phase 
would involve building a 10,000 tonne/day blast furnace and installation of the third 
BOS converter.  The second phase would include further investment to support iron 
making, building a 1.45m wide strip mill, uprating the existing plant and installing the 
                                                          
827
 Dudley and Richardson, p.91. 
828
 Bill Sirs, Hard Labour (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1985), p.64. 
829
 Dudley and Richardson, pp.91-93. 
830
 Ibid, p.96.  Abromeit, p.135. 
831
 Dudley and Richardson, p.96.  Charles Villiers, Chairman‟s statement in BSC Annual 
Report and Accounts 1976-77, p.24.  Breyer et al, p.172. 
832
 Hansard (Commons). 1
st
 July 1976, column 1284. 
 208 
continuous casting plant833.  To secure approval the local trade unions had given a 
commitment to achieve international manning levels and a productivity rate of 500 
tonnes of liquid steel/employee834.  This compared to current potential maximum 
output of about 250 tonnes/employee.   
 
By the time that the Government approved its plans BSC fully recognised that there 
was no market for 6 million tonnes/annum of steel from Port Talbot and 1.85 million 
tonnes from Shotton.  Demand did not exist to justify the expansion without other 
major closures.  Villiers now accepted that previously forecast demand would never 
materialise.  After years of pressure to get Government approval BSC now needed 
an excuse to cancel the expansion.  Two weeks later they found that excuse when 
520 electricians came out on unofficial strike over pay.  A few days later BSC closed 
Port Talbot.  Despite repeated appeals from the TUC to return to work the strike 
lasted for 11 weeks only ending in June 1977 at an estimated cost to BSC of £60 
million835.  On return to work BSC announced that because of the strike and lower 
demand the Port Talbot development had been deferred836.  In reality it was a 
cancellation.   
 
As for BSC‟s overall commercial performance the important year was 1974-75.  BSC 
returned a £56 million profit but during the first half-year made a profit of £82 million 
before the position deteriorated because of the oil crisis837.  Both the Strip Mill 
Division and Port Talbot operated profitably838.  During 1974 BSC also had to deal 
with the effects of the miners strike.  The Strip Mill Division, restricted to just 65% of 
normal production, was unable to fully satisfy home demand839.  Following Britain‟s 
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1973 entry into the EEC customers turned to continental producers to guarantee 
steel supplies.  BSC never fully recovered from these setbacks.   Between 1970 and 
1975 BSC‟s share of the home market declined from 70.4% to 54.1%840.   
 
By the beginning of 1975 BSC cut back strip mill production through lack of demand 
which directly affected Port Talbot.  It was now clear that BSC had too many strip 
mills.  BSC estimated that the 1970s miners strikes alone cost them 6% or one 
million tonnes of the home market841.  Despite this BSC was unable to meet 
increased customer expectations on quality and reliability on delivery.  This resulted 
in further loss of market share.  BSC‟s main problem area was its strip mills which 
accounted for about two thirds its weekly losses.  Finniston‟s focus on the 
development strategy to improve quality resulted in little other action being taken to 
address the problem.  In effect BSC failed to build on, and fully exploit, the 
advantages of building Port Talbot‟s BOS plant and the harbour.  To add further to 
BSC‟s problems in the year after the 1974 miners strike they suffered 109 internal 
disputes.  One million tonnes of production was lost842.   
 
By April 1975 some BSC plants were working at just 50% of their capacity.  BSC 
responded by announcing a 20,000 reduction in the workforce843.  To improve 
productivity and reduce losses BSC reached three separate agreements with the 
unions between May 1975 and January 1976.  In January 1976 BSC unilaterally 
suspended weekend working and threatened to end the guaranteed working week 
leading to an unofficial strike of 1,200 ISTC members and a complete shutdown of 
Port Talbot844.    
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By mid 1975 steel production was running at about 17,000 tonnes/week (equivalent 
to just 884,000 tonnes/annum) compared to 40,000 tonnes/week several months 
earlier845.  With so little production Port Talbot must have contributed substantially to 
BSC‟s losses.  During 1975-76 BSC made a loss of £255 million with the Strip Mills 
Division contributing as much as £200 million846.  Port Talbot‟s share of this was 
never published.  In consequence, Port Talbot‟s electro-zinc line was closed847.  
These results clearly undermined Beswick‟s case for retaining steelmaking at 
Shotton.     
 
During 1976 BSC attempted to introduce three separate sets of price increases but 
were unable to enforce them848.  Even so, during 1976-77 BSC‟s losses fell to £95 
million849.  At this point the EEC intervened to create a more controlled European 
market by preventing external dumping, introducing controls on production and 
prices and an attempt to remove subsidies from 1st January 1978850.   
 
The period July-September 1977 was a turning point for BSC851.  The International 
Monetary Fund imposed public spending cuts which reduced subsidies to the 
nationalised industries852.  As a consequence BSC decided to “make a new assault 
on the „Beswick‟ plants853.”  Works were picked off individually with attractive 
redundancy payments to soften the closure854.  By March 1978 the only „Beswick 
plant‟ remaining was Shotton. 
 
Villiers described BSC‟s 1977-78 £443 million loss as totally unacceptable855.  During 
1978-79 BSC lost a further £309 million856.  This was the only year that BSC 
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published sub-divisional financial Results.  The position within the Welsh Division 
was :- 
 
Table 9.2: BSC’s Welsh Division Performances 1978-79857 
Unit Profit (Loss) (£ million) (Loss)/Ingot Tonne (£ million) 
Port Talbot (30.1) (14.4) 
Llanwern (30.7) (17.3) 
Shotton (27.3) (23.9) 
APG (10.2) n/a 
Tinplate 1.7 n/a 
Total Welsh Division (96.6) n/a 
 
Port Talbot‟s loss per ingot tonne produced was less than either Llanwern or 
Shotton.  No equivalent figures were given for Ravenscraig but with £249 million 
being invested at Ravenscraig the entire Scottish Division produced just 1.3 million 
ingot tonnes and lost £83.0 million858.  Ravenscraig must have produced less than 
1.3 million tonnes, and must have been losing considerably more per tonne than the 
Welsh plants.  The Welsh Division‟s performance resulted in action to reduce costs 
including 1,500 job losses at Port Talbot and Ebbw Vale859.  
 
Port Talbot‟s performance appeared to increase significantly in 1978-79.  In one 
week in October 1978 Port Talbot produced 57,000 tonnes of ingots, the highest 
weekly figure for 5 years860 suggesting that Port Talbot‟s performance and 
production had improved markedly since mid 1975.  However, Ravenscraig was 
being modernised at this time and BSC were loading up Port Talbot with available 
orders.  This highlighted Port Talbot‟s potential performance.  But it was not a 
performance that could be maintained at lower levels of capacity utilisation once 
Ravenscraig‟s modernisation was completed. 
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In 1978 the Government produced a White Paper „The Road to Viability‟ on BSC‟s 
medium and long-term prospects861.  It recognised that globally steel demand had 
been greatly reduced and was unlikely to increase in the foreseeable future862.  
Consequently the UK no longer needed the steelmaking capacity in the Ten Year 
Development Strategy.  It also recognised that the additional 5½ million tonnes of 
capacity about to come online at Ravenscraig and Redcar would simply add to 
BSC‟s overcapacity.  BSC and the Government agreed that :- 
 
1) “the modernisation and expansion projects already approaching completion 
must be completed; 
2) there must be continuing substantial investment to improve product quality 
and so ensure competitiveness in the 1980s; 
3) there is no case at present for new starts on steelmaking capacity.  
Accordingly the proposed expansion at Port Talbot and the construction of 
electric arc plants at Shelton, Hunterston, and Ravenscraig should be 
deferred until demand forecasts improve sufficiently to justify their 
construction863.” 
 
This confirmed BSC‟s decision to defer Port Talbot‟s expansion (in effect to cancel 
it).  It concluded that BSC‟s capacity needed to be brought more inline with 
demand864.  Giving evidence at the House of Commons in 1980, Villiers, who only a 
few years earlier had argued in favour of the Port Talbot development stated :- 
 
“The investment planned for Port Talbot which was £850 million would have doubled 
the capacity of Port Talbot and heaven knows what we should have done with 
that865.” 
 
For the expansion to have made economic sense in a reduced market would have 
necessitated not only the closure of Shotton but also the closure of either 
Ravenscraig or Llanwern.  This was never suggested at the time, though this was 
exactly what would happen in the 1990s and 2000s.  The wrangling over Shotton 
prevented any substantial investment and improvements at Port Talbot which might 
have helped to retain market share.  Thus BSC failed to fully capitalise on the 
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investment in the BOS plant and the harbour.  The blame for that rests with Finniston 
and his determination to push the Port Talbot development to the exclusion of all 
else.  As a result of the modernisation and expansion of Ravenscraig, including a 
concast plant, Port Talbot fell behind technologically.  The result was to distort the 
economics of BSC‟s strip mill operations until the 1990s.  
 
Naturally there was great local disappointment over the cancellation with queries 
being raised over the long-term survival of Port Talbot Steelworks866.  The local MP 
and Secretary of State for Wales, John Morris, under intense pressure, summed up 
the situation :- 
 
“Of course we are disappointed that the time is not opportune for the full 
development at Port Talbot.  The truth is that with world overcapacity no one in his 
senses would confidently invest in increased steelmaking capacity.  Who wants to 
make Port Talbot produce steel that cannot be sold, and weigh it down with interest 
charges of servicing the cost of the investment?867” 
 
Peter Allen, the Welsh Division‟s Managing Director, argued that without the 1977 
electricians strike contracts would have been placed for at least £500 million868.  This 
view was reiterated during the 1980 national steel strike by the Port Talbot Works 
Group Director, Brian Moffat869.  Neither addressed the issue of what BSC would 
have done with the extra output.  The 1977 strike simply gave management the 
excuse it needed to cancel the development. 
 
Peter Ferguson, BSC‟s Welsh Division‟s Personnel Director, stated that the 
Government‟s decision to shelve the £835 million investment would inevitably lead to 
Port Talbot job losses870, perhaps suggesting that BSC had been hoarding labour in 
anticipation of the expansion.  He also stated that at Llanwern each employee 
produced approximately 300 tonnes/annum of liquid steel whereas at Port Talbot it 
was only 200 tonnes (see Appendix 28).  Since output was similar and Port Talbot 
was losing less money per ingot tonne than Llanwern (see table 9.2) with lower 
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manning at Llanwern, this indicates the effect of other factors.  This was the cost of 
transporting ore to Llanwern by rail from Port Talbot.   
 
Ferguson‟s statement about redundancies at Port Talbot undercuts some of Breyer 
et al‟s widely quoted arguments for retaining steelmaking at Shotton.  In their 
analysis they compared the capital costs for expanding Port Talbot and Shotton (as 
shown earlier Port Talbot was expected to undercut Shotton‟s operating costs by at 
least £1-50 per tonne of liquid steel).  Their capital cost analysis includes Shotton‟s 
closure and redundancy costs in Port Talbot‟s capital costs but they failed to include 
any Port Talbot redundancy costs in Shotton‟s capital costs871.  Thus their figures are 
distorted in favour of Shotton.   
 
A reduction in Port Talbot‟s manning level was now inevitable.  The unions accepted 
this but hoped that the reduction would be partly achieved through natural wastage 
and early retirement.  The unions‟ manning agreements with management at the 
sinter plant and at the new concast plant already put 2,000 jobs at risk872.  To ensure 
that every employee understood the seriousness of Port Talbot‟s situation an 
unprecedented communications exercise was run in October 1978.  It emphasised 
that home demand for strip products was flat and BSC‟s share of that market was 
decreasing.  Emphasis was placed on meeting customer quality and reliability 
requirements873. 
 
Superficially the decision to cancel the Port Talbot development appeared to be a 
disaster.  Yet it was to be of long-term benefit to steelmaking in the area.  
Management now turned their attention to modernising the plant, manning levels and 
working practices within the existing capacity.  These changes allowed a more 
cautious longer term expansion.       
 
Unquestionably the most important investment decision at this time was the building 
of the continuous casting plant.  The decision to build the concast plant was 
announced at the time the development scheme was cancelled in 1978.  Full 
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authorisation came in January 1979874.  It was intended to improve quality at a time 
when more customers were demanding only continuous cast sheet.  Yet in 1978 only 
a third of production was planned to be continuously cast.  Savings of £4 
million/annum were expected but orders worth £18 million would be retained.  The 
cost, along with some quality improvement plant (desulphurisation), was estimated to 
be £71.5 million at April 1978 prices or £92.7 million at outturn.  BSC had obtained a 
commitment from the unions to man the plant to internationally competitive levels875. 
 
With continuous casting becoming crucial why was a second caster not built?  The 
DoI claimed that as the costs outweighed the savings BSC saw no advantages in 
building a second concast machine876.  Yet the plant had been designed to allow the 
installation of a second concaster.  This might indicate a lack of funds and/or BSC 
wanting to gain local experience with continuous casting before installing a larger 
second concaster to eliminate the slabbing mill. 
 
Other investments taking place in the late 1970s included the building of the new 
sinter plant, a major overhaul of Number 4 blast furnace, and investment in the cold 
mill to improve the quality of surface critical panels for the car industry.  The latter 
included refurbishment of Number 2 pickle line, converting the 3 stand cold mill into a 
4 stand cold mill and a new high speed side trim and coil inspection line877.  The cold 
mill improvements were belated but important.  Had they been made earlier less 
market share would have been lost especially to the car industry.  
 
The investment during the late 1970s was intended to improve quality and reduce 
costs to retain and improve market share.  It differed from the development strategy 
in that it was carried out within the existing capacity.  BSC were beginning to address 
the deficiencies at its lowest cost strip mill.  Yet it was done in such a way as to allow 
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later increases in capacity.  The September 1978 photo below shows Port Talbot 






BSC clearly saw a future for Port Talbot but felt that it was overmanned.  During 
1975 Chief Executive, Bob Scholey, claimed that it was grossly overmanned and 
everyone recognised it878.  With the financial pressures mounting after 1974 it is 
surprising that BSC did not address this problem more robustly.  Between 1967 and 
1978 there were apparently some major strides in reducing manning.  Manning fell 
from 15,531 at the end of 1968 to 12,537 at the end of 1978 i.e. a reduction of 2,994 
or 23.9% (see Appendix 28).  Yet the closure of the VLN Plant in July 1969 and the 
Abbey Melting Shop in November 1970 resulted in 2,247 job losses879.  Elsewhere 
there were only 727 job losses over an eleven year period.  Most of these came 
during 1975-1977.  A number of factors contributed to this slow pace.  The proposed 
expansion was not finally cancelled until 1977.  Therefore it made sense for BSC to 
retain trained workers.  It is generally accepted that the unions were in a strong 
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position.  Yet as will be shown the unions, particularly the ISTC, were remarkably 
compliant when major job cuts occurred.  They turned their attention to maximising 
compensation rather than fighting the cuts.  For most of the 1970s, like in the 1950s, 
management were hoarding labour for future expansion.  With its cancellation 
management‟s attitudes changed.  At a meeting with the DoI in December 1978 
Works Director, Brian Moffat, stated that in December 1977 Port Talbot employed 
12,563.  By the end of the 1978-79 financial year they hoped to reduce this to 
12,000.  Eventually they hoped to achieve an output of 285 liquid 
tonnes/employee/annum with a workforce of 11,200.  He also remarked that 
engineering services in overseas plants were provided by sub-contractors but at Port 
Talbot were provided in-house as the unions opposed outsourcing880.  Outsourcing 
was clearly being considered by management. 
 
The 1970s were difficult years for the British and global steel industries.  As a result 
of the oil crisis and its aftermath forecast growth in demand failed to materialise at a 
time when global steelmaking capacity was expanding which resulted in global 
surplus capacity.  BSC also had to deal with the effects of the miners strikes and the 
opening up of the home market to continental competition after Britain entered 
Europe.  These pressures exposed the industry‟s structural problem of too many 
steelmaking sites of sub-optimal size, particularly in strip mills.  It was during this 
period that the full effects of the decisions of the 1950s were felt.  BSC entered the 
period with five strip mills but still had four at the end.   
 
Linking the Port Talbot expansion to ending steelmaking at Shotton was a mistake 
that dominated much of this period.  It stifled investment and development at Port 
Talbot and resulted in loss of market share.  After converting steelmaking to the BOS 
process and building the harbour the key question was how to fully exploit these 
advantages, but the wrangling over Shotton prevented BSC exploiting these 
advantages.  A more flexible approach to expansion might have allowed investment 
at Port Talbot to improve quality and efficiency to retain more market share.  BSC, 
and particularly Monty Finniston, simply ignored the mounting available evidence 
that the market did not exist for their expansion in strip mill output.  Linking Port 
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Talbot with the Shotton closure ensured that BSC could not expand Port Talbot but 
could, and did, expand Llanwern and Ravenscraig.  It resulted in expansion and 
modernisation at higher cost sites.  In that sense the economics of steelmaking were 
distorted.  Once the expansion was abandoned BSC belatedly turned their attention 
to addressing Port Talbot‟s quality and efficiency issues.  Despite Port Talbot‟s 
shortcomings in the late 1970s an internal DoI minute reveals that if BSC had to 
close a modern plant they would prefer to sacrifice Llanwern rather than Port 
Talbot881. 
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Chapter 10: The National Steel Strike, Slimline and the 
Struggle for Survival 1979-1981  
 
Port Talbot was restructured following the election of the Conservative Government 
in May 1979.  The new Government, as part of its effort to privatise the steel 
industry, attempted to make the industry financially viable and imposed large 
manning reductions on BSC.  Since BSC‟s main problem area was its strip mills, 
Port Talbot was a prime target.  It resulted in manning reductions, the end of 
restrictive practices, a switch to flexible working and outsourcing.  The local 
restructuring developed into an ongoing process rather than being a one off 
exercise.  The required changes initially took local management by surprise and 
resulted in a rushed process.  It met the demands of the politicians but it also bought 
time to develop a more considered longer term commercial strategy.   
 
One aspect of these events was a shift in production from the South Wales strip mills 
to Ravenscraig, but this proved to be only a short-term measure to retain market 
share because only Ravenscraig had an operational concast plant.  Once manning 
levels had been reduced and Port Talbot‟s concaster was commissioned production 
moved back to South Wales.  The 1980-81 Corporate Plan followed this period of 
upheaval and was intended to introduce a more commercial approach to production.      
 
BSC lost £309 million during 1978-79 based upon sales of 12.5 million tonnes882 
(see Appendix 27).  In the following year BSC retained just 54% of the home 
market883.  During 1978-79 Cardiff East Moors closed totally, whilst steelmaking and 
hot rolling was ended at Ebbw Vale, Shelton and Glengarnock884.  The Welsh 
Division produced 5.2 million tonnes of liquid steel and lost £96.6 million with 
production being adversely affected by a haulage strike in January 1979885.  
Employment fell from 53,950 in 1977-78 to 48,400 in March 1979, with plant closures 
accounting for 4,600 or 83% of the reduction886.  Both quality and delivery 
performance improved steadily during 1978-79, notably as a result of collaboration 
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with the automotive manufacturers to develop lighter and more corrosion resistant 
steel sheet887.   
 
During 1978-79 Port Talbot lost £30.1 million or £14.4 per ingot tonne888.  Even 
during these difficult years considerable investment was undertaken at Port Talbot 
but without expanding its 3.25 million tonne capacity.  On 19th January 1979 
approval was received to install the twin-strand curved mould continuous slab 
casting machine.  This was essential for the long-term future of steelmaking at Port 
Talbot and without a concast plant steelmaking at Port Talbot would probably have 
ended.  However, as significant as this investment was there was an element of 
„catch up‟ to make up for the lack of investment during the 1970s due to the 
controversy over the development strategy.  Construction of the new Morfa coke 
ovens and coal handling plant continued during 1979-80 which were built to receive 
imported coal from the harbour by way of a 1¾ mile long conveyor and indigenous 
coal from nearby tipplers889.  A new cold mill pickling line was under construction and 
another was being planned.  To increase both quality and gauge demands the 3 
stand cold mill underwent conversion to 4 stand and the entry end of the 5-stand mill 
was remodelled in June 1979 to handle larger coils.  To boost the power supply a 
new power plant was built to replace the existing Margam „A‟ power station890.  In 
June 1978 the new sinter plant was finally commissioned.  By December it had 
produced one million tons of high grade sinter.  In the autumn of 1978 Number 4 
blast furnace was relit after a reline and reached its planned output within eight 
weeks.  In January 1979 Number 5 produced its ten thousandth cast of the 
campaign and a Port Talbot campaign record of 3.8 million tons.  In April 1979 
Number 4 achieved a new monthly fuel rate of 495 Kg/tonne, the lowest of any 
British blast furnace.   
 
During November 1978 production at the strip mill was the highest for four years and 
it also reached its 50 millionth ton of output.  Works Director, Brian Moffat, claimed 
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that the strip mill was performing better than ever and meeting rigorous and 
demanding quality standards891.  Yet on 20th August 1979, Moffat privately admitted 
that Port Talbot was not meeting customers‟ higher quality specifications892.  He 
hoped that by adding a 7th stand to the strip mill its life would be extended by 15-20 
years.  What local senior management were saying in public and private was 
different.  They were aware that some form of strip mill rationalisation was likely soon 
and they needed both to push for modernising investment and present a positive 
image of achievement at the same time. 
 
During 1978-79 there was much talk of a „new dawn‟ at Port Talbot :- 
 
“……there are many on-going development plans at Port Talbot and a full order book 
for many months ahead is reported by the company.  There are encouraging signs 
that business is steadily building up893.” 
 
It was claimed that since the autumn of 1978 all personnel were prepared for the 
„Customer Campaign‟ quality and sales drive, and local efforts were being made to 
become more commercially minded.  As noted earlier the trade unions had agreed to 
reduce manning at Port Talbot to international competitive levels.  During 1978-79 
various production records were set throughout the steelworks and harbour894.   
However, as has been shown, BSC were loading Port Talbot up with available 
orders while Ravenscraig was being modernised.  Thus Port Talbot‟s improved 
performance was somewhat false.  Port Talbot and Ravenscraig were developing an 
awkward relationship.  Each performed better when the other was constrained.  
Although ultimately they were competitors, at times of modernisation BSC still 
needed both plants to maintain output.    
 
(i) „The Return to Financial Viability‟ 
To address BSC‟s financial performance the Labour Government had initiated a 
rationalisation programme which developed into „The Radical Review‟895.  This was 
rejected by the new Conservative Secretary of State for Industry, Sir Keith Joseph, 
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as not being radical enough.  He insisted on BSC‟s workforce of 186,000 being 
reduced by 52,000.  This was the basis for BSC‟s „The Return to Financial Viability‟.  
BSC‟s Chief Executive, Bob Scholey, presented it to the board on 10th December 
1979 as a business proposal for 1980-81896.  Thus the forthcoming radical changes 
were being driven by the politicians.  The national unions had accepted the closures 
that had taken place as the local workforces had accepted them with the aid of large 
redundancy payments.  For several years BSC was highly successful in this 
approach to closures897.  „The Return to Financial Viability‟ in effect became the 
blueprint for the future of BSC.  For 1980-81 it forecast further falls in UK output of 
cars, mechanical engineering and other metal using industries and no change in the 
medium term.  It estimated that UK liquid steel demand during 1980-81 would be 
between 14-14½ million tonnes with flat or declining demand beyond that898.  BSC 
estimated that their home market prices were unsustainably about 15% above 
average EEC prices.  They hoped to capture just 56% of the home market with a 
realistic sales forecast for 1980-81 of 11.2 million tonnes (9.5 million tonnes for the 
home market and 1.7 million tonnes of exports). 
 
Table 10.1: BSC Forecast 1980-81 Sales by Product Group (million tonnes)899 
 Home Sales Export Sales Total Sales 
BBR 2.5 0.5 3.0 
Sections 1.2 0.4 1.6 
Plates 0.8 negligible 0.8 
Strip 2.6 - 2.6 
Narrow Strip 0.4 negligible 0.4 
Tubes 0.6 0.3 0.9 
Tinplate 0.9 0.3 1.2 
Other 0.5 0.2 0.7 
Total 9.5 1.7 11.2 
 
As a consequence BSC proposed to reduce manned capacity to about 15 million 
tonnes of liquid steel900 as shown below :-  
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Table 10.2: BSC Planned Manned Steelmaking Capacity: January 1981901 









BSC were seeking to bring production in line with likely demand.  They were 
abandoning export markets where they could not recover production costs.  BSC 
now openly acknowledged that Britain‟s steel demand was permanently lower and 
unlikely to recover.  Yet it was the politicians who were forcing this agenda, speeding 
up the closure programme and forcing manning reductions at the remaining works.   
 
Surprisingly both Labour and Conservative Governments took a similar approach to 
BSC.  Both accepted that demand had been permanently reduced and both 
unrealistically expected BSC to breakeven by March 1980, primarily by concentrating 
production at the more modern and efficient plants.  Where the two Governments 
differed was in the closure timeframe.  The Labour Government was prepared to 
accept a longer timeframe to get union agreement.  The Conservatives speeded up 
the closure process and imposed manning reductions.  Even so, in reality the 
Conservative Government ended up propping up BSC with funds on an 
unprecedented scale throughout the early 1980s902. 
 
BSC aimed to cut capacity in such a way as to allow limited future expansion and 
began to develop their own agenda separate from the Government.  To produce the 
planned reduced tonnage BSC considered the following factors :- 
 
i) The market and product requirements. 
ii) The plant facilities taking into account :- 
the benefits from recent developments; 
the age of existing facilities and the need for maintenance capital; 
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the ability to be able to respond to upward or downward changes in    
demand; and 
the need not to prejudice possible longer term developments. 
iii) The overall production costs-present and projected 903. 
 
BSC was under pressure to quickly push through its rationalisation programme.  In 
July 1979 BSC announced the end of steelmaking at Shotton and Corby.  This 
involved the loss of approximately 6,420 and 5,500 jobs respectively904.  These job 
losses went part of the way towards meeting the Government‟s workforce reduction 
target of 52,000, but to reach the target the workforce at other plants, including Port 
Talbot, needed to be reduced. 
 
BSC envisaged strip mill production continuing at Ravenscraig and their „South 
Wales Option‟ i.e. Port Talbot and Llanwern (see Appendix 31).  They recognised 
that retaining steelmaking at both South Wales plants was more expensive than 
closing one of them by up to £15 million/annum905.  This was partly offset by the 
potential for higher sales and reduced production costs of £13 million/annum from 
the introduction of continuous casting at Port Talbot.  By not going for the cheapest 
option and keeping both South Wales strip mills BSC were retaining spare capacity.  
This gave them a future option of closing the badly located Ravenscraig.  It is evident 
that BSC were looking beyond the immediate crisis.  Crucially, available investment 
was being directed towards Port Talbot to improve quality and to reduce production 
costs despite management‟s claims of possible closure. 
 
Steelmaking costs at Ravenscraig were higher than at the South Wales strip mills.  
During 1978-79 losses at Ravenscraig were estimated to be £60 million when those 
at Port Talbot were £30.1 million and Llanwern £30.7 million906.  Why then was BSC 
loading up a less efficient steelworks?  Ravenscraig was the only strip mill with an 
operational concast plant at a time when a growing number of customers would only 
accept concast steel907.  Therefore BSC was loading up Ravenscraig to retain 
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market share, but this would only be a short-term arrangement.  The problem was 
that BSC had modernised and enlarged its least economic strip mill.  They had 
started with Ravenscraig ahead of Port Talbot because the latter was embroiled in 
the political dispute over Shotton‟s closure.  The result was that in the short-term 
Ravenscraig‟s concast plant was essential to retain market share.    
 
Why then was Ravenscraig‟s output to be restricted to 2.1 million tonnes?  This was 
the maximum output that could be produced on a two blast furnace operation.  It was 
sufficient to exploit the benefits of the concast plant and was close to Ravenscraig‟s 
breakeven point908.  Planned output from the strip mills was :- 
 
Table 10.3: Planned Annualised Liquid Steel Output 1979–1981 (million 
tonnes)909 
 1979-80 Q4 1980-81 Q1 1980-81 Q2 1980-81 Q3 1980-81 Q4 
Ravenscraig 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 
Llanwern 2.3 2.3 
2.7* 2.7* 2.7* 
Port Talbot 2.3 2.7 
Shotton 0.4 - - - - 
Total 7.0 7.1 4.7 4.7 4.7 
* Combined Port Talbot and Llanwern output 
 
Strip mill sales for 1980-81 were forecast at 3.8 million tonnes distributed as shown :- 
 
Table 10.4: Planned Allocation of Strip Mill Saleable Production 1980-81910 
Steelworks (million tonnes) 
Llanwern 1.2 
Port Talbot 1.1 




During this phase, Ravenscraig would deliver 737,000 tonnes of hot rolled coil for 
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Table 10.5: Welsh Destinations of Ravenscraig’s Hot Rolled Coil (tonnes)911 






As noted earlier the above shows that a significant proportion of Shotton‟s feedstock 
would come from Ravenscraig not Port Talbot.  BSC were also proposing to 
transport over 200,000 tonnes of steel from Scotland to their South Wales tinplate 
works.  This could not be economically viable in the long-term.  BSC in the short-
term were loading up a modernised Ravenscraig to fully exploit their recent 
investment in its concast plant.  Internally the DoI stated that larger savings could be 
obtained from the complete closure of one plant or partial closures in South Wales 
rather than retaining both South Wales steelworks912.  Yet BSC turned down these 
options.  By retaining 3 strip mills it allowed time for them to modernise their better 
located South Wales steelworks before relocating production.   
 
BSC had embarked on a major plant closure programme and had political support 
for the closures.  This was a suitable time to close one of the strip mills, but they 
chose not to for good commercial reasons.  In the short-term, Ravenscraig was a 
valuable asset even though BSC believed that in the long-term the soundest location 
for its rationalised strip mill output was South Wales.  Within a couple of years 
Ravenscraig‟s advantages had evaporated and BSC were calling for Ravenscraig‟s 
closure.  By this time they had an operational concast plant at Port Talbot, reduced 
manning levels and new working practices in South Wales though they lacked the 
necessary political support for Ravenscraig‟s closure.  However, BSC were able to 
load the South Wales plants with increased orders and pursue their own long-term 
strategy independently of the politicians.  This did not yield the most savings in the 
short-term but would in the longer-term. 
 




 Kew, NA, Ref BT 255/988, Demanning At Port Talbot, internal DoI paper by S.J. Gross, 
1980,  
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As already noted earlier to get the concast plant the Port Talbot unions had agreed 
to reduce manning to internationally competitive levels. Manning reductions were 
therefore inevitable.  During 1978-79 BSC announced that 1,500 jobs would go at 
Port Talbot and Ebbw Vale913.  At Port Talbot 1,000 management and white collar 
jobs would go during 1979-80 under the „Fixed Cost Reduction Scheme‟ and 200 
craft jobs under the „Group Working Practices Agreement‟914.  These jobs would go 
through natural wastage.  As Fevre notes, this was a continuation of the process of 
„paring away‟ that had been underway since 1976915.  By September 1979 
negotiations with the unions were completed.   
 
Until December 1979 local management were planning to increase Port Talbot‟s 
1980 production from 2.3 million tonnes to 2.7 million tonnes with a workforce of 
11,250916.  By this time „The Return to Financial Viability‟ had specified that instead 
of 4.6 million tonnes to be produced in South Wales only 2.7 million tonnes would be 
produced though it was not publicly specified where the 2.7 million tonnes would be 
produced917.  BSC considered 4 options for South Wales918 :- 
 
1 Retain Port Talbot with a reduced workforce to undertake all steelmaking and 
rolling with Llanwern closing. 
2 „Slimline‟ where both plants were to maintain reduced steelmaking and rolling 
with reduced workforces.   
3 The „dog-leg‟ where Port Talbot would lose all rolling activities but produce all 
the steel to the slab stage and Llanwern would undertake all rolling but no 
steelmaking. 
4 Port Talbot would close and all production would be concentrated at 
Llanwern. 
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Only in November 1979 was Port Talbot‟s Works Director, Brian Moffat, informed of 
the four alternatives.  Moffat asked Port Talbot‟s management committee to produce 
a plan for the Slimline option whereby both Llanwern and Port Talbot would each 
produce 1.4 million tonnes.  He felt that this was the only realistic option although he 
unsuccessfully argued for the closure of Llanwern and the concentration of 
operations at Port Talbot919.  The Welsh Division‟s Managing Director, Peter Allen, 
decided to go with Slimline.  BSC‟s board approved the decision on 17th January 
1980.  The advantage of this option to BSC was that it allowed future production 
increases at both South Wales steelworks920.  It also kept BSC‟s options open.   
 
The differing interests of BSC‟s different managerial levels emerged at this time.  At 
the local level it often produced Works Directors who showed an immense loyalty to 
their works.  At Ebbw Vale, Works Director, John Powell, attempted to retain 
steelmaking by regularly publishing new production records through the „creative 
use‟ of statistics921.  During this period the local press often recorded new Port Talbot 
production records.  Local management were no doubt feeding information to the 
press and putting a positive spin on performance.  When the closure of Consett 
Steelworks was announced on 27th November 1979 the Consett Works Director was 
moved to Teesside.  It was claimed that he was the one man in management “who 
would have fought like hell to keep the Works open922.”  Moffat followed this pattern 
in arguing to concentrate South Wales production at Port Talbot.  A consequence of 
BSC‟s managerial structure was a divergence of interest and tension between the 
local senior management and BSC‟s higher management.  Local management often 
aligned themselves with the workforce where their interests coincided.  Regional 
management often aligned themselves with National Management.  In the end that 
alliance of interests was too powerful for local management to resist.        
 
Slimline‟s implications for Port Talbot were worked out in December 1979.  Each 
manager was asked how many jobs they could lose if production was cut from 2.3 to 
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1.4 million tonnes.  Each job loss had to be approved by the Works Director923.  They 
arrived at an authorised manning level of 5,701 to be implemented by March 1981924.  
Current manning was 12,415 (see Appendices 32a-d). 
 
As already noted, retaining steelmaking and rolling at Port Talbot and Llanwern was 
not the most efficient option in the short term.  Port Talbot could have produced 2.7 
million tonnes with a workforce of 7,000 i.e. an output of 386 
tonnes/employee/annum.  Retaining Port Talbot and Llanwern with a combined 
workforce of 10,600 resulted in output of 255 tonnes/employee/annum.  BSC also 
incurred greater fixed costs.  Why then did BSC decide upon this option?  It certainly 
met BSC‟s requirements to reduce manning levels925, but it was not the most 
productive option.  As already shown the explanation lies with Ravenscraig and its 
operational concast plant.  Until Port Talbot‟s concast plant started production, 
Ravenscraig was the only strip mill with a concast plant and loading the Ravenscraig 
concast plant was a way to retain market share.  It also allowed time for the lower 
cost plants in South Wales to reduce production costs and to be modernised.  Once 
that had been achieved, if demand had not increased (and BSC did not believe that 
it would) then one plant would be vulnerable.  As Ravenscraig was locationally the 
least cost effective it would be the most vulnerable and its closure and the retention 
of steelmaking and rolling at Port Talbot and Llanwern would in the longer-term be 
the most effective way to reduce BSC‟s cost base for strip mill products.  
 
(ii) Industrial conflict at Port Talbot and the 1980 Steel Strike 
Prior to Slimline during the autumn of 1979 BSC returned to the unions with 
proposals for a further reduction of 1,800 jobs at Port Talbot926.  This would reduce 
manning to about 9,000 by March 1980.  Of the already 1,200 agreed job losses only 
500 redundancies had taken place by November 1979.  Moffat warned the unions 
that Port Talbot was still losing money and that the threat of closure hung over any 
works not showing a profit by March 1980927.  He stated that it cost more to make a 
tonne of steel at Port Talbot than at Llanwern, Lackenby or at Ravenscraig.  This 
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claim for Llanwern and Ravenscraig probably relied on some „creative accounting‟ 
such as disregarding transport costs since during 1978-79 Llanwern and 
Ravenscraig both lost more per tonne than Port Talbot but it was a way of 
pressurising the local unions to accept further job losses. 
 
The additional Port Talbot job losses were :- 
 
Table 10.6: Proposed Additional Port Talbot Job Losses Autumn 1979928 
Department Jobs Losses 
Coke and Iron Departments 319 
Steel and Slabbing 169 
Hot Rolled Departments 130 









The reaction of the unions was surprisingly mixed.  A minority of officials agreed to 
go along with these additional job losses.  However, a majority said that without 
guarantees of no further cutbacks they would fight them929.   
 
BSC lost £145.6 million in the half year to September 1979 with Port Talbot losing 
£2.1 million and Llanwern £8.9 million930, appearing to contradict what Moffat stated 
about it being cheaper to make a tonne of steel at Llanwern.  The local press 
reported that in the last quarter before the 1980 strike that Port Talbot broke even 
with Llanwern almost breaking even931.  In August 1979 Brian Moffat privately stated 
that in the first quarter of 1979-80 that Port Talbot had operated in the black and was 
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expected to operate profitably during 1980-81932.  However, this was at a time when 
Ravenscraig was not working to its full capacity and BSC was loading up the South 
Wales plants with the available orders.   
 
Throughout the second half of 1979 concerns grew in Port Talbot about job losses 
and even possibly closure933.  In December 1979 concerns were expressed by local 
MPs as the scale of job losses emerged.  Yet at the same time a £2.4 million 
contract was awarded for a water treatment plant at the concast plant934. It will also 
be remembered that in December 1978 the DoI noted that BSC would prefer to close 
Llanwern rather than Port Talbot if a South Wales mill were to close935.  This 
evidence, both public and private, indicates that BSC did not seriously intend to 
close Port Talbot.  It was part of their tactics to get the workforce to accept major 
manning reductions and changes in working practices.     
 
After the Conservatives returned to power in May 1979 Margaret Thatcher stated 
that the Government was prepared to fund BSC‟s investment and redundancy 
programme in the short-term.  They would not fund losses which arose from 
excessive wage costs unearned from higher productivity.  If necessary they were 
prepared for a strike936.  In September 1979 Villiers warned Keith Joseph that wage 
restraint at a time of works closures and redundancies could result in a national steel 
strike.  He later stated that the huge adjustments in working practices necessary for 
the very survival of BSC made a strike virtually unavoidable937.  Keith Joseph 
informed the Prime Minister on 6th December 1979 that BSC, with half year losses of 
£145.6 million, had abandoned its March 1980 breakeven target.  As such there 
would be no general wage increase from 1st January 1980 apart from the 
                                                          
932
 Kew, NA, Ref BT 255/988, S.J. Gross‟s notes of visit to Port Talbot, 20th August 1979, 
p.1. 
933
 Norman Denby, „Margam Fears More Job Gloom‟. SWEP, 30th November 1979, p.1. 
934
 Paul Chambert, „MP Demands Answers On Steel Crisis‟. SWEP, 1st December 1979, p.1.  
Anon. „MPs call on Govt to save „steelworkers‟‟. SWEP, 3rd December 1979, p.1.  
935
 Kew, NA, Ref BT255/987, Port Talbot Concaster, internal DoI minute from S.J. Gross to 
the Secretary of State, 19
th
 December 1978.  
936
 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), p.93, 
p.108, p.109. 
937
 Villiers, in BSC, 1979-80, p.3. 
 232 
consolidation of certain additional increases of 2%938.  BSC moved to a „nothing for 
nothing‟ principle in wage negotiations and to locally negotiated productivity deals.   
 
After negotiations with the unions broke down on 7th December 1979 the ISTC 
executive council instructed their members at all BSC plants to strike from 2nd 
January 1980939.  All South Wales delegates had voted against strike action940.  On 
21st December 1979 the NUB gave notice to strike from the same date941.  On 2nd 
January 1980 the 92 day national steel strike started942. 
 
In early March 1980 BSC organised a national ballot of all employees.  Their final 
offer was 14.4% with the opportunity to locally negotiate further increases to 18-
21%943.  The unions advised members not to take part.  The result was that 56% of 
employees either voted against or refused to vote944.  On 18th March the executives 
of the ISTC and NUB decided to seek third party intervention if further talks failed.  
When these talks failed the unions sought a meeting with the Industry Minister, Jim 
Prior.  He reiterated that the Government did not wish to intervene but suggested a 
Committee of Inquiry.  It recommended an 11% increase across the board plus 4% 
from local productivity plans making 15.95% in total.  On 1st April the offer was 
accepted by the ISTC and NUB with a planned return to work on 3rd April 1980945. 
 
The strike at Port Talbot began on 2nd January 1980 with hundreds of men on mass 
picket duty at all steelworks entrances.  On the weekend before the strike started 
damping down of the furnaces began.  At this stage only two unions were involved, 
the ISTC and NUB.  Both received 100% support from their members.  There were 
                                                          
938
 Ibid.  Thatcher, p.109. 
939
 Sirs, p.90. 
940





 Upham, Tempered Not Quenched, p.139. 
942
 ISTC, Strike Diary Of Events. Man and Metal, Vol.57(1), January and February 1980, p.1.  
Ray Hudson and David Sadler, The International Steel Industry–Restructuring, state policies 
and locations (London: Routledge, 1989), p.69. 
943 BSC. „Steelmen: British Steel Offer You A Democratic Way To End The Strike Do You 
Want A Vote?’  Advertisement in the PTG, 6th March 1980, p.3.  
944
 Sirs, p.107. 
945
 Ibid, pp.109-111.  BSC, 1979-80, p.20.  ISTC, Strike Diary Of Events. Man and Metal, 
Vol.57(2), March/April/May 1980, p.1.  Villiers in BSC 1979-80, p.3.  Upham, Tempered 
Not Quenched, p.147. 
 233 
still 2,500 craft union members at work but a week later when their own pay talks 
failed they joined the strike946.   
 
Over the course of the strike local union leaders changed the strike‟s emphasis from 
one exclusively about a wage increase to linking it to the planned manning 
reductions947.  Anger turned towards BSC‟s local and the Welsh Division‟s 
management.  The unions argued that the Welsh Division had to shoulder 50% of 
BSC‟s capacity reductions and that it made more economic sense for Port Talbot 
and Llanwern to produce higher tonnages.  The local ISTC even called for local 
talent to replace the „Yorkshire Mafia‟ in senior positions within the Welsh Division948.   
 
Only hours after the strike ended at Port Talbot on 3rd April nearly 8,000 men staged 
a lightning walkout following the suspension of a crane driver who refused to unload 
a lorry that had crossed picket lines during the strike.  Picket lines were quickly re-
established at all entrances by about 2,000 strikers.  Police had to intervene with 
violent scenes following management‟s decision to withhold a £50 payment as part 
of the return to work agreement.  About 1,000 strikers marched to the main offices 
where 30 policemen barricaded the main entrance.  A number of windows were 
smashed and 3 strikers were arrested.  It took union officials to restore order.  The 
men got their £50949.   
 
At the end of the strike the Welsh Division‟s Managing Director, Peter Allen, claimed 
that it had cost BSC £60 million950.  BSC later claimed that of their 1979-80 loss of 
£545 million, £200 million was directly attributable to the strike951.  An unforeseen 
consequence was that BSC remained within the Government‟s 1979-80 cash limit of 
£700 million952. 
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Before the strike BSC‟s overall UK market share was 54%953.  In April 1980 BSC 
estimated that the strike would cost them 10% of their home market954.  Surprisingly, 
imports during the strike from Europe were little above normal levels.  British industry 
was hardly affected by the three month strike955.  Villiers concluded that British 
industry survived the strike amazingly well to such an extent that “BSC has learnt 
that it needs its customers more than they need it 956.”  It was clear to everyone in 
the industry that if British industry had hardly been affected by a three month strike 
then BSC faced a survival struggle.  This was its legacy. 
 
ISTC General Secretary, Bill Sirs, believed that the eventual pay rise of 15.95% was 
worth the sacrifice of a three month strike957.  However, Martin Upham argues that it 
resulted in a transfer of power from the unions to management958.   Locally the 
unions were certainly not broken but they were never as strong again.  Further mass 
strike action either nationally or locally was never a realistic prospect.  The strike 
brought home to the unions, like management, the precarious position that BSC was 
in.   
 
One outcome of the strike was a shift in power within the ISTC.  Influence shifted 
from the centre to local officials.  The shift towards local pay agreements was the 
catalyst for this change.  At both Port Talbot and Ravenscraig the local ISTC officials 
began ignoring the national union and coming to local agreements to safeguard their 
works959.  Threats of works closure were a tactic successfully used by local 
management throughout the country.  The national ISTC had little option but to 
accept this change.   
 
A surprising consequence of this at Port Talbot was that local management and 
unions were drawn closer together.  As shown earlier the different management 
levels within BSC had different agendas.  At works level these interests often 
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coincided with the local unions.  Despite the shift in power towards management 
both sides needed to work towards the same goal of survival.  
 
After management‟s decision to implement the Slimline option, discussions with the 
unions concluded in March 1980.  Slimline became operational by August but 
without full implementation of manpower reductions960.  Even during the strike union 
officials had met with BSC to decide how to implement the redundancies to reach the 
authorised manning level of 5,701 by 31st March 1981961. 
  
Under Slimline 5,807 workers out of a total of 12,476 in March 1979 were made 
redundant962.  The first jobs to go were those remaining under the „Fixed Cost 
Reductions‟ and the „Group Working Practices‟ agreements and finally 4,500 Slimline 
redundancies.  By the end of 1980 actual manning was down to 6,636963.  Of those 
made redundant 42% were aged 55 or over and 50% had worked at Port Talbot for 
20 or more years.  Therefore redundancy fell predominantly on older workers.  As for 
the actual redundancy payments these averaged £8,000 within a range between 
£2,000 to £16,000964.  Both MacGregor and the DoI regarded these payments as 
being very generous and possibly discouraging natural wastage at other plants965.   
 
BSC portrayed Slimline as a great success and the saviour of Port Talbot.  However, 
a closer look reveals a more complex outcome.  The first point is that actual manning 
remained higher than the authorised manning of 5,701 beyond the implementation 
date of March 1981.  At this time, and later, Port Talbot produced greater quantities 
of liquid steel than the Slimline figure with even less manning.  The problem for local 
management was that Slimline was a rushed process within tight deadlines.  They 
met the manning reductions demanded by the politicians but no more.  But it bought 
time to develop a more market focussed approach to production.  In the process 
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BSC in effect bought off its workforce with Government money to smooth the whole 
process in order to avoid resistance to the redundancies. 
 
The other major change that occurred was the introduction of more flexible working 
practices.  Until this time demarcation had been enforced by the unions.  It has been 
argued that demarcation and restrictive practices were the consequence of 
overmanning and occupied the surplus workers.  As the surplus jobs disappeared 
management could no longer tolerate demarcation as it prevented efficient 
operations.  Management argued that for Slimline to work properly they needed the 
unions to cooperate with new flexible working practices966.  Demarcation between 
various groups of craftsmen began to disappear.  All craftsmen‟s mates were 
abolished.  Instead, various craftsmen helped each other and even production 
workers helped the craftsmen967.   
 
A further significant change was the replacement of direct labour with contractors.  
Before Slimline BSC only used contractors on non capital work where their own 
employees could not, or would not, do the work968.  As previously shown, by 
December 1978 management wanted to extend the use of contractors but opposition 
from the unions prevented this.  The Slimline agreement increased use of 
contractors.  Appendix 2 of the agreement specifically stated there was to be “No 
restriction on the use of Contractors within or ex-works969” (see Appendix 33 for 
outsourced functions).  According to Fevre, the advantages of outsourcing were970 :-  
 
a) It helped cut direct employment which helped satisfy the politicians. 
b) Contracting was headquarters policy responding to Government pressure to 
privatise.   
c) Possibly some short-term cost advantages. 
d) The switch to contracting redistributed costs rather than reducing total costs 
i.e. it reduced wage cost but increased other areas. 
                                                          
966
 HoC, 1980, p.419.  Fevre, Wales is Closed, p.58. 
967
 Pagnamenta and Overy, p.101. 
968
 Fevre, Wales is Closed, pp.55-56. 
969
 Ibid, p.54. 
970
 Ralph Fevre, in „Contract Work In the Recession‟ in The Changing Experience Of 
Employment, ed by K. Purcell, S. Wood, A. Watson and S. Allen (London: The MacMillan 
Press Ltd, 1986), pp.28-30. 
 237 
 
BSC certainly believed that contractors reduced costs and specifically engineering 
maintenance costs971.  This was attributed to using different work practices and in 
some cases their workforce not being on site full-time.  After the 1980 redundancies 
they employed redundant steelworkers for nominal wages with the EEC making up 
90% of their BSC wages for 78 weeks972.  Contractors also put pressure on BSC‟s 
own workforce to accept working practice changes to match the contractors in order 
to prevent outsourcing973.  The unions were unable to seriously challenge the 
process.  One effect that outsourcing did have was that it reduced the total job 
losses from around 6,800 to around 4,000 as the difference was transferred to 
contractors974.   
 
An issue regarding outsourcing that Ralph Fevre does not touch upon was the 
relationship with the craft unions.  As shown earlier many of the industrial relations 
problems in the 1950s and the 1960s involved the craft unions.  In addition there was 
the long 1977 unofficial electricians strike.  It is possible to speculate that 
management saw outsourcing as a means of resolving a long-term industrial 
relations problem.  By buying the service from contractors rather than using their 
own workforce they were transferring the risk to the contractors.      
 
(iii) MacGregor‟s „Survival Plan‟ and its impact on Port Talbot 
In September 1980 BSC was reorganised into a series of discrete, decentralised, 
product-based businesses each acting as a profit centre.  The reorganisation aimed 
to achieve better competitive standards on cost, quality and service.  Port Talbot 
became part of the Strip Mills Group975.   
 
In December 1980 BSC‟s new Chairman, Ian MacGregor, presented the new 
„Corporate Plan‟ to the Government which aimed at achieving significant 
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improvements in cost and efficiency.  It was to be achieved by further reducing 
capacity, expanding sales through more aggressive marketing and pricing efforts, 
and improved quality and delivery (an area that MacGregor considered to be 
particularly weak).  Manned capacity was to be reduced from 15 million 
tonnes/annum to 14.4 million tonnes due to increased import penetration and severe 
price competition.  Nationally it involved the loss of at least 20,000 jobs, some plant 
closures and a deferred wage claim of 7%.  A further 700 Port Talbot jobs were lost.  
In addition to the Port Talbot job losses 1,000 jobs were to go at Velindre Tinplate 
Works976.  During the first half of 1980-81 BSC‟s share of the home market fell from a 
pre-strike figure of 54% to 47%.  The Corporate Plan hoped to attain a 90% 
utilisation rate of manned capacity977.   
 
Under the Corporate Plan steelmaking was retained at the three strip mills within the 
Strip Products Group.  Total strip mill output was planned to increase to 5.5 million 
tonnes and both Port Talbot and Llanwern would increase production from 1.4 to 1.7 
million tonnes of liquid steel (Ravenscraig was to remain at 2.1 million tonnes).  Of 
the 5.5 million tonnes, 0.64 million tonnes was destined for BSC‟s Plate business978, 
primarily Ravenscraig supplying the Dalzell Plate Mill.  On this basis Ravenscraig 
would only produce 1.46 million tonnes for strip products, which was less than Port 
Talbot or Llanwern.  MacGregor had concluded that Ravenscraig was the weakest 
strip mill in terms of market share and competitive cost.  However, until Port Talbot‟s 
concaster started production Ravenscraig would remain open979.  This was the start 
of a protracted effort by BSC to close Ravenscraig. 
 
In early January 1981 BSC organised a ballot of its entire 130,000 workforce on the 
„survival‟ plan.  BSC claimed that it needed to convince the Government that they 
had the workforce‟s support in order to receive the £750 million needed in 1981-
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82980.  The NUB and SIMA had already stated that they would support the plan but 
the BSC ballot pre-empted the ISTC ballot.  As Upham states, the arrival of 
MacGregor heralded an abrasive industrial relations policy stance981.  The ballot was 
part of this change and intended to pressurise the ISTC.  It resulted in 63,237 votes 
in favour of acceptance, 17,900 against and 43,225 abstentions982.  Even before the 
result was known the Port Talbot unions had agreed to implement the survival plan 
but as one union official stated :- 
 
“We had no alternative because the Corporation have the workers and unions 
nationally over a barrel and we voted to save Port Talbot Works983.” 
 
This is further evidence of the shift in the balance of power away from the unions.  
The authorised manning level was now reduced to approximately 5,000 while 
production increased to 1.7 million tonnes.  In terms of manning and production this 
was well beyond the Slimline manning figures of 5,701 and production of 1.4 million 
tonnes.     
 
Works Director, Brian Moffat, stated that Port Talbot‟s future depended on the 1981 
Corporate Plan984.  He claimed it had two features that were critical for Port Talbot 
i.e. increased output and lower operating costs.  The changes would ensure that the 
manhours required to produce a tonne of steel at Port Talbot would be as low as any 
European steelworks.  Prior to Slimline it took 9.4 manhours to produce a tonne of 
steel at Port Talbot.  The Corporate Plan aimed to reduce this to 5.74 
manhours/tonne.  This became a very important point of comparison for BSC and it 
is important to understand some of its implications.  Figures were often quoted which 
ignored differences in products or the functions provided by contractors.  Therefore 
these comparisons should be treated with caution.  Moffat claimed that Slimline was 
not an exercise in immediate profit making but an attempt to secure Port Talbot‟s 
steelmaking future.  He stated that although Slimline reduced manned liquid steel 
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capacity to 1.4 million tonnes lack of orders meant that actual output was only 1.1 
million tonnes.  Even so, Slimline had reduced operating costs and made Port 
Talbot‟s future more secure.  At national level he saw the Corporate Plan as a 
means of achieving higher sales through more aggressive selling and further cost 
reductions (a planned 12%).  This was to be achieved through reduced manning, 
increased yields, more rigid expenditure controls, more competitive purchasing, an 
improved energy policy and improved quality.  Output was expected to increase in 
1981, by 28% in liquid steel, 25% in iron, 22% in hot rolled coil and 43% in cold 
reduced coil985.   
 
The Corporate Plan aggressively reduced manning even as output increased.  It 
addressed some important features missing from Slimline including more aggressive 
sales and better financial and energy control.  It also relied heavily on outsourcing, 
making accurate productivity comparisons very difficult.  This was MacGregor‟s 
legacy to BSC.  He did not initiate the closure programme but he pushed it further 
and also turned BSC into a more commercially focussed and driven organisation.     
 
During February 1981 Port Talbot reached or exceeded its targets.  However, 
problems persisted in the rolling mills as demand improved986.  Progress on the 
Number 1 pickle line was slower than expected which caused a bottleneck for the 
cold mill which affected deliveries987.  By June 1981 the problems were still 
unresolved.  As a consequence the cold mill was unable to fulfil orders.  BSC blamed 
technical problems and restrictive practices.  The hot strip mill was stopped for 24 
hours as the pickle line was unable to cope with output988.  The problem was so 
great that in July 1981, Works Director, Brian Moffat, had to deny rumours that Port 
Talbot would close989.  In face of these difficulties, the ISTC and AUEW pulled back 
from any resistance based on strike action.  
 
During October 1981 4 ISTC workers on the pickle line were sacked over poor 
performance.  This resulted in 300 pickle line workers walking out.  Other ISTC 
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branches were not prepared to escalate the strike990.  The strike was resolved within 
a week when BSC agreed to withdraw the dismissal notices and suspend the men 
on full pay pending the outcome of the disciplinary appeals procedure991.  Likewise, 
in July and November 1981 unofficial disputes over job cuts for AUEW members saw 
the AUEW unwilling to support unofficial action by fitters and then have the advice of 
its full-time officials rejected by members when they proposed resistance to 490 
redundancies992.   
 
The members of the AUEW after two years of massive job losses and a 13 week 
strike had no stomach for further industrial action.  Management were now 
determining manning levels knowing that there would be little serious union 
opposition.   
 
These redundancies reveal another aspect of management‟s strategic thinking.  This 
batch of redundancies concentrated upon non steelmaking functions which could be 
provided by contractors.  At least some of these redundancies were simply jobs 
transferred to contractors.  Locally BSC was following a strategy of reducing 
production manning as far as possible and buying in other services as and when 
required.  Overall year end manning was reduced from 5,626 in 1981 to 5,319 in 
1982 and 4,797 in 1983993 (also see Appendix 28). 
 
While Slimline had concentrated on cutting back manning and outsourcing, the 
Corporate Plan now focussed attention on sales and customer service.  During 1980 
Port Talbot began to receive all its coal from overseas994.  In 1981, following a 
Government decision to increase coal subsidies, BSC signed a contract with the 
NCB to supply Port Talbot with 350,000 tonnes of Welsh coal and 150,000 tonnes of 
Staffordshire coal995.  This was only to prove a temporary arrangement.  The old 
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special relationship with the NCB was replaced by fully commercial purchasing on 
global markets.  Villiers described Australian coal as “……very much cheaper and 
more suitable coking coal996.”  Importing Port Talbot‟s coal requirements illustrates 
the fundamental changes that were taking place.  The SCoW had tried to import 
some of its coal requirements in the early 1960s but had been vetoed by the 
Government to maintain mining jobs.  Thus two obstacles to efficient steelmaking 
and commercial success in the form of overmanning and lack of cheaper better 
quality imported coal had been removed.  Yet a Conservative Government, 
ideologically committed to the free market was still prepared to interfere and force 
BSC to take British coal and preventing Ravenscraig‟s closure for political advantage 
in Scotland. 
 
More investment was being directed towards Port Talbot than any other BSC works 
with £267 million being invested in the concast plant, coke ovens, pickle lines and 
ancillary equipment during 1979-80997.  BSC claimed that approximately 50% of the 
investment at Port Talbot was “for reasons of product quality998.”  It was essential to 
retain market share and to develop new markets.  The importance of this investment 
is often overlooked due to the other changes that were taking place, but it should be 
seen as part of the same process of improving efficiency, quality and 
competitiveness.   
 
These changes linked to the Corporate Plan had major effects on Port Talbot‟s 
physical resources and operating practices.  The catalyst for change was 
Government pressure for BSC to become commercially successful.  Yet there were 
ambiguities to the Government‟s approach.  They enforced manning reductions on 
BSC but also forced them to take British coal and were to prevent them from closing 
Ravenscraig for political advantage.  The focus in these years was managerial 
assaults on overmanning, restrictive practices, outsourcing of ancillary functions, 
improvements in quality and adjusting output to meet market needs.  Slimline was 
rushed and poorly prepared but it was also the precursor of a shift in mindset from 
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the old production based philosophy of SCoW days where output was maximised to 
one more focussed on satisfying market requirements.   
 
Although a full turnaround at Port Talbot was not achieved, it was apparent that 
some success had been achieved according to „The Economist‟ :- 
 
“Although depressed European prices for strip steel cause them still to make a loss 
the Welsh mills of British Steel have performed a small miracle in productivity.  At 
Port Talbot and Llanwern, the man hours needed to make a tonne of crude steel are 
now only 5.7 and 4.6 respectively.  Just 18 months ago each works still took nearer 
10 man hours to make a tonne of steel.  Today‟s performance compares with the 
best in Europe and with the average in Japan999.”  
 
But BSC‟s structural problem still remained.  Foreseeable levels of demand could be 
supplied from two strip mills when there were three.  By October 1981 the Strip 
Group was still losing £2½ million/week1000.  It was also claimed that Ravenscraig 
was losing between £15-£25/tonne whereas the South Wales plants were losing 
between nil and £5/tonne1001.  Ravenscraig was therefore the most vulnerable of the 
three strip mills, and Port Talbot stood to be a major beneficiary from the demise of 
its historic rival strip mills. 
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Chapter 11: 1982 to 1988: Continuing Change, the 
Marginalisation of Ravenscraig and Privatisation 
 
Between 1979 and 1988 the Conservative Government gradually pushed BSC 
towards privatisation.  Against this background the long running story of rivalry and 
interdependence between the three remaining strip mills moved into a final phase 
which culminated in the consolidation of Port Talbot as the most productive of these 
plants.  This led to the marginalisation and eventual closure of Ravenscraig.  This 
chapter focuses on developments between 1982 and 1988.  It shows continued 
investment at Port Talbot to make up for the lack of investment during the 1970s.  
The investment was directed towards efficiency and quality objectives.  It was 
instrumental in the marginalisation of Ravenscraig.  There was a progressive change 
towards more flexible working practices.  This was aided by a shift in power away 
from the unions.  Management skilfully exploited the Port Talbot workforce‟s 
insecurity about the future of steelmaking to implement the changes.  Yet it shows 
that management continued to consult with the unions about the changes and used 
that to control some elements of the workforce.    
 
The Conservative Government of 1979 took more than a year to start talking publicly 
about steel privatisation although management had already discreetly explored the 
possibility.  When Ian MacGregor was appointed BSC‟s chairman in 1979 an 
arrangement was put in place to remunerate his previous employers, Lazard Freres 
and Co, for his services which included payments made under four headings.  One 
of which was privatisation1002.  Therefore privatisation was an explicit and important 
part of his remit.   
 
During the 1980s management developed five different routes whereby parts of BSC 
were transferred to the private sector.  These included direct sale of assets; joint 
venture companies; management buyouts; free standing companies; and contracting 
out of peripheral services.  Direct sales of assets and management buyouts were 
rare.  Instead, free standing companies conformed to a general Government desire 
for a clarification of management responsibilities and performance.  They also 
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functioned as „goods in the shop window‟ for prospective buyers.  By the middle of 
the 1980s ten such companies existed1003.  Joint venture companies or „phoenixes‟ 
were an attempt to re-introduce private capital by forming public-private sector 
partnerships to run a defined but rationalised sector of the industry1004.  BSC first 
shed steelmaking capacity in March 1986 to the biggest of the joint ventures, United 
Engineering Steels.  From 1983-84 BSC‟s Annual Report and Accounts devoted a 
section to „Privatisation‟ or „Joint Ventures and Disposals‟1005.  Only in the 1986-87 
Annual Report and Accounts was the privatisation of BSC itself first mentioned1006. 
 
In June 1988 the ISTC‟s General Secretary, Roy Evans, stated that the ISTC did not 
have the necessary resources to effectively oppose privatisation.  Instead he urged 
his members to accept any shares on offer1007.  Both BSC and the ISTC were 
vehemently opposed to a break up of BSC arguing that it should be sold as an entity.  
A Whitehall leak revealed that the Government supported this approach as some 
parts of the business were regarded as unsaleable1008 .  
 
An alternative proposal put forward in early 1988 by Motherwell South‟s Labour MP, 
Jeremy Bray, involved the separate privatisation of Ravenscraig, Shotton, 
Clydesdale and the Dalzell Plate Mill1009.  He argued, incorrectly, that the new 
organisation had more advanced technology than either Port Talbot or Llanwern1010.  
The proposal received no support from the Government1011.  BSC did not want to 
retain Ravenscraig but did not want it to become a competitor1012.  The ISTC in 
Wales gained assurances from all Welsh Labour MPs, a number of Conservative 
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MPs and Plaid Cymru MPs that they were prepared to work towards BSC being 
privatised as a single entity1013. 
 
The privatisation of BSC as a single entity was carried out during 1988 culminating in 
the floatation of two billion shares in British Steel (BS) at £1-25 each in December 
19881014.  There were 650,000 applications for shares and it was oversubscribed by 
a factor of 3.31015.  Up to 10% of the share issue was reserved for BS‟s employees.  
Each received £70 worth of free shares and a further £2 of shares for each year of 
service, two free shares for each bought up to a limit, a 10% discount on the offer 
price up to £2,200 worth of shares and priority to buy up to £10,000 worth1016.  The 
offer was taken up by 95% of employees and 40% participated in BS‟s ongoing 
British Steel „Sharesave Scheme‟1017. 
 
With a Government ideologically committed to privatising BSC it was essential that 
BSC adopted a more market led approach to operations1018.  Chairman Charles 
Villiers initiated the change even before the Conservatives returned to power but it 
came to fruition under Ian MacGregor.  MacGregor believed that for privatisation to 
succeed BSC needed to be able to generate sufficient profits to cover all capital 
needs and to pay a dividend.  To achieve this BSC needed to recover as much of the 
UK steel market as possible1019.  MacGregor‟s plan was to minimise costs; 
concentrate production on the more efficient plants; dispose of all non-mainstream 
activities; eliminate production overlaps with the private sector; restrict capital 
expenditure to improving efficiency and competitiveness; improve marketing; sell 
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more aggressively; improve quality and customer service; and establish 
decentralised product based businesses which would act as profit centres1020. 
 
In parallel with MacGregor‟s BSC plan the EEC introduced the „Davignon Plan‟.  This 
introduced national output quotas and price controls intended to stabilise the steel 
market to allow European steelmakers the time to rationalise production1021.  It 
created a more stable trading environment and allowed a certain protection for 
national markets.  It allowed BSC to pursue its own strategy and helped it return to 
profitability.  The problem for BSC was that the Government would not give approval 
to close Ravenscraig.  Therefore it was prevented from rationalising its strip steel 
production.  This had direct implications for Port Talbot.   
 
The result of MacGregor‟s strategy was that by privatisation BSC had been largely 
reduced to being a bulk carbon steelmaker with little special steelmaking capacity 
remaining.  Of more significance commercially was that BSC‟s stockholding network 
was disposed of.  The privatised BS soon re-established its own network of 
stockholders to act as an outlet for its products.  Despite this flaw BSC‟s new 
strategy, EEC intervention and increased demand allowed a return to profitability on 
a much reduced output.    
 
Between 1980-81 and 1983-84, although still losing money, BSC‟s financial 
performance improved (also see Appendix 27) :- 
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Severe weather caused operational problems during December 1981 and January 
1982 as did a rail dispute in January and February 1982.  These cost BSC £40 
million.  In March 1982 BSC recorded its first monthly pre-interest trading profit for 5 
years.  However, during the summer of 1983 prices collapsed1023.   
 
Between 1980-81 and 1986-87 BSC‟s labour productivity more than doubled.  In 
1980 UK labour productivity was just 40% of US levels.  By 1986 it had exceeded US 
levels and almost matched those in West Germany and Japan.  This was achieved 
by concentrating the reduced production at the more efficient works and reducing 
manning.  During the 1970s BSC‟s annual liquid steel production exceeded 20 
million tonnes/annum but during 1980-88 it was less than 15 million tonnes/annum.  
However, output per employee was significantly higher.  During the 1970s the 
highest annual liquid steel production was 113.6 tonnes/employee.  By 1987-88 it 
was 284.9 tonnes/employee (see Appendix 30 for details).  Between 1980 and 1983 
energy consumption per tonne of production was reduced by 16%1024.  Overall BSC 
successfully reduced production costs at Corporate, Group and Plant levels. 
 
The Strip Products Group‟s performance between 1981-82 and 1983-84 was in line 
with that of BSC as a whole.  However, despite improving output per employee the 
improvement was boosted by outsourcing of some functions.  Slimline had greatly 
increased the use of contractors at Port Talbot.  After Slimline their use was further 
increased.  Further outsourcing occurred in internal and external transport, slabbing 
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mill crane maintenance and at the BOS plant.  By 1985 when Port Talbot directly 
employed around 4,700 there were approximately 2,000 contractors (excluding 
capital projects)1025.  Gradual outsourcing continued over the ensuing years.  This 
partly explains the relative ease with which management were able to reduce the 
workforce.  Contractors replaced direct employment.   
 
The Group improved delivery performance and better quality standards.  This led to 
increased customer satisfaction1026.  Group performance was :- 
 
Table 11.1: Strip Product Group Output, Turnover and Manning 1981- 19841027 








1981-82 5.4 1,024 27,400 197.1 
1982-83 4.8 1,058 23,750 202.1 
1983-84 5.6 1,238 22,630 247.5 
 
Between 1981-82 and 1983-84 Port Talbot achieved the start up of the concast 
plant, continuing manning reductions and the introduction of more flexible working 
practices.  In early 1982, Works Director, Brian Moffat, was optimistic about Port 
Talbot‟s prospects even though he thought that 1982 would be a difficult year for the 
steel industry.  Port Talbot‟s manning level was now at an internationally competitive 
level and it was unlikely to close.  Over £130 million worth of new plant, including the 
concast plant, was due to come online during 1982.  With the new plant and lower 
manning Moffat believed that Port Talbot would operate highly efficiently and 
produce a high quality product1028.  
 
Liquid steel production increased from 1.9 million tonnes in 1981-82 to 2.0 million 
tonnes in 1983-841029 (see Appendix 34).  With increasing production and falling 
manning productivity increased.  The very fact that activities were being outsourced 
reduced manning and increased the tonnages of steel produced per employee.  
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Even allowing for the outsourcing it is clear that productivity was increasing.  Nichols 
argues that scrapping less efficient plant and concentrating production into a smaller 
number of modern plants in itself increases labour productivity1030.  Port Talbot is an 
example of this.  Closure of the strip mills at Ebbw Vale and Shotton meant that 
production was being concentrated at the newer strip mills.  Within Port Talbot only 
the larger blast furnaces were in production, coke production was largely 
concentrated on the new Morfa Coke Ovens and the concast plant would eventually 
lead to the closure of the slabbing mill.  Closures, new investment and outsourcing 
pushed down direct manning requirements and increased direct labour productivity.  
By February 1982 production was running higher than envisaged with a number of 
post Slimline records being achieved :- 
 
Table 11.2: Production: February 19821031 
 Weekly Average (tonnes) Weekly Record (tonnes) 
No 4&5 Blast Furnaces 35,920 38,387 
Sinter Plant 41,709 46,500 
Slabbing Mill 38,800 - 
Hot Strip Mill 31,200 35,400 
 
In April 1982 an order worth £10 million for 75,000 tonnes of slabs was received from 
the Kaiser Steel Corporation in the USA.  It was won against competition from 20 
other steel companies on cost, quality and delivery criteria1032.  It showed that Port 
Talbot was now capable of competing, and winning, in a highly competitive 
international market.  Despite this rumours of short time working due to a low order 
book persisted1033.  Short time working materialised in October 1982 with one 
production shift per week being dropped1034.  Yet during the first half of 1983 
production records were again regularly being recorded along with further quality and 
delivery improvements1035.  In evidence to the Commons Select Committee on Trade 
and Industry in February 1984 the National Association of Steel Stockholders stated 
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that they hardly ever heard complaints about the quality of BSC‟s products.  They 
now purchased 70-75% of their requirements from BSC.  BSC‟s coil and sheet 
quality was now matching the highest international standards1036. 
 
The start of 1982 saw the introduction of a new Port Talbot bonus scheme. It 
replaced the 1981 quarterly bonus scheme which related exclusively to manhours 
per tonne.  The new bonus was still related to this but was now also linked to BSC‟s 
Corporate Plan.  If Port Talbot attained its tonnage under the Plan a quarterly bonus 
of 5% would be paid.  If exceeded a larger bonus would be paid1037.  One of the 
outcomes of the 1980 national steel strike was that it introduced an element of local 
wage flexibility.  The bonus schemes were part of this and were being refined to suit 
management‟s need to drive down costs.  Port Talbot‟s manning continued to fall 
(also see Appendix 28) :- 
 







The most important addition to the plant between 1982 and 1988 was 
unquestionably the concast plant.  It was a 2 strand slab caster with a 12.5m 
bending radius and 30m metallurgical length1039.  Slabs of up to 250mm in thickness 
and 675-1850mm width could be produced at a rate of 23,000 tonnes/week1040.  The 
manager for steel and slab, Kerry Philips, described it as being vital to Port Talbot‟s 
future1041.  It allowed production of slabs of a more uniform composition, more 
consistent dimensions and with better surface quality1042.  The initial market for its 
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output was the car industry and the two piece can that BSC was producing where 
surface critical coil and sheet were essential1043.  About 80% of this output was 
suitable for the highest quality applications in the cold mill (sheet), tinplate and 
coated products1044.  The initial feasibility study was undertaken in 19771045.  A tried 
and tested design was adopted for this vital plant.  Work started on the site in May 
1979 and the first cast was made on 26th July 1982 rising to full capacity in early 
1983.  It cost approximately £100 million.  Initial annual capacity was approximately 
one million tonnes of low carbon slabs1046.  As experience grew by the late 1980s 
this output almost doubled (see Appendix 34).   
 
The concast plant meant that BSC was no longer reliant upon Ravenscraig for all its 
concast strip steel.  Once Port Talbot‟s concaster became operational BSC 
considered the possibility of closing Ravenscraig.  The caster allowed quality 
improvements which could not be attained through the traditional ingot route.  
Importantly the plant was built with the capability of later installing a second caster.  
 
The hot strip mill was now 30 years old and was unable to match the quality of 
Llanwern‟s hot strip mill products.  Towards the end of 1982 as the concast project 
was completed the local press indicated that a further multi-million pound investment 
in the strip mill was being considered1047.  The Government and the EEC gave 
approval for a new strip mill during 1983-84.  It would bring significant improvements 
with regard to coil weights and product quality.  The maximum coil weight that the 
existing strip mill could handle was 10 tonnes.  This imposed limitations on quality, 
efficiency and output.  It also imposed constraints on the subsequent finishing mills 
that Port Talbot supplied.  The principle objective therefore was to increase coil 
weight to 34 tonnes.  There was to be no change in the maximum width of coil which 
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remained at 80”.  The cost of the development was estimated at £171 million.  It was 
hoped that this investment would place Port Talbot amongst the most efficient and 
high quality integrated strip mills in Europe1048. 
 
The new mill was installed in two phases.  Replacement of the existing mill started in 
1983 and by August 1985 it could produce the new larger coils.  The second phase 
involved remotoring the mill1049.  During the installation the strip mill was kept in 
operation for the maximum possible time.  However, it still required the closure of the 
mill for 10 weeks between August 1984 and December 19851050.  In August 1985 
concast slabs were sent to Llanwern for rolling1051.  Commissioning of the 
refurbished hot strip mill started, on time and on budget, on 1st January 19861052.  
The Prince and Princess of Wales performed the official opening on 11th June 
19861053.  In September the hot strip mill produced a weekly average of 34,252 
tonnes of coil1054. 
 
The building of Port Talbot‟s concast plant and the rebuilding of the hot strip mill 
were intricately linked.  Both were designed to support BSC‟s strategy of attaining 
commercial success through meeting customer requirements for higher quality and 
reducing costs.  They were complemented by major quality focused improvements 
including new pickle lines in 1982 and by new racking and conveyor belt systems in 
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the cold mill during 1985 and 19871055.  In 1984 the galvanising line was refurbished 
involving re-motoring the line, installing a new ceramic zinc pot, the latest type of 
matt finish and tension control equipment and other sophisticated 
instrumentation1056.  A £1 million investment was made at the Morfa coke ovens to 
reduce steam consumption and reduce energy costs by approximately £0.5 
million/annum1057.  Number 4 blast furnace was relined and modernised in 19851058.  
It is shown below after modernisation :-  
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The concast plant, and the eventual closure of the slabbing mill, increased yield from 
a given amount of liquid steel thus increasing productivity.  A further controlled and 
relatively small expansion in capacity at Port Talbot could eliminate the need to keep 
Ravenscraig open even when demand was high.  In 1986-87 „light degassing‟ was 
introduced into the „steelmaking to concast route‟ to produce a cleaner and more 
consistent steel1059.   
 
During 1988 it was announced that Port Talbot was to have a second continuous 
casting machine to be commissioned in early 1991 at a cost of £75 million1060.  By 
this time Port Talbot was 100% concast after the slabbing mill closed during 1986-
87.  The capacity of the concast plant was now restricting Port Talbot‟s output.  The 
building of the second concast machine was to raise Port Talbot‟s overall output and 
allow BS to fully exploit the potential of the new strip mill.  It also further reduced 
BS‟s need for Ravenscraig even when demand was high.  BS aimed to reduce costs 
further by concentrating strip mill production on two strip mills rather than three.  
Increasing Port Talbot‟s quality and capacity removed any commercial reason to 
retain Ravenscraig.   
 
During 1984-85 BSC lost £140 million on its ordinary activities.  This included £180 
million of costs relating to the 1984-85 miners strike.   Without this BSC would have 
returned an operating profit of £40 million1061.  According to Bob Scholey, BSC‟s 
Chief Executive, the strike‟s adverse effects on BSC included :-   
 
 abnormal imports of coal and coke bought at „spot‟ prices rather than 
contracted prices and at unfavourable exchange rates; 
 the inland movement of all raw materials by road rather than rail; 
 extra shipping, transhipment and demurrage costs for raw materials; 
 non-standard material blends, operating practices and process routes at 
the Corporation‟s works;  
 lost production during the first six months of the strike; 
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 lost sales to the National Coal Board throughout the strike; and 
 higher interest charges 1062. 
 
Port Talbot, however, experienced fewer adverse effects from the strike as its 
workforce and unions refused to make significant sacrifices for the striking miners.  
At the start of the strike BSC Chairman, Robert Haslam, warned that if any steel 
plant closed it might not reopen1063.  Both Ravenscraig and Llanwern were more 
vulnerable than Port Talbot as they depended on rail transport.  Early in the dispute 
the ISTC believed that it had reached agreement with the NUM and rail unions to 
allow movement of sufficient coal to safeguard the blast furnaces and to protect 
regular orders, but towards the end of May 1984 the NUM successfully pressurised 
the rail unions to stop all deliveries of coal and iron ore.  BSC brought in lorries to 
deliver its coal and ore.  This remained the position until the end of the strike.  At the 
height of the strike BSC was nationally moving over 100,000 tonnes of coal and ore 
each day by road.  A total of 4.8 million tonnes of coal and ore was transported to 
Llanwern and Ravenscraig during the strike1064.  At Port Talbot imported coal through 
the harbour was difficult to disrupt.  Throughout the strike Port Talbot Steelworks 
was picketed by striking miners, especially at the beginning of the strike.   Despite 
these attempts to disrupt operations, production records were broken throughout 
1984-851065. 
 
In March 1984 the NUM asked the 600 strong NUB Margam Lodge to stop unloading 
90,000 tonnes of coal from the „Pacific Courage‟ in the harbour.  The men voted 
unanimously to continue unloading the coal to maintain production1066.  The NUM 
pressurised the regional ISTC but it was clear that members were not prepared to 
                                                          
1062
 Scholey, ibid. 
1063
 Robert Haslam. in Philip Bassett, and Ian Rodger „BSC chief warns of permanent plant 
closures‟, Financial Times, 10th May 1984, p.1. 
1064
 Anon. „Coal Strike Warning‟. Steel News, No309, 17th May 1984, p.1.  Ibid, „New 
dangers from coal, docks strike‟. No311, 19th July 1984, p.1;  „NUM Strike Costs BSC £175 
Million‟. No319, 14th March 1985, p.1. BSC, 1984-85, p.18.  Robert Haslam, „Business As 
Usual‟. Steel News, No 314, 18th October 1984, p.1.  Sirs, pp.10-19.  Geoffrey Goodman, The 
Miners’ Strike (London: Pluto Press Ltd, 1985), pp.105-106.  Upham, Tempered Not 
Quenched, pp.181-185. 
1065
 Anon. „1984-85 was a record year‟. Steel News, No322, 13th June 1985, p.1. 
1066
 Caroline Painter, „Steelmen reject mine plea‟. PTG, 29th March 1984, p.1.  John Perring, 
Quoted in „Steelmen reject mine plea‟. PTG, 29th March 1984, p.1. 
 257 
have output affected at either Port Talbot or Llanwern1067.  By early April 1984, 11 
pickets had been arrested at Port Talbot‟s main entrance trying to prevent coke 
leaving the works.  Despite further NUM pleas, union officials at Port Talbot stated 
that foreign coal had been used for some time and that any halt in production could 
result in closure1068.  The following week the „Polyclipper‟ arrived at the harbour with 
60,000 tonnes of Australian coal.  This triggered more trouble on the picket line with 
58 arrests1069.  In July 1984 about 200 women unsuccessfully attempted to stop the 
morning convoy of lorries leaving Port Talbot for Llanwern1070.  It was clear that the 
workforce were not prepared to curtail production to support the miners. 
 
During September 1984 a number of striking miners got into the harbour and armed 
with supplies occupied the transporter cranes.  After injunctions were served they 
came down and were arrested1071.  The T&G union tried to prevent raw materials 
arriving by persuading tug men at Port Talbot not to berth ships.  The men ignored 
the plea1072.  No further major incidents took place at Port Talbot.  A factor that may 
have influenced the steel unions was a feeling that they had not received sufficient 
support from the NUM during the 1980 strike1073.  However, nationally the ISTC gave 
the NUM £65,000 during the dispute and a similar amount locally1074.       
  
During the strike both Port Talbot and Llanwern achieved production in excess of 
40,000 tonnes/week1075.  The strike further demonstrated the locational advantages 
of Port Talbot.  It was less susceptible to disruption as its raw materials came by sea 
and involved no rail transport.  Although production was maintained at all three strip 
mills, the cost advantages of Port Talbot over both Llanwern and Ravenscraig must 
have been more clearly demonstrated than at any other time. 
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From the early 1960s onwards management had recognised that to maintain sales at 
Port Talbot product quality needed to improve.  During the 1980s the British steel 
industry developed various systems to improve quality.  A Quality Assurance 
Programme was developed which essentially involved including a guarantee of 
product quality in the price1076.   The steel industry adopted the BS5750 standard.  In 
practice by the mid 1980s there were mixed responses to this.  Those closely in 
contact with customers were more aware of the need for quality assurance than 
those further upstream in the production process where attitudes were slower to 
change1077.  This was tackled by building quality requirements into individual 
managers‟ work objectives1078.  Later in the decade BSC adopted the Lloyds 
Register Quality Assurance Ltd independent certification on quality1079.  At a national 
level the 1987-88 pay agreement included a link to Total Quality Performance1080.  
The idea of quality was gradually integrated into all activities in the production 
process. 
 
By 1988 product quality had became a major objective of Port Talbot‟s recent 
investment, process improvements and training initiatives.  Attaining the BS5750 
standard in 1987 and its international equivalent ISO 9002 was felt to be essential in 
demonstrating Port Talbot‟s commitment to improving product quality and customer 
service1081.  It involved a complete review and revision of Port Talbot‟s 
documentation, procedures and record of the quality management systems1082.  In 
practice quality meant :- 
 
“Get it right first time, every time, on time.  Eliminate faults as they occur, prevention 
before detection.  Prevent the waste of time, manpower and cost associated with 
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correcting faults.  Our challenge is to assure customers that the Port Talbot Dragon 
MEANS QUALITY 1083.” 
 
A measure of Port Talbot‟s progress occurred during 1988-89 when it received one 
of Ford of Europe‟s much sought after Q1 Quality awards for the consistent high 
quality of the car body sheet it supplied1084, a dramatic change from the 1970s when 
Ford would not accept steel for some car bodywork parts from BSC because of its 
poor quality.   
 
The improvement in quality was essentially the result of a two pronged approach.  
Firstly, the investment taking place and by meeting recognised external quality 
standards and incorporating the idea of quality into all activities to gain customer 
confidence and commercial success.  If this change in mindset had taken place in 
the early to mid 1970s it is possible that Port Talbot would have helped BSC retain a 
greater market share.  Managerial focus on capacity expansion largely prevented 
this. 
 
Allied to quality is research and product development.  From its formation BSC 
operated a number of research laboratories.  This included facilities at Port Talbot.  
BSC‟s approach to research indicates some of their thinking.  During BSC‟s early 
years most research was directed towards solving problems in the production 
process rather than product development.  An exception was the development of 
coated sheet with PVC or other plastic coatings for an expanding market1085.  BSC‟s 
failure to develop new products was a mistake.  New products would have increased 
demand for strip steel, an area where they had surplus capacity.  Their approach 
was a consequence of their production focussed mindset from the 1950s.  They 
certainly gained production efficiencies but failed to fully exploit market opportunities.  
This was particularly felt when the market contracted. 
 
After 1980 BSC‟s research focus shifted.  Although they never fully abandoned 
research to support the steelmaking process more effort was directed towards 
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improving quality and increasing the product range.  Of particular interest to Port 
Talbot was BSC‟s development of a two piece can aimed at retaining market share 
in the food and drink markets1086.  Research was now supporting a more 
commercially minded approach to production.   
 
This period was also a period of continuing transition at Port Talbot for both working 
practices and pay.  There were radical changes in work organisation seeking both 
functional and numerical flexibility1087.  These included multi-skilling, teamworking, 
reductions in demarcation, moves towards merit based promotion (as opposed to 
seniority based promotion) as well as increased sub-contracting (as discussed 
earlier).   
 
One of the main outcomes of the 1980 strike was the introduction of performance 
related pay.  By the late 1980s and early 1990s BSC introduced „total quality 
performance‟ which meant that bonuses depended not only on shedding manpower 
but also on trade unions accepting new working practices1088.  The 1980s also saw a 
shift away from highly centralised pay bargaining.  The last national pay agreement 
came into effect in 1988.  Bargaining was increasingly devolved to divisional 
level1089.  Port Talbot was involved early in this process.  At the start of 1983 the local 
ISTC officials agreed a local multi-union agreement which effectively replaced the 
Annual Review.  As a result they were removed from office by the national union1090.  
They were eventually re-instated but with a warning from the union1091.  After 1980 a 
„climate of fear‟ overcame the steel industry with managers able to threaten plant 
closure in order to pressurise local and regional union officials into accepting new 
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working practices1092.  This was undoubtedly an influence at Port Talbot even though 
BSC had no intention of closing Port Talbot.   
 
Shop floor working practices changed radically.  Particularly significant was the 
introduction of „multi-skilling‟ where single trade craftsmen were replaced with 
craftsmen with a knowledge and training in a number of skills.  At Port Talbot BSC 
introduced just two grades of multi-skilled craftsmen, namely, „mechanical‟ and 
„electrical‟.  Apprentices were trained in one of these specialities1093.  Alongside this 
came the introduction of „teamworking‟.  This entails self-contained groups of 
workers responsible for all of the activities in the work area and a move away from 
rigid experienced based seniority systems1094.  By the early 1990s its introduction 
into the British steel industry had been patchy and certainly at Port Talbot seniority 
remained the route for promotion for production workers1095.  Teamworking was not 
universally accepted by management.  Some mangers felt that it was not appropriate 
in the steel industry1096.  
 
Nevertheless more flexible working practices were widely introduced at Port Talbot.  
Examples included rollermen who band (package) steel sheets also working in other 
parts of the cold mill when the need arose and blast furnace process workers fitting 
the lances used to pierce the clay taps at the bottom of the furnaces1097.  To run off 
by-products at the coke ovens now only required one man whereas before 1980 it 
took six.  In the Transport Department locomotive drivers started to refuel their 
locomotives1098. 
 
These and other changes to working practices after 1980 were faster than at any 
time during the 1960s and 1970s.  Bacon et al argued that the unions developed no 
new mechanisms to influence systems of individualised training and rewards1099.  
They also claimed that flexibility agreements and the erosion of demarcation marked 
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a potentially decisive shift in shop floor power in the steel industry.  Yet there is little 
evidence that the roles of the unions were displaced by new management 
techniques.  However, union influence was certainly reduced at Port Talbot.  Here, 
and throughout the strip mill plants, management played upon workforce insecurity 
to implement change.  At one level management removed the union veto over 
change.  Yet even that may be misleading.  Even when the unions were much 
stronger in the 1950s, it was not so much that the unions had a veto, but that 
management were not prepared to sacrifice significant profits in order to force their 
will on the workforce.  Despite the shift in power in the 1980s management continued 
to readily consult the unions on all changes.  Management needed the influence of 
the unions at the local level even if they were hostile to them at national level.  Local 
management wanted to avoid resistance from the workforce.  Agreement and 
consultation with the various local unions remained a means of avoiding this. 
 
During the period 1985-86 to 1988-89 BS‟s liquid steel production increased from 
14.0 million tonnes in 1985-86 to 15.4 million tonnes in 1988-891100.  Steel deliveries 
are set out below :- 
 
Table 11.4: BSC/BS Deliveries of Steel 1984-85 to 1988-89 (million tonnes)1101 
Year Total Deliveries Exports Home Sales 
1984-85 10.6 2.8 7.8 
1985-86 10.7 3.0 7.7 
1986-87 10.3 3.7 6.6 
1987-88 12.1 4.4 7.7 
1988-89 13.1 4.2 8.9 
As a consequence BSC/BS‟s financial performance improved.  Their financial 
performance is set out below (these figures differ slightly from those in Appendix 27 
as BS altered the way that it recorded its financial results in 1988-89) :- 
Table 11.5: BSC/BS Financial Performance 1984-85 to 1988-89 (£ million)1102 
Year Trading Profit (Loss) Profit (Loss) For Distribution* 
1984/85 (64) (383) 
1985/86 91 38 
1986/87 190 178 
1987/88 424 410 
1988/89 656 561 
* After exceptional items, tax and minority items. 
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These steadily improving figures are a reflection of improved market conditions, 
concentrating production on more productive modern plant, a weaker pound, 
reduced manning and flexible working practices.  By 1986 BSC‟s operating profit in 
terms of dollars per tonne exceeded anywhere in the European Community, was 
ahead of the deteriorating Japanese average and markedly superior to the protected 
loss making US steel industry1103.   
 
The Strip Products Group participated in this revival, though less strongly than BSC 
as a whole.  While its home sales were strong its export growth was less strong :- 
 
Table 11.6: BSC/BS Strip Products Group Performance 1985-86 to 1988-891104 












1985-86 5.4 1,405 21,436 3.1 1.2 
1986-87 5.7 1,424 21,080 3.0 1.8 
1987-88 6.6 1,668 20,570 3.6 2.1 
1988-89 * * * 4.2 1.6 
* The figures are not available in comparable form 
 
Between a quarter and a third of the Group‟s liquid steel production came from Port 
Talbot where output ranged between 1.597 million to 2.263 million tonnes/annum 
between 1985 and 1988 (see Appendix 34).  Production was notably lower during 
1985-86 due to the rebuilding of the hot strip mill.  During 1987 and 1988 output per 
employee was between 470-485 tonnes/year/employee compared to less than 200 
prior to 1973.  
 
Throughout this period production records were broken at Port Talbot.  For the week 
ending 10th January 1987 the concast plant produced 46,003 tonnes of slabs and a 
weekly average of 40,037 tonnes during January1105.  This was equivalent to about 2 
million tonnes/year which was considerably more than when the plant was first built.  
Yet slab production remained a bottleneck restricting output at Port Talbot after the 
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slabbing mill had closed1106.  Also during January 1987 the refurbished strip mill 
produced a new weekly record of 43,663 tonnes.  In February 1987 the blast 
furnaces produced a post Slimline weekly average of 42,000 tonnes of iron and the 
sinter plant 57,300 tonnes of sinter1107.  This improved performance reflected BSC‟s 
national performance.  The plant was operating at the peak of the demand cycle and 
as much production as possible was being concentrated at Port Talbot.  It was a 
lower cost steelmaker because of its locational advantages and contained costs.  Its 
quality and customer support had also improved.  Once the refurbishment of the strip 
mill had been completed work began on installing a second reheat furnace1108.   
 
The Group still contained three strip mills but existing levels of demand required just 
two fully modernised and slightly expanded steelworks.  However, during 1987-88 
when demand was particularly high, bottlenecks in the production process at the 
three strip mills meant that all three steelworks were still needed.  It has to be 
remembered that steelmaking is the sum of a number of sub-processes.  The overall 
capacity is limited by the lowest capacity of the individual processes.  At Port Talbot 
that was the capacity of the concast plant.  At Ravenscraig it was the iron making 
capacity.  Removing such bottlenecks through relatively small investment could allow 
BS to close one mill.  Demand for the Group‟s products was high particularly from 
the motor industry as UK vehicle production rose from 94,500 to 130,500 
units/annum between 1984 and 19901109.  
  
It has already been argued that higher production costs at Ravenscraig made it the 
most vulnerable strip mill.  Port Talbot with its harbour required no land transport for 
its ore or coal.  Llanwern received all of its ore through Port Talbot Harbour.  Like 
Ravenscraig its ore required shipment by rail that added to production costs.  Yet 
Llanwern enjoyed considerable cost advantages over Ravenscraig in assembling its 
raw materials.  The distance between the ore port of Hunterston and Ravenscraig 
was 51 miles and between Port Talbot and Llanwern 45 miles.  The cost per tonne to 
transport ore by rail was £2.40/tonne and £1.46/tonne respectively (4.7p and 3.3p 
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per tonne/mile)1110.  The difference was due to a number of factors.  These included 
the greater distances involved, an extra locomotive needed to get the trains up an 
incline to Ravenscraig and the need to remove the locomotive to get into 
Ravenscraig over a weak bridge1111.  Thus both Port Talbot and Llanwern enjoyed 
cost advantages over Ravenscraig in assembling their raw materials.  Additionally, 
Port Talbot Harbour imported raw materials for two steelworks which meant that 
costs per tonne discharged were less. 
 
One of Ravenscraig‟s blast furnaces was permanently closed in August 1982.  This 
restricted iron production to two relatively small blast furnaces and liquid steel 
production to just 2.1 million tonnes/annum1112.  Ravenscraig‟s maximum liquid steel 
output was 1.8 million tonnes in 1986-871113.  The same amount of steel could be 
produced at Llanwern using just its Number 3 blast furnace.  At Port Talbot in 1991, 
based upon a two blast furnace configuration, 2.8 million tonnes of liquid steel was 
produced (see Appendix 28).  As for steelmaking Port Talbot had two 300 tonne 
converters in its BOS plant, Llanwern three 185 tonne converters and Ravenscraig 
three 130 tonne converters1114.  Thus the scale of steelmaking at Ravenscraig was 
smaller than at either South Wales plant.  By contemporary standards a capacity of 3 
million tonnes was regarded as the minimum economic capacity.  Practical 
steelmaking at Ravenscraig was considerably short of this.  Both Port Talbot and 
Llanwern would produce over 3 million tonnes of liquid steel in the future.  At both 
South Wales plants output was limited by the capacity of their concasters.  
Ravenscraig was limited by actual steelmaking capacity.   
 
A further problem with Ravenscraig‟s blast furnaces was the means of slag disposal.  
At Port Talbot and Llanwern slag was run into a pool alongside the blast furnaces, 
cooled and removed by road.  At Ravenscraig the blast furnace configuration meant 
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that the slag was tapped into railway slag pots and removed by rail1115.  This was a 
more costly operation.  Another problem for Ravenscraig occurred when BSC 
purchased Alphasteel‟s Newport mill and closed it on 15th January 1986.  Its 
concaster was installed at Llanwern1116.  Llanwern‟s concaster came on line during 
April 1988 at a cost of £47 million1117.  Now all three strip mills had concast facilities. 
 
A further problem for Ravenscraig was the collapse in demand for steel in Scotland.  
Whole sectors of Scotland‟s engineering and metal using industries ceased 
production in the early 1980s.  Production ceased at the Linwood car plant, the 
Bathgate vehicle works and at Hoover‟s factory.  All were major consumers of 
Ravenscraig‟s strip mill output.  Consequently Britain‟s major markets for strip 
products became concentrated in the Midlands and the South East.  Thus 
Ravenscraig became more distant from its markets than the South Wales plants1118.   
 
Scotland‟s collapse in demand for sheet resulted in the closure of the Gartcosh cold 
mill in March 1986.  Ravenscraig‟s hot strip mill output could no longer be turned into 
sheet in Scotland.  When Gartcosh closed the Scottish market took just 2.8% of 
Britain‟s cold rolled sheet production.  Even with Gartcosh open Ravenscraig was at 
a cost disadvantage in producing sheet.  Port Talbot and Llanwern had integrated 
cold mills.  Gartcosh was located 12 miles from Ravenscraig with the consequent 
additional transport costs.  By closing Gartcosh and loading up the South Wales cold 
mills BSC saved £440,000 per annum in transport costs1119.  The Gartcosh closure 
was correctly seen as being a threat to the future of Ravenscraig as it took a third of 
Ravenscraig‟s output1120.  The closure meant that the majority of Ravenscraig‟s hot 
rolled strip output would be sent to Shotton for finishing.  It would supply 
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approximately 75% of Shotton‟s requirements.  The outcome was becoming clear.  
Robert Haslam, BSC‟s Chairman, stated in 1984 that he believed that Ravenscraig‟s 
closure would be phased rather than a single closure1121.   
 
It was 1986 before any substantial investment was made at Ravenscraig.  At first 
sight a £30 million investment appeared to be substantial.  Half of this was for new 
coal injection facilities at the blast furnaces as BSC refused to invest in the coke 
ovens.  This was an essential investment to maintain iron production.  Other 
investments included a partial reline of Number 1 blast furnace at £5½ million and £2 
million to rebuild Number 1 re-heat furnace1122.  Over £20½ million of the £30 million 
was simply to maintain iron production.  The rest was spent to allow Ravenscraig to 
supply 3,000 tonnes/month of „grain orientated‟ electrical steel to the Orb Works in 
Newport in South Wales, the very town where Llanwern was located.  Despite being 
one of the most sophisticated and complicated of bulk steels to produce this was 
hardly a long-term solution to Ravenscraig‟s problems.  This investment was 
necessary to retain steelmaking at Ravenscraig.  Meanwhile investment at Port 
Talbot continued to increase quality and output which was later used to replace 
Ravenscraig.  
 
As late as 1988 Ravenscraig was still breaking production records.  The hot strip mill 
produced a daily record of 7,330 tonnes1123.  By then BSC were stating that they 
were committed to maximising the benefits of their Port Talbot investments1124.  
However, BSC still needed Ravenscraig so that it could meet peak demand until the 
bottleneck at Port Talbot of having only one concaster was removed.  Ravenscraig 
had also been needed to maintain strip mill output during the rebuilding of Port 
Talbot‟s strip mill, a reversal of the situation in the late 1970s, when Ravenscraig 
was being modernised.   
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A further factor working against Ravenscraig was the location of the two South 
Wales strip mills in relation to each other.  Being so closely located developed its 
own synergy.  Costs were reduced by sharing assets and expertise.  Contracts were 
let for both steelworks and an element of shared management developed which 
further reduced costs.   
 
The problem for BSC was that considerable political opposition existed even within 
the Conservative Government to closing Ravenscraig.  In 1982, with an approaching 
General Election, the Secretary of State for Industry, Patrick Jenkin, announced that 
steelmaking would continue at all of BSC‟s five integrated steelworks until 19861125.  
This was later extended until 19891126.  The political support to retain steelmaking at 
Ravenscraig was such that the Conservative Scottish Secretary of State, George 
Younger, indicated in 1982 that closure would be a resignation issue1127.  During 
1982-83 keeping Ravenscraig open was estimated to have cost BSC about £100 
million1128.  Conservative political support largely evaporated with BSC‟s privatisation 
and the Government‟s refusal to interfere with a private company.  The question was 
now not if, but when, it would close.  Closure came after privatisation with the hot 
strip mill closing in 1991 and steelmaking in 19921129.  It was no coincidence that 
closure followed the opening of Port Talbot‟s second concast plant.  A bottleneck 
had been removed at Port Talbot which meant, even in periods of high demand, that 
the South Wales plants could meet any likely demand.  The last commercial reason 
for retaining Ravenscraig was removed. 
 
The Conservative Government‟s attitude to Ravenscraig is particularly interesting.  
For the majority of nationalised industries the chosen model of ministerial control 
was the arm‟s length Morrisonian model where the government would agree overall 
strategy with the corporation but leave day to day implementation in the hands of 
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management1130.  With regard to Ravenscraig the Conservative Government in effect 
took control of BSC down to a lower level for electoral reasons.  A Conservative 
Government, which more than any previous post war Government, embraced the 
idea of the free market, interfered to keep Ravenscraig open.  This had a direct 
effect on Port Talbot in that BSC could not fully exploit the latter until Ravenscraig 
closed. 
 
The benefits of the investment and changes to working practices at Port Talbot 
mounted during 1985-1988.  The rebuilding of the hot strip mill coupled with the 
concast plant enabled Port Talbot to produce low cost hot strip of the highest quality.  
This and the decision to install a second concast machine to increase effective 
capacity ensured the eventual closure of Ravenscraig.  
 
During the 1980s Port Talbot not only survived but largely regained its position as 
BS‟s primary strip mill.  It received over £500 million of investment during the decade 
and by 1988 fears of closure had disappeared.  It was claimed to be one of the most 
competitive and productive steelworks in Europe making a major contribution 
towards BS‟s profits1131.  The numbers employed at Port Talbot had fallen from 
approximately 12,000 in the late 1970s to 4,500 in the late 1980s.  It was the harbour 
that allowed it to maintain a cost advantage over Llanwern and Ravenscraig.  Peter 
Allen, the Managing Director, Operations, BSC Strip Mill Products, stated in 1987 
that Port Talbot, with some more changes, had a great future with little likelihood of 
further job losses1132.  On the latter point he was wrong.  Some difficult periods lay 
ahead but Port Talbot has continued to produce steel into the twenty-first century 
(see postscript). 
 
Port Talbot‟s success was due largely to its continued exploitation of its locational 
advantages and particularly the harbour attached to the works.  Allied to this was a 
workforce prepared to go along with the changes that management wanted even if 
this involved conflict with the national union.  Management skilfully exploited their 
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new found strength after the 1980 strike largely through threats to the future of 
steelmaking and a drive to make everyone aware of the commercial realities that 
they faced.  In addition investment in the 1980s made up for the lack of investment 
during the 1970s.  This investment, and to a lesser extent, investment at Llanwern 
removed the last commercial reasons to retain Ravenscraig.  Privatisation largely 
removed the political support that Ravenscraig enjoyed and speeded up closure.  
BSC pushed hard to privatise BSC as an entity and it is likely that the desire to close 
Ravenscraig rather than create a potential rival for the South Wales strip mills was 
one of the reasons for this.  After the traumatic events of the early 1980s, Port 
Talbot‟s position stabilised.  That process was to continue after privatisation.  Short-
term and medium-term survival had been assured. 
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Chapter 12: Postscript and Conclusions 
 
Postscript 
British Steel operated Port Talbot until its merger with the Dutch steelmaker, 
Koninklijke Hoogovens NV, on 6th October 1999 to form Corus1133.  In October 2006 
the Indian company, Tata Steel, made an offer for Corus1134, and took over 
ownership in 2007. 
 
During the UK recession of 1990-91 BS decided to load up the lower cost strip mills 
at Port Talbot and Llanwern in preference to Ravenscraig1135.  This resulted in the 
closure of Ravenscraig‟s hot strip mill.  Ravenscraig continued to operate as a slab 
producer feeding the South Wales strip mills using just one blast furnace until all iron 
and steelmaking ended in June 19921136.   
 
On 1st February 2001 Corus announced a major restructuring in response to difficult 
trading conditions.  This involved the closure of the Ebbw Vale Tinplate Works and 
the end of iron and steelmaking at Llanwern although the hot strip mill continued in 
production1137.  It was supplied with slabs from Port Talbot and Redcar.  In 2009 all 
production at Llanwern temporarily stopped due to the economic downturn.  This left 
Port Talbot as Britain‟s only operating hot strip mill1138.  
 
Liquid steel production at Port Talbot has gradually increased since 1988 stimulated 
by investment, the closure of Ravenscraig and the end of steelmaking at Llanwern in 
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During 2007 Number 5 blast furnace produced a weekly record of 48,833 tonnes of 
iron1140.  Also in 2007 the hot strip mill rolled a record 3 million tonnes of coil1141.  In 
November 2008 Tata announced that due to the economic downturn European 
production was to be reduced by 30%.  Port Talbot was temporarily reduced to a one 
blast furnace operation (Number 5)1142.  The major investments since privatisation 
have been :- 
 
Table 12.1: Port Talbot Investment Since 19881143 
  Cost (£ million) 
1991 Second Concast Plant 83 
1992-93 Number 4 Blast Furnace Rebuild 71 
1993 Degassing Unit Installed 13 
1994 Link Equipment Installed in Cold Mill 12 
1996-98 Continuous Annealing Line Installed 121 
1998 Coal Injection at Blast Furnaces 20 
2002 Rebuild of Number 5 Blast Furnace 65 
2005 Third Concast Plant Installed 80 
2006 Improvements to Blast Furnaces 16 
2008 Investment in Energy Management 60 
 
                                                          
1139
 Corus, Information supplied by Corus Port Talbot, 2008. 
1140
 Paul Lewis, „Safety first as record smashed at steel works‟. SWEP, 31st May 2007, p.1. 
1141
 Corus, „Well Done‟. Corus advertisement in SWEP, 21st December 2007, p.16. 
1142
 Robin Turner, „„Knee-jerk reaction‟ claim at Corus plant‟. PTG, 13th November 2008, 
p.3.  Richard Youle, „Steel giant to slash production‟. SWEP, November 2008, p.1. 
1143
 BS, 1989-1990, p.3; 1990-91, p.10; 1991-92, p.12; 1992-93, p.13; 1993-94, p.19; 1994-
95, p.18; 1996-97, pp.8-9; 1998-99, p.13.  Anon. „£71m blast furnace gets into action‟. 
SWEP, 8
th
 September 1992, p.1.  Corus, 2001, p.14; 2002, p.6, p.11.  Corus announces £60 
million investment at Port Talbot steelworks in Wales: Corus news release, 4
th
 February 2008.  
Paul Lewis, „Welcome for major steel plant boost‟. The Courier, 10th May 2005, p.1.  Ibid, 
„£16m act of support wins praise‟. SWEP, 21st September 2006. p.10. 
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As investment took place and more activities were outsourced the workforce fell from 
4,689 in 1988 to approximately 2,900 in 2005.  By 2008 it has risen again to almost 
3,5001144.  It was felt that too many works critical functions had been outsourced and 
a strategic decision was made to bring them back in house to reduce risk1145. 
 
Predicting the future of steelmaking at Port Talbot is difficult.  Investment in plant has 
been high; there is a well trained workforce and no rival integrated steelworks in 
Britain.  The plant may be modern but it is far from ideally laid out leading to higher 
production costs.  Steelmaking capacity exceeds rolling capacity by almost 2 million 
tonnes.  With Llanwern back in production during 2009 in effect Port Talbot‟s second 
strip mill is located over 40 miles away and its tinplate mill 20 miles away at Trostre 
which is far from ideal.  For Port Talbot to have a long-term future it needs 
substantial political support both in Wales and at Westminster.  With foreign 
ownership and continuing globalisation long-term survival must be at least 
questionable.  
 
                                                          
1144
 Paul Turner, „Cheer for workers as steel company shows huge profit‟. SWEP, 26th August 
2005, p.1.  Anon. „Corus contractor cuts 40 temporary jobs‟. SWEP, 20th October 2008, p.1. 
1145
 Corus Manager, Conversation with Stephen Parry, November 2008. 
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Conclusions 
Over the period covered in this piece of work there have been a number of 
fundamental changes for the British steel industry.  The most fundamental has been 
the completion of a process already underway at the start of the twentieth century, 
namely the replacement of home produced iron ore with foreign ore.  By 1988 
virtually all ore and most coal used was foreign in origin.  This change altered the 
economics of steelmaking in Britain in favour of coastal steel production with access 
to an ore dock/harbour.  This eliminated costly rail transport to inland steelworks.  It 
is that change and particularly direct access to an ore dock/harbour that has largely 
accounted for the expansion and survival of steelmaking at Port Talbot.   
 
A further change in steelmaking during the twentieth century was the concentration 
of steelmaking at fewer but larger sites.  The stimulus for this change was the need 
to gain the economies of scale enjoyed by some foreign steelmakers.  Larger 
steelworks needed greater amounts of raw materials which made coastal locations 
with access to a port even more attractive sites for steelmaking.  These two trends 
made Port Talbot an ideal site for steelmaking.  A further locational advantage was 
the abundant availability of low value land for expansion.  Despite these advantages 
the evidence reveals that steelmaking started at Port Talbot almost by accident.  The 
stimulus was that the dock owners needed to increase trade and a steelworks met 
that requirement.  After the initial company failed Baldwins acquired the steelworks 
relatively cheaply.  That meant that capital was available for investment.  That and 
the locational advantages ensured that it became the largest steelworks in South 
West Wales and one of national importance exploiting the growing market for heavy 
steel products. 
 
For most of the period covered here British steel companies lagged behind American 
and German companies in terms of size.  In many ways the story of the British steel 
industry throughout the twentieth century was how it responded to the challenges of 
these larger overseas steelmakers.  A barrier in responding adequately to these 
challenges was not just the difficulty in smaller firms raising the necessary capital but 
the need to co-operate or merge with longstanding rivals.  It can be argued that 
British steelmaking in the twentieth century has really been a question of how to gain 
efficiency through scale of production.  Port Talbot demonstrated what this process 
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could achieve.  It was certainly not unique in British steelmaking but mergers tended 
to take place here more easily than in other locations.  Part of the reason for this was 
that the companies involved at Port Talbot once Baldwins took over were not long 
established firms.  That gave a flexibility that long established family firms may have 
found more difficult to achieve.   
 
Yet if the formation of Baldwins in the early twentieth century was an example of a 
successful merger which allowed the development of heavy steel production at Port 
Talbot the merger in 1930 to form GKB was far from ideal.  Firstly it was only a 
partial merger which became a financial success but it was also intended to 
stimulate investment.  Because of the divergent interests of the parent companies it 
actually delayed investment in the strip mill.  This delay was the catalyst for the 
eventual merger of Baldwins with Richard Thomas.  Secondly the rationalisation that 
followed the formation of GKB ensured the end of steelmaking at Dowlais.  From the 
mid 1930s it is likely that Dowlais would have been profitable as an iron producer.  
The formation of the SCoW was a successful merger by any standards.  By pooling 
the resources of the leading South Wales tinplate and sheet producers massive 
investment and high profits were made.  Although the steelmakers in South Wales 
faced some unique problems it is tempting to speculate what could have been 
achieved by similar mergers in other sectors.  The validity of this approach is 
highlighted by the fact that Port Talbot was the only British strip mill that did not 
cause serious financial problems for its parent company.  This willingness to pool 
resources in South Wales related to the product mix.  To remain in the flat product 
markets meant that they had little choice other than to gain access to the new 
technology and to concentrate steel production at one site.  The sheer scale of 
investment necessitated merger to gain access to the necessary capital.  This was 
the almost inevitable culmination of a process already underway in South Wales of 
the linking of the main steel companies.  Yet the denationalisation of the industry in 
the 1950s reversed that process and further fragmented the industry in South Wales.  
This in turn made it more difficult for the companies to respond to the deteriorating 
financial position of the 1960s.   
 
As to location Port Talbot was the obvious site, and arguably only site, for this strip 
mill.  It already had relatively modern iron and steelmaking plant and the all important 
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dock to unload higher quality foreign ore.  It would have been impossible to have 
built this strip mill and associated plant at another site as the necessary additional 
funds to build the equivalent plant already at Port Talbot were not available.  Thus 
the interests of the steelmakers regarding location coincided with those of the 
politicians, most noticeably Hugh Dalton.  Port Talbot suited both parties.   
 
Two problems existed with Port Talbot.  Firstly because the strip mill was attached to 
pre-existing plant it ensured that the layout of the steelworks was not the most 
efficient.  That added to production costs.  Secondly, locating the tinplate mill at 
Llanelli on employment grounds caused inefficiency in tinplate production.  This 
mistake was repeated when the second tinplate works was built near Swansea in the 
mid 1950s.  
 
The 1950s were a period of rising production and profits for the SCoW.  Yet this 
created problems.  The pressure to increase profits caused inappropriate investment 
in plant.  The turning point for the SCoW was the decision to built two additional strip 
mills.  They correctly believed that demand would not justify these mills.  It signified a 
change in operating strategy from simply maximising output in order to increase 
profits to become more concerned with efficiency in the production process and 
gaining customer satisfaction.  They began to address manning levels but not 
vigorously enough.  It also meant that Port Talbot would never have the second strip 
mill needed to maximise the full advantages of this site.  It is tempting to speculate 
that with a second strip mill and with support from Shotton and Ebbw Vale Britain‟s 
strip mill requirements would have been adequately met.  Yet it was the 1970s 
before the full significance of the two new strip mills was felt regarding over capacity. 
 
A feature that differentiated Port Talbot from the wider industry is the flexibility to 
reinvent itself.  Steelmaking started with a small steelworks producing tinplate bars.  
After its failure it reopened and expanded to produce heavy products as market 
opportunities emerged.  That process was reversed after World War Two as it 
moved back into flat products to support the post war consumer boom.  That 
flexibility allowed exploitation of new market opportunities as they arose.  It was the 
foresight of the senior managers that achieved this.  Port Talbot always seemed to 
have the right men in charge.  John Roper Wright, Julian Pode and Fred Cartwright 
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all showed insight in how to exploit developing market and technological 
opportunities.  In more challenging times Charles Wright steered local steelmaking 
through a very difficult period by developing and maintaining good customer 
relationships, delegating to talented junior staff and understanding the need for 
mergers.  Equally Brian Moffat skilfully guided steelmaking at Port Talbot through the 
traumatic events of the late 1970s and early 1980s to ensure survival and eventually 
increased capacity. 
 
At various times Port Talbot has been both a technological industry leader and a 
follower.  It was certainly an industry leader from the end of the Second World War 
until the early 1960s.  That position changed due to increased domestic strip mill 
competition and the increasing scale of the investment needed to modernise.  As 
costs increased so did the risk of works closure and company failure through 
investing in the wrong plant.  It is therefore unsurprising that after 1960 tried and 
tested steelmaking technology was used.  This was a sensible approach which built 
on others‟ experiences and reduced risk. 
 
The impact of Government on Port Talbot has been mixed.  A feature was the steady 
growth in Government influence up to and beyond nationalisation.  The positive 
effects include the support in building the strip mill.  Yet Government prevented the 
SCoW and BSC from developing Port Talbot to maximise its full potential by building 
a second strip mill.  Failure to get Government approval in the 1970s for expansion 
meant that BSC could not fully exploit the advantages of the new harbour and 
conversion to BOS production.  It meant that Port Talbot technologically fell behind 
Ravenscraig and Llanwern.   
 
Throughout the period from 1900 to 1988 Port Talbot has benefited from its 
locational advantages.  It allowed it to develop and withstand the challenges of other 
British steelworks.  That has been the dominant factor throughout the twentieth 
century. 
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British Steel Ingot Output (tons): 1885-19221146 
 Bessemer Output  Open-Hearth Output  Total Steel Ingot Output   
1885   1,880,014 
1886   2,265,503 
1887   3,046,619 
1888   3,306,737 
1889 2,141,503 1,429,169 3,570,670 
1890 2,014,863 1,564,200 3,579,060 
1891 1,642,005 1,514,538 3,156,540 
1892 1,500,783 1,418,830 2,919,610 
1893 1,493,354 1,456,309 2,949,660 
1894 1,535,364 1,575,318 3,110,680 
1895 1,535,225 1,724,737 3,259,960 
1896 1,814,842 2,317,555 4,132,390 
1897 1,884,155 2,602,006 4,486,160 
1898 1,759,386 2,806,600 4,565,980 
1899 1,825,074 3,030,251 4,855,320 
1900 1,745,004 3,156,050 4,901,050 
1901 1,606,253 3,297,791 4,094,040 
1902 1,825,779 3,083,288 4,090,060 
1903 1,910,018 3,124,083 5,034,100 
1904 1,781,533 3,245,346 5,026,880 
1905 1,974,210 3,838,072 5,812,280 
1906 1,907,338 4,554,936 6,462,274 
1907 1,859,259 4,663,489 6,522,750 
1908 1,478,539 3,817,103 5,295,640 
1909 1,733,220 4,148,408 5,881,630 
1910 1,779,115 4,595,366 6,374,480 
1911 1,461,140 5,000,472 6,461,610 
1912 1,522,487 5,273,657 6,796,140 
1913 1,600,701 6,063,175 7,663,870 
1914 1,279,516 6,555,597 7,835,110 
1915 1,301,224 7,049,720  8,550,000* 
1916 1,601,970 7,045,562  8,991,700* 
1917 1,661,546 7,835,000  9,716,500* 
1918 1,356,005 7,825,551  9,539,400* 
1919 789,200 6,894,800  7,894,000* 
1920 820,900 7,984,100  9,067,300* 
1921 238,900 3,351,000  3,703,400* 
1922 468,500 5,304,709  5,880,600* 
*Includes castings and electric steel  
   
 
                                                          
1146
 Anon, „Output of Steel Ingots in Great Britain 1885-1923‟, I&CTR, 11th July (1924), 57. 
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Appendix 2 
Port Talbot Steelworks: Technical Details: 19201147 
Number 1 Melting Shop  
1x50ton (acid) open-hearth furnace 
1x50ton (basic) open-hearth furnace 
3x45ton (basic) open-hearth furnaces 
1x25ton casting house crane 
1x10ton casting house crane 
Ingot size 24-45cwt 
4 gas fired soaking pits 
 
Number 2 Melting Shop  
6x60ton (basic) open-hearth furnaces 
3 overhead Wellman charges 
2x100ton ladle cranes 
Ingot size 6ton 6cwt–12tons 
4 gas fired soaking pits (capacity 32 ingots) 
 
Cogging Mill 
1 stand 40” rolls (produced slabs 54”x14”) 
Lamberton Bloom shears–blooms 11”x11” or 20”x6”  
 
32” Heavy Bar Mill 
3 stands of 2-high rolls 
(used to roll sections, billets, heavy rails, slabs and blooms) 
 
16” and 12” Light Bar Mills 
16”-3x3 high stands 
12”–3x2 high stands 
2x5ton cranes   
(used to roll sections, rounds, squares, flats and light rails) 
 
Plate Mills (Light and Heavy) 
3 reheat furnaces 
3x3 high rolls for roughing, finishing and 2 high for chequering pass (light mill) 
42” reversing heavy plate mill (plate 2” thick and 125” wide) 
1 stand of 2 high rolls 12‟ 6” in length (heavy mill) 
1x20ton crane (light mill) 
2 sets of electrically driven plate shears (to shear ½”) (light mill) 
Products 1/8”–2” up to 50‟ in length and 11‟ 3” in width (heavy mill) 
Rolls electrically driven 
 
Power House 
2 Williams-Siemans high pressure turbo-generators 
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1 shaking screen 




Service bunker capacity: 1,000tons/hour 
120 Coppee Regenerative Ovens (2 batteries of 60 ovens) 




2 blast furnaces 
Builder: Head, Wrightson & Co Ltd 
Bunker storage capacity: 21,000tons 
Height: 84‟ 
Hearth diameter: 12‟6” 
Bosh diameter: 20‟ 
Throat diameter: 15‟ 
Bell diameter: 10‟ 
2 dust catchers per furnace 
Capacity of charging bucket: 8tons of ore and 4tons of coke 
Charging rate: 100tons/hour  
10 hot blast Cowper type stoves 90‟ high/21‟ diameter 
 
Melting Shop 
4x60ton open-hearth furnaces 
Designed and built by William Smith Owen Engineering 
Furnace bath: 36‟x12‟6” 
2x100ton tapping side cranes 
Ingot size: 3ton 5cwt 
Gas produced by a battery of 16 producers 
2 groups of soaking pits in melting shop 
 
Rolling Mill 
3 stands of 36” diameter rolls (cogging, roughing and finishing) 
Cogging and roughing rolls 8‟ long on the barrel 
Finishing rolls 7‟3” on the barrel 
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 Horton, „Baldwins, Ltd., Adds New Plant‟, Iron Trade Review, 21st October (1920), 1133-





Baldwins Financial Results: 1902-03 to 1916-171149 
Year Ending 30th June Profit(£) Dividend 
1902-03 108,354  
1903-04 68,885  
1904-05 69,130 1¼% 
1905-06 110,016 2½% 
1906-07 148,712 5% 
1907-08 129,693 5% 
1908-09 157,602 5% 
1909-10 149,083 5% 
1910-11 209,529 7½% 
1911-12 213,977 10% 
1912-13 275,106 10% 
1913-14 209,048 10% 
1914-15 260,237 10% 
1915-16 232,081 12½% 
1916-17 224,604 12½% 
 
 
Baldwins Financial Results: 1917-18 to 19371150 
 1917-18(£) 1918-19(£) 1919-20(£) 1920-21(£) 1921-22(£) 
Trading Profit 442,900 554,997 683,405 410,758 306,132 
Net Profit 359,043 471,139 567,023 325,167 86,993 
Brought Forward 156,969 255,139 285,799 291,325 303,479 
 516,012 726,270 852,822 616,492 390,472 
Reserve 75,000 75,000 75,000 25,000 Nil 
Pref Dividend 13,750 13,750 45,667 80,476 81,294 
Ord Dividend 153,790 351,729 440,830 207,537 Nil 
 (11½%) (12½%) (12½) (5%)  
Carried Forward 273,473 285,799 201,325 303,479 309,178 
 
 1922-23(£) 1923-24(£) 1924-25(£) 1925-26(£) 1926-27(£) 
Trading Profit 484,760 493,520 214,078 255,837 120,009 
Net Profit 200,902 193,412 Dr43,955 11,168 Dr129,970 
Brought Forward 309,178 424,140 526,618 230,231 241,489 
 510,080 617,552 482,663 241,489 111,519 
Reserve Nil Nil Nil Nil 55,297 
Pref Dividend 85,940 90,935 52,342 Nil Nil 
Ord Dividend Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 
      
Carried Forward 424,140 526,617 230,321 241,489 55,297 
                                                          
1149
 JISC, „Baldwins Three Pounds For One‟, Journal of the Iron and Steel Confederation, 
1922, pp.56-57, p.375. 
1150
 Anon. „Baldwins Report for the year ended 30th June 1921‟. Economist, 21st January 
1922, p.84.  Ibid, Y/E 30th June 1924, 13th December 1924, p.959; „Baldwins‟ Lean Year‟, 
26
th
 November 1927, p.927;  Y/E 31st December 1930, 11th April 1931, pp.796-797; Y/E 31st 
December 1932, 1
st
 April 1933, p.699; Y/E 31
st
 December 1933, 24
th
 March 1934, p.642; 
„Baldwins Progressive Report‟ 27th March 1937, pp.710-711; „Baldwins Accounts‟, 26th 
March 1938, pp.698-699. 
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 1928(£) 1929(£) 1930(£) 1931(£) 1932(£) 1933(£) 
Profit 220,107 352,042 300,905 174,080 190,599 356,457 
Depreciation 79,131 80,000 80,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 
Other Deductions 32,026 43,751 36,566 17,571 16,095 21,758 
Debenture Interest, Sinking 
Fund 
105,551 138,307 135,906 142,504 144,729 156,346 
Increase Debenture 
Interest 
 41,679 29,242 Nil Nil 64,152 
General Reserve   20,000 Dr20,000   
Debtor Amount Written Off  23,811     
Inc/Decrease C/F 3,399 27,894 -809 -25,995 -30,225 54,201 
 
 
 1934(£) 1935(£) 1936(£) 1937(£)  
Gross Profit 502,642 512,246 630,440 808,547  
Depreciation 75,000 75,000 75,000 140,000  
Income Tax & NDC 68,535 74,256 125,394 225,000  
Fees, Pensions etc  16,548 17,766 21,479 20,530  
Debenture Interests 254,259 138,653 133,598 57,544  
Preference Dividends 50,766 50,640 29,439 77,011  
Ordinary Share :-      
Earned 37,534 155,931 245,530 288,462  
Paid 26,595 96,588 158,520 188,664  
Earned (%) 3.5% 12.1% 15.5% 15.3%  
Paid 2.5% 7.5% 10% 10%  
Carried Forward 36,005 45,348 45,439 43,474  
Capital - 1,661,732 2,078,947 2,494,737  
NB To 1926-27 Y/E 30
th

































Port Talbot Dock:  Iron Ore Imports (tons): 1922-19471151 
 Port Talbot Dock: Iron Ore Imports  South Wales: Iron Ore Imports  
1922 83,464 565,285 
1923 211,651 1,227,933 
1924 302,680 1,117,853 
1925   
1926 90,596 355,360 
1927 128,326 704,199 
1928 191,744 900,569 
1929 265,719 1,121,612 
1930 336,221 808,140 
1931   
1932   
1933 453,426 647,759 
1934 453,606 639,987 
1935 408,023 657,632 
1936 406,304 956,962 
1937 456,232 1,217,787 
1938 318,946 909,722 
1939 388,024 1,175,810 
1940 341,941 994,723 
1941 93,188 469,107 
1942 24,700 321,595 
1943 28,449 310,236 
1944 48,775 372,016 
1945 178,269 860,895 
1946 390,848 1,476,594 
1947 514,612 1,470,473 
                                                          
1151
 GWR, Great Western Ports, 1925, (London: H.N. Appleby, 1925), p.109, p.124.  Ibid, 
1926, p.115, p.130; 1929, p.160, p.165; 1930, p.161, p.166; 1931 p.167, p.172; 1932, p.173, 
p.168; 1936, p.171, p.176; 1937, p.171, p.176; 1939, p.172, p,177.  BTC, South Wales Ports, 




South Wales and British Steel Ingot/Castings Output (tons): 1920-19381152   
 South Wales Steel Ingot/Castings 
Output 
British Steel Ingot/Castings 
Output 
1920 1,884,300 9,067,300 
1921 854,500 3,703,400 
1922 1,873,900 5,880,600 
1923 2,212,100 8,481,800 
1924 2,254,600 8,201,200 
1925 1,962,800 7,385,400 
1926 902,100 3,596,100 
1927 1,927,300 9,097,100 
1928 2,158,600 8,519,700 
1929 2,336,100 9,636,200 
1930 1,503,200 7,325,700 
1931 1,274,000 5,202,600 
1932 1,347,500 5,261,400 
1933 1,769,500 7,024,000 
1934 1,845,900 8,849,700 
1935 1,883,300 9,858,700 
1936 2,421,700 11,784,600 
1937 2,628,800 12,984,000 




South Wales and British Pig Iron Output (tons)1153 
 Pig Iron Output South Wales Pig Iron Output Great Britain 
1913 889,200 10,263,300 
1929 926,500 7,589,300 
1930 542,300 6,192,400 
1931 279,800 3,772,600 
1932 353,500 3,574,000 
1933 451,400 4,136,000 
1934 491,700 5,969,100 
1935 512,800 6,424,100 
1936 750,800 7,721,400 
1937 814,500 8,496,600 





                                                          
1152NFISM, p,11, p.14.  Anon. „Output of Pig Iron and Steel in Great Britain‟ I&CTR, 30th 
September (1938), 509, and 27
th
 January (1939), 195.  Carr and Taplin, p.366, p.429. BSC, 
Statistical Handbook 1966, p.10.  John Williams, p.355. 
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Hot Strip Mill Details: 19511154 
Stand Working Roll Diameter 
Vertical Edger 42” 
Roughing Scalebreaker 36”x72” 
No I Broadside 42”x130” 
No 2 Rougher 36”x80” 
No 3 Rougher 36”x80” 
No 4 Rougher 27”x80” 
No 5 Finisher 27”x80” 
No 6 Finisher 27”x80” 
No 7 Finisher 27”x80” 
No 8 Finisher 27”x80” 
No 9 Finisher 27”x80” 






UK Liquid Steel and Flat Product Production: 1945-1966 (million tons)1155 
 Liquid Steel 
Production  
Imports Exports  Tinplate 
Production  




1945 11.82 0.17 0.67 0.51   
1946 12.70 0.48 2.30 0.58   
1947 12.72 0.46 1.73 0.66   
1948 14.88 0.50 1.98 0.74   
1949 15.55 1.09 2.36 0.75   
1950 16.29 0.56 3.15 0.76   
1951 15.64 0.52 2.61 0.76   
1952 16.42 1.77 2.55 0.91   
1953 17.61 1.11 2.75 0.76   
1954 18.52 0.47 2.90 0.76   
1955 19.79 1.86 3.36 0.89   
1956 20.66 1.77 3.29 0.92   
1957 21.70 0.95 3.72 1.04   
1958 19.57 0.58 3.14 1.04   
1959 20.19 0.50 3.48 1.10   
1960 24.30 1.60 3.89 1.23   
1961 22.09 0.57 3.99 1.08 1.88 2.52 
1962 20.49 0.97 3.96 1.20 1.85 2.91 
1963 22.52 1.53 4.30 1.21 2.15 3.58 
1964 26.23 1.98 4.63 1.19 2.40 4.03 
1965 27.01 0.76 4.72 1.21 2.32 4.18 
1966 24.32 1.15 4.47 1.22 2.19 4.00 
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 Brinn, p.41. 
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UK Pig Iron and Steel Production: 1945-1966 (000’ tons)1156 












1945 7,107.4 99 71.7 11,824.4 
1946 7,761.2 98 79.3 12,695.3 
1947 7,784.6 94 83.1 12,724.5 
1948 9,276.4 102 90.9 14,876.6 
1949 9,498.5 101 93.7 15,552.9 
1950 9,632.9 100 96.6 16,292.7 
1951 9,668.8 100 96.7 15,638.5 
1952 10,727.7 103 104.6 16,417.9 
1953 11,174.8 105 106.7 17,608.5 
1954 11,883.4 100 118.6 18,519.7 
1955 12,470.0 99 126.4 19,790.6 
1956 13,170.1 100 131.9 20,658.9 
1957 14,282.6 98 145.5 21,699.1 
1958 12,974.5 88 146.8 19,565.7 
1959 12,582.5 78 160.6 20,186.4 
1960 15,762.9 85 185.4 24,305.0 
1961 14,747.1 82 179.8 22,086.1 
1962 13,692.1 73 186.8 20,491.0 
1963 14,591.4 64 228.6 22,520.2 
1964 17,273.6 67 257.0 26,229.9 
1965 17,459.9 66 262.9 27,006.1 
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Development Scheme L: Main Port Talbot Provisions1157 
Facility Provision/Completion 
Dock Extension to Margam Wharf.  Additional 500tons/hour 
Transporter Bridge (1955) 
Coal Preparation Construction of 16 additional drainage bunkers, conveyors, 
and coal bunker (1955) 
Coke Ovens Construction of 90 coke ovens (battery No4) and „B‟ by-
product plant (1956) 
Sinter Plant Construction of No2 sinter strand (1954) 
Blast Furnace Construction of 10,000tons/week Number 4 blast furnace with 
29‟9” hearth diameter (Jan 1956)  
Abbey Melting Shop Construction of 4x230ton fixed open-hearth furnaces (1957) 
Port Talbot and 
Margam Melting 
Shops 
Increase in size of the open-hearth furnaces (75tons to 
100tons) 
Soaking Pits Construction of Numbers 21-24 soaking pits (1955) 
Reheat Furnaces Construction of No4 triple zone furnace (1955) 
Pickle Line Construction of No2 continuous pickle line (1955) 
Annealing Bay Construction of 4 furnaces (1954) 
Gas Holder Construction of a 3,000,000 cubic/foot gasholder at Margam 
(1956) 
Power plant Construction of „B‟ power plant (1956) 






















                                                          
1157
 Kew, NA, Ref BE2/328-261086, Undated Iron and Steel Corporation minute to the 
Organisation For European Economic Co-operation Re SCoW Scheme L, 1952.  Ibid, 
Undated Ministry of Supply note on Development of the South Wales Tinplate Industry, 


















Margam Works    
Coke Ovens £3.24m   
Mechanical Handling £0.35m   
Plant at Blast Furnaces £0.81m   
Sinter Plant (2nd Strand) £1.10m   
No4 Blast Furnace £1.14m   
No4 Blast Furnace Stoves £0.39m   
Power Plant, Pump House & Boilers £2.61m   
Electrical Power £0.36m   
Rail Track 7 Earthworks   £0.37m   
Miscellaneous £2.22m   
Margam Total  £12.59m  £15.22m 
Abbey Works    
Scrap Box Filling Bay £2.54m   
Soaking Pits £0.30m   
Pickle Bay £1.04m   
Rolling Stock £0.44m   
Miscellaneous £3.37m   
Abbey Total £7.69m  £12.80m 
Professional Fees & Admin £0.81m  £1.12m 
Other   £0.20m 
Steel Division Total £21.09m  £29.29m 
Margam Wharf   £0.20m 
Velindre £11.88m  £12.70m 
Total £32.97m £40.00m £42.22m 










                                                          
1158
 Ibid, Ministry of Supply note on Development of the Tinplate Industry; Iron and Steel 
Corporation, note by Sir James Steele–The Steel Company of Wales Ltd–Revised Estimated 
Cost of „L‟ Scheme, 1953. 
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Appendix 13 
SCoW Production: 1948-1966 (tons)1159 








1948 310,000 361,000 416,000 105,000 160,000 229,000 
1949 304,000 347,000 431,000 93,000 165,000 242,000 
1950 305,000 341,000 463,000 65,000 184,000 257,000 
1951 469,000 438,000 640,000 74,000 253,000 258,000 
1952 749,000 552,000 963,000 173,000 391,000 339,000 
1953 717,000 671,000 1,305,000 221,000 570,000 401,000 
1954 691,000 893,000 1,559,000 259,000 646,000 477,000 
1955 720,000 943,000 1,748,000 233,000 782,000 502,000 
1956 956,000 1,018,000 1,728,000 254,000 700,000 523,000 
1957 1,051,000 1,211,000 2,095,000 298,000 733,000 703,000 
1958 1,053,000 1,327,000 2,178,000 280,000 775,000 670,000 
1959 1,082,000 1,365,000 2,324,000 206,000 912,000 802,000 
1960 1,494,000 1,918,000 2,777,000 194,000 1,113,000 891,000 
1961 1,434,000 1,830,000 2,633,000 242,000 1,017,000 791,000 
1962 1,342,000 1,929,000 2,515,000 168,000 985,000 847,000 
1963 1,515,000 2,183,000 2,720,000 158,000 996,000 853,000 
1964 1,324,000 1,786,000 2,419,000 180,000 877,000 768,000 
1965 1,290,000 2,160,000 2,736,000 216,000 970,000 832,000 
1966 1,435,000 2,155,000 2,685,000 211,000 962,000 765,000 
Appendix 14 
SCoW: Turnover to Profits (£,000)1160 
Y/E Turnover Trading 
Surplus 






1948 22,167 1,514 549  370  595 273 
1949 25,959 2,089 662  487  940 268 
1950 30,343 2,381 700  953  726 268 
1951 37,165 3,966 1,264  1,568  1,128 260 
1952 58,684 8,408 3,054  1,877 4,000 523 355 
1953 63,110 7,666 3,320  2,264 1,500 582 367 
1954 74,193 14,244 3,551 800 2,408 4,200 3,285 372 
1955 83,894 18,294 4,175 1,400 2,417 5,650 4,652 389 
1956 86,798 14,212 4,678 1,700 3,583 1,950 2,301 390 
1957 109,552 18,962 5,641 2,400 4,164 4,500 2,257 1,380 
1958 113,397 22,159 6,085 2,500 4,535 6,000 3,039 2,070 
1959 125,586 23,257 6,613 2,650 4,765 5,000 4,229 2450 
1960 143,096 30,479 8,217 3,000 4,835 7,400 7,027 3,062 
1961 133,040 23,252 8,333 2,000 4,890 3,100 4,929 2,450 
1962 135,026 18,584 8,995  5,332 700 3,557 2,450 
1963 138,724 18,758 9,472  5,006 950 3,330 2,450 
1964 126,905 13,300 9,565  4,976 Cr 1,750 509 2,450 
1965 141,015 21,118 9,395  5,278 1,050 5,395 2,350 
1966 137,415 17,646 9,640  4,952 900 2,154 3,175 
                                                          
1159
 SCoW, Annual Report and Accounts 1961, p.19; 1966 p.18.  BSC, Statistical Handbook 
1966, p.8, p.10.  Brinn, p.43. 
1160
 SCoW, Director’s Report and Accounts 1951 p.7; 1952, p.6; 1953 p.6; 1954 p.6; 1961 
p.19; 1962 p.18; 1963 p.18; 1964 p.14; 1965 p.14; 1966 p.18.  Brinn, pp.44-45. 
 292 
Appendix 15 
Development Scheme M: Main Port Talbot Provisions1161 
Facility Provision/Completion 
Dock Additional 500tons/hour Transporter Bridge (1959)  
Coal Preparation Construction Grange plant sidings, tipplers, blenders (1959) 
Coke Ovens Construction of Grange plant battery No6 (80 coke ovens) and 
by-product plant (1959) 
Sinter Plant Construction of No3 sinter strand (1959) 
Blast Furnace Construction of 1850tons/day Number 5 blast furnace, 31‟0” 
hearth diameter (1959)  
VLN Plant 
 
Construction of VLN shop with 3x50ton converters (1959). 
Construction of 4 lime kilns and 2x1,200ton mixers (1959) 
Soaking Pits Construction of numbers 25-34 gas heated soaking pits (1958-
59) 
Slabbing Mill Replaced by new universal mill: 60,000tons/week (Nov 1959) 
Reheat Furnaces Construction of No5 furnace (1960) 
Pickle Line Construction of 48” No3 pickle line (1959) 
Cold Mill Install Davy-United 4 stand cold rolling mill (1959) 
Anneal Bay Construction of number 17-33  annealing furnaces (1958) 
Gas Holders Construction of 5,000,000 cubic/foot gasholder at Margam 




















1948 416,000    494,000 118.8% 
1949 431,000    500,000 116.0% 
1950 463,000    506,000 109.3% 
1951 640,000    585,000 91.4% 
1952 963,000 173,000 391,000 339,000 903,000 93.8% 
1953 1,305,000 221,000 570,000 401,000 1,192,000 91.8% 
1954 1,559,000 259,000 646,000 477,000 1,382,000 88.6% 
1955 1,748,000 233,000 782,000 502,000 1,517,000 86.8% 
1956 1,728,000 254,000 700,000 523,000 1,477,000 85.5% 
1957 2,095,000 298,000 733,000 703,000 1,734,000 82.8% 
1958 2,178,000 280,000 775,000 670,000 1,725,000 79.2% 
1959 2,324,000 206,000 912,000 802,000 1,920,000 82.6% 
1960 2,777,000 194,000 1,113,000 891,000 2,198,000 79.2% 
1961 2,633,000 242,000 1,017,000 791,000 2,049,000 77.8% 
1962 2,515,000 168,000 985,000 847,000 2,000,000 79.5% 
1963 2,720,000 158,000 996,000 853,000 2,007,000 73.8% 
1964 2,419,000 180,000 877,000 768,000 1,825,000 75.4% 
1965 2,736,000 216,000 970,000 832,000 2,018,000 73.8% 
1966 2,685,000 211,000 962,000 765,000 1,938,000 72.2% 
                                                          
1161
 Anon. „This Is Scheme 4‟. The Dragon, June 1956, pp.4-5.  Ibid, „Scheme “M” In 
Progress‟. December 1957, pp.4-5.  Brinn, p.13. 
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Development Scheme V: Capital Costs1163 
Plant Cost(£) 
Iron Making 800,000 
Steelmaking 2,550,000 
Continuous Casting 1,130,000 
Slabbing Mill 980,000 
New Hot Strip Mill 11,100,000 
Velindre Pickle Line 2,850,000 
Abbey Cold Mills 5,320,000 
General Services and Water Supply 1,965,000 
Total 26,695,000 








Development Scheme V: Main Port Talbot Provisions 1164 
Facility Provision/Completion 
Sinter Plant Construction of No4 Sinter Strand (1961) 
Abbey Melting Shop Conversion of 4x200ton open-hearth furnaces to 4x400ton 
Maerz Boelens furnaces (1961-62) 
VLN Plant Installation of 4th 50ton VLN converter (1962) 
Construction of lime kilns No5-7 (1961-63) 
Continuous Casting Installation of developmental 2 strand slab casting machine 
(1963) 
Soaking Pits Construction of gas fired pits No35–38 and 3 electric 
soaking pits (1961) 
Anneal Bay Construction of 6 annealing furnaces (1961) 
Temper Bay Installation of No3 temper mill (1962) 
Reservoir Building of Eglwys Nunnydd reservoir (1963) 










                                                          
1163
 Kew, NA, Ref BE1/337, Scheme For Increasing Production Of Cold Sheet By 350,000 
Tons Per Annum, 1959. 
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Development Scheme A: Main Port Talbot Provisions1165 
Facility Provision/Completion  
Harbour/Wharf Development of a deep water harbour with BTDB.  Construction of 
unloaders and stockyard (1969) 
Ore 
Preparation 
Installation of crushing and screening plant, blending and conveying 
equipment (1969)  
Blast 
Furnaces 
Increase capacity of No2 blast furnace (1971) 
Steel Plant Construction of BOS plant with 2x300 ton vessels (1969) 
Degassing 
Unit 
Installation of 315ton capacity DH vacuum degassing plant (1969) 
Soaking Pits Replace electric soaking pits with conventional pits (1968) 
Pickle Lines Convert to HCI pickling (1968) 
Cold Mill Conversion of 4-stand mill to 5-stand (1968) 







Development Scheme A: Costings1166 
Development Costing(£) 
New Harbour 20,000,000 (£15.5m funded by BTDB) 
BOS Plant 18,500,000 
Burden Preparation 3,250,000 
Blast Furnace Modifications 2,500,000 
Mill Modifications 1,500,000 














                                                          
1165
 Anon. „Company Switching To L.D.-New steel plant will boost our capacity to 75,000 
tons a week‟. The Dragon, April 1966, p.1.  Brinn, p.16. 
1166
 Brinn, ibid. 
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Appendix 21 
Port Talbot and UK Steel Ingot Production: 1948-1966 (tons)1167 
 Port Talbot  UK  Port Talbot as % Of UK Production 
1948 416,000 14,877,000 2.8% 
1949 431,000 15,553,000 2.8% 
1950 463,000 16,293,000 2.8% 
1951 640,000 15,639,000 4.1% 
1952 963,000 16,418,000 5.9% 
1953 1,305,000 17,609,000 7.4% 
1954 1,559,000 18,520,000 8.4% 
1955 1,748,000 19,791,000 8.8% 
1956 1,728,000 20,659,000 8.4% 
1957 2,095,000 21,699,000 9.75 
1958 2,178,000 19,565,000 11.1% 
1959 2,324,000 20,186,000 11.5% 
1960 2,777,000 24,305,000 11.4% 
1961 2,633,000 22,086,000 11.9% 
1962 2,515,000 20,491,000 12.3% 
1963 2,720,000 22,520,000 12.1% 
1964 2,419,000 26,230,000 9.2% 
1965 2,736,000 27,006,000 10.1% 
1966 2,685,000 24,315,000 11.0% 
Appendix 22 
Port Talbot: Coke Consumption Per Ton of Pig Iron1168 
 Coke Produced (tons) Pig Iron Produced (tons) Coke Consumed 
(ton) Per Ton of Pig 
Iron 
1948 310,000 361,000 0.9 
1949 304,000 347,000 0.9 
1950 305,000 341,000 0.9 
1951 469,000 438,000 1.1 
1952 749,000 552,000 1.4 
1953 717,000 671,000 1.1 
1954 691,000 893,000 0.8 
1955 720,000 943,000 0.8 
1956 956,000 1,018,000 0.9 
1957 1,051,000 1,211,000 0.9 
1958 1,053,000 1,327,000 0.8 
1959 1,082,000 1,365,000 0.8 
1960 1,494,000 1,918,000 0.8 
1961 1,434,000 1,830,000 0.8 
1962 1,342,000 1,929,000 0.7 
1963 1,515,000 2,183,000 0.7 
1964 1,324,000 1,786,000 0.7 
1965 1,290,000 2,160,000 0.6 
1966 1,435,000 2,155,000 0.7 
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 SCoW, 1961, p.19; 1966 p.18.  BSC, Statistical Handbook 1966, p.8, p.10.  Brinn, p.43. 
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SCoW Trading Profits as a Percentage of Turnover/Company Value (£,000)1169 
Y/E Turnover Trading 
Surplus 
Trading Surplus 




as % of Value 
1948 22,167 1,514 6.8%   
1949 25,959 2,089 8.0%   
1950 30,343 2,381 7.8%   
1951 37,165 3,966 10.7%   
1952 58,684 8,408 14.3% 77,736 10.8% 
1953 63,110 7,666 12.1% 89,851 8.5% 
1954 74,193 14,244 19.2% 98,164 14.5% 
1955 83,894 18,294 21.8% 112,267 16.3% 
1956 86,798 14,212 16.4% 130,102 10.9% 
1957 109,552 18,962 17.3% 144,889 13.1% 
1958 113,397 22,159 19.5% 161,907 13.7% 
1959 125,586 23,257 18.5% 174,688 13.3% 
1960 143,096 30,479 21.3% 184,429 16.5% 
1961 133,040 23,252 17.5% 183,317 12.7% 
1962 135,026 18,584 13.8% 183,924 10.1% 
1963 138,724 18,758 13.5% 173,222 10.8% 
1964 126,905 13,300 10.5% 162,932 8.2% 
1965 141,015 21,118 15.0% 166,727 12.7% 
1966 137,415 17,646 12.8% 166,056 10.6% 
1967 134,107 14,312 10.7% 174,735 8.2% 
 
                                                          
1169
 SCoW, Director’s Report and Accounts 1951 p.7; 1952, p.6; 1953 p.6; 1954 p.6; 1961 




SCoW Adjusted Trading Surplus (£,000)1170 
Y/E Turnover Trading 
Surplus 
Depreciation Interest Adjusted 
Profit 
Adjusted Profits 
as % of Turnover 
1948 22,167 1,514 549 370 595 2.7% 
1949 25,959 2,089 662 487 940 3.6% 
1950 30,343 2,381 700 953 726 2.4% 
1951 37,165 3,966 1,264 1,568 1,128 3.0% 
1952 58,684 8,408 3,054 1,877 3,477 5.9% 
1953 63,110 7,666 3,320 2,264 2,082 3.3% 
1954 74,193 14,244 3,551 2,408 8,285 11.2% 
1955 83,894 18,294 4,175 2,417 11,702 13.9% 
1956 86,798 14,212 4,678 3,583 5,951 6.6% 
1957 109,552 18,962 5,641 4,164 9,157 8.4% 
1958 113,397 22,159 6,085 4,535 11,539 10.2% 
1959 125,586 23,257 6,613 4,765 11,879 9.5% 
1960 143,096 30,479 8,217 4,835 17,427 12.2% 
1961 133,040 23,252 8,333 4,890 10,029 7.5% 
1962 135,026 18,584 8,995 5,332 4,257 3.2% 
1963 138,724 18,758 9,472 5,006 4,280 3.1% 
1964 126,905 13,300 9,565 4,976 -1,241 -1.0% 
1965 141,015 21,118 9,395 5,278 6,445 4.6% 
1966 137,415 17,646 9,640 4,952 3,054 2.2% 






















1958 624,000 161,907 108,000 16,074 17.2% 9.9% 
1959 696,000 174,688 109,000 16,644 15.7% 9.5% 
1960 750,000 184,419 141,000 22,262 18.8% 12.1% 
1961 840,000 183,317 104,000 14,919 12.4% 12.7% 
1962 1,010,000 183,924 67,000 9,589 6.6% 5.2% 
1963 1,238,000 173,222 59,000 9,286 4.8% 5.4% 
1964 1,189,000 162,932 87,000 3,735 7.3% 2.2% 
1965 1,194,000 166,727 80,000 11,723 6.7% 7.0% 
1966 1,230,000 166,056 47,000 8,006 3.8% 4.8% 
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 Ibid, all. 
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Port Talbot Steel Division: Workforce and Steel Production: 1948–19671172 
Y/E Manning Steel Production (tonnes) Output Per Man/Annum (tonnes) 
1948 4,337 416,000 95.9 
1949 4,452 431,000 96.8 
1950 4,863 463,000 95.2 
1951 7,441 640,000 86.0 
1952 9,071 963,000 106.2 
1953 10,063 1,305,000 129.7 
1954 11,051 1,559,000 141.1 
1955 12,390 1,748,000 141.1 
1956 13,754 1,728,000 125.6 
1957 14,824 2,095,000 141.3 
1958 15,497 2,178,000 140.5 
1959 17,627 2,324,000 131.8 
1960 18,352 2,777,000 151.3 
1961 17,790 2,633,000 148.0 
1962 18,006 2,515,000 139.7 
1963 17,847 2,720,000 152.4 
1964 17,764 2,419,000 136.2 
1965 17,487 2,736,000 156.5 
1966 16,762 2,685,000 160.2 
1967 16,754   
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BSC: Financial Performance: 1968-1988 (£ million)1173 
 Turnover Profit/(Loss) Before Taxation 
and Long-Term Interest 
Adjusted 
Profit/(Loss) 
1967-68 1,071 (21) (19) 
1968-69 1,196 (22) (23) 
1969-70* 682 10 12 
1970-71 1,457 7 (10) 
1971-72 1,292 (45) (68) 
1972-73 1,478 9 3 
1973-74 1,775 56 50 
1974-75 2,256 144 73 
1975-76 2,357 (129) (253) 
1976-77 3,059 69 (95) 
1977-78 3,154 (275) (443) 
1978-79 3,288 (137) (309) 
1979-80 3,105 (381) (545) 
1980-81 2,954 (526) (668) 
1981-82 3,443 (242) (358) 
1982-83 3,231 (318) (869) 
1983-84 3,358 (128) (256) 
1984-85 3,736 (70) (409) 
1985-86 3,735 130 38 
1986-87 3,461 226 178 
1987-88 4,116 472 410 
*6 months only 
 
NB Post 1980-81 the method of calculating the „Profit (Loss)‟ varied :- 
 
1981-82 First Loss is „Trading loss after depreciation‟, the second is „Loss 
before taxation‟. 
 
1982-83 First Loss is „Loss on ordinary activities‟, the second is „Total loss for 
the year‟. 
 
1983-84 First Loss is „Loss in ordinary activities before interest payable‟, the 
second is „Loss for the financial year‟. 
 
1984-85 First Loss is „Loss on ordinary activities before interest and 
exceptional costs‟, the second is „Loss for the financial year‟.  
 
1985-86 to 1987-88 
First Profit is „Profit on ordinary activities before interest and 
exceptional costs‟, the second is „Profit for the financial year‟. 
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 BSC, 1971-72, p.6; 1974-75, p.3; 1978-79, p.7; 1980-81, p.5; 1981-82, p.6, p.26; 1982-





Port Talbot Steel Output and Manning Levels: 1968-1988 











1968   15,531  
1969  1,797,520 14,884 120.8 
1970  1,660,066 14,725 112.7 
1971  2,144,591 14,029 152.8 
1972  2,509,473 13,642 184.0 
1973  2,798,640 13,812 202.6 
1974  2,038,209 14,053 145.0 
1975 1,793,600 1,829,406 13,492 135.6 
1976 2,259,600 2,097,142 13,140 159.6 
1977 1,604,900 1,653,395 13,226 125.0 
1978 2,189,300 1,929,425 12,537 153.9 
1979 1,855,600 2,314,528 12,468 185.6 
1980* 1,360,500 902,735 6,669 135.4 
1981 1,941,000 1,785,156 5,659 315.5 
1982 1,704,200 1,653,773 5,409 305.7 
1983 1,964,200 1,818,873 5,054 359.9 
1984 2,020,700 1,921,204 4,808 400.0 
1985 1,597,500  4,736 337.3 
1986 1,901,000  4,764 399.0 
1987 2,263,400  4,670 484.7 
1988 2,219,100  4,689 473.3 
1989 2,354,800  4,579 514.3 
1990 2,334,200  4,466 522.7 
1991 2,795,800  4,398 635.7 
1992 2,735,500  4,118 664.3 
1993 3,227,000  4,041 798.6 
1993 3,373,400  4,157 811.5 
1994 3,424,500  4,214 822.6 
1995 3,466,600  4,276 810.7 
1996 3,540,000  3,941 898.2 
1997   3,904  
*Strike affected 
  
**For steel output BS figures used from 1975 
 
BS figures are Y/E 31st March, Fevre‟s figures calendar Y/E 
 
                                                          
1174
 Information supplied by British Steel Port Talbot, 1997 and 1998 in Stephen Parry, The 
Case of A Local Labour Market–Continuing Development And The Significance Of 
Contracting. Unpublished MA Dissertation–University of York, 1998. 
1175
 Fevre, Wales is Closed, p.127. 
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Port Talbot Expansion: Costs (April 1977)1177 
Plant Cost (£m)  
Harbour/Raw Materials Handling 40.1 
Coke Oven Replacements 57.5 
Blast Furnaces 120.2 
BOS Plant 74.7 
Continuous Casting 73.3 
Slab Treatment 44.8 
1.45m Wide Hot Strip Mill 242.4 
Services 104.5 
Contingencies 37.8 
Engineering Services 39.7 
Total 835.0 
 
 New Capacity (tonnes) 
Iron Making* 2,930,000  
Steelmaking** 3,130,000  
Hot Rolled Coil 3,275,000  
*Existing iron making reduced to around 2,000,000 tonnes/annum. 
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 Kew, NA, Ref BT255/987, Letter from BSC‟s W.G. Moore to European Commission and 
Investment Project Summary regarding the Port Talbot expansion, 29
th
 March 1977.  Ibid, 
Letter from DoI‟s J.H. Pownall to BSC‟s J.C. Siddons re Select Committee on Nationalised 
Industries Sub Committee, 19
th





BSC Production, Deliveries (both million tonnes*) and UK Manning1178 



















1967-68* 22.9 13.6 3.5 17.1 254.0 90.2 
1968-69 24.6 16.2 3.0 19.2 254.0 96.2 
1969-70** 12.5 8.6 1.4 10.0 255.2 96.4 
1970-71 26.1 16.8 2.9 19.7 252.4 49.5 
1971-72 21.5 12.8 3.7 16.5 229.7 113.6 
1972-73 25.1 14.4 3.6 18.0 226.6 110.8 
1973-74 23.0 15.4 2.7 18.1 220.4 104.4 
1974-75 20.8 13.0 2.1 15.1 228.3 91.1 
1975-76 17.2 10.5 2.2 12.7 210.2 81.8 
1976-77 19.7 11.0 2.7 13.7 207.9 94.8 
1977-78 17.4 10.2 3.2 13.4 196.9 88.4 
1978-79 17.3 9.6 2.9 12.5 186.0 93.0 
1979-80 14.1 8.0 2.5 10.5 166.4 84.7 
1980-81 11.9 7.2 2.3 9.5 120.9 98.4 
1981-82 14.0 8.0 2.7 10.7 103.7 135.0 
1982-83 11.7 6.8 2.5 9.3 81.1 144.3 
1983-84 13.4 7.5 2.9 10.4 71.1 188.5 
1984-85 13.0 7.8 2.8 10.6 64.5 201.6 
1985-86 14.0 7.7 3.0 10.7 54.2 258.3 
1986-87 11.7 6.6 3.7 10.3 52.0 225.0 
1987-88 14.7 7.7 4.4 12.1 51.6 284.9 
 
*production for 1967-68 is measured in tons 
**6 month period only 
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new coke ovens 
new large sinter plant 
no4 & 5 blast furnaces refurbished together with 3 smaller furnaces 
a large modern BOS shop with 300 tonne cast weights 
vacuum degassing facilities 
a universal slabbing mill 
continuous casting being installed together with further iron and steel refining 
 
It should be noted that when the slab caster is installed the slabbing mill bottle neck 
will be removed enabling higher steel makes up to 3 million tonnes. 
 
The hot mill was installed in 1949 and has been enhanced but there remain serious 
limitations on coil weights, and output eg the reheating furnaces restrict slab length 
and the result is coil weights under 10 tonnes on most widths (480 lbs/inch width 
maximum). 
 
The picklers and cold mills.  These are being refurbished and will be comparable in 
performance to new facilities.  One of the cold mills is a wide mill meeting the small 
requirements of the market for over 56” material. 
 
The hot dipped galvanising plant. 
 
The main factors mitigating against the complete closure of Port Talbot are :- 
 
Loss of benefit of iron and steelmaking facilities adjacent to deep water terminal. 
Loss of use of modern large BOS shop. 
Loss of vacuum and degassing and concast facilities. 
 
Llanwern 
no harbour – iron ore by rail from Port Talbot 
older coke ovens need replacing 
1 new blast furnace of 5,000 tonnes per day plus 2 other furnaces smaller than 
no4 & 5 at Port Talbot 
a BOS shop with a smaller cast weight–180 tonne casts 
no continuous casting, vacuum degassing or other iron and steel refining facilities 
a universal slabbing mill 
 
The hot mill is superior to any other in the Corporation in terms of coil weights and 
output potential.  It has 5 large reheat furnaces (30‟ in width compared with 18‟6” at 
Port Talbot) thus producing heavier coils up to 27 tonnes at widest width (1,000 
lb/inch width) and the output potential is about 60kt of HR coil/week. 
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The main factors mitigating against the complete closure of Llanwern are :- 
 
Loss of modern hot mill with about 40% greater capacity than the Port Talbot mill.  
The latter requiring substantial investment to cover refurbishment.  Thus the 
potential overall hot coil make in South Wales would be lower by about 0.75 
million tonnes/annum. 






Port Talbot and Llanwern: Employment Broad Timetable: June 19801180 
Date Port Talbot Llanwern 
1st September 1979 actual 12,584 9,353 
1st April 1980 actual  8,546 
1st May 1980 actual 11,486  
Mid June 1980 planned 11,202 8,636 
Mid September 1980 planned 6,723 5,050 
Mid December 1980 planned 6,342 4,984 
Mid March 1981 planned 6,053 4,899 
End March 1981 planned 5,701 4,899 
 
         Appendix 32b 
Port Talbot: Manning Reductions By Major Category1181 
 29th September 1979 Jobs To Go Jobs To Remain 
Management 712 214 498 
Staff 2,690 1,394 1,296 
Process 4,441 2,674 1,767 
Maintenance *  4,741 2,601 2,140 
Total 12,584 6,883 5,701 




Port Talbot: Manning Reductions By Trade Union1182 
 29th September 1979 Jobs To Go Jobs To Remain 
Staff    
Management 712 214 498 
ISTC 2,031 1,127 904 
NCCC 586 258 328 
TASS 73 9 64 
Sub Total 3,402 1,608 1,794 
Industrial Grades    
ISTC 4,818 2,943 1,875 
NUB 1,228 780 448 
T&GWU 463 293 170 
AUEW 1,185 502 683 
EEPTU 533 221 312 
ASB 182 67 115 
UCATT 297 193 104 
BRTTS 7 5 2 
GMWU 50 50 0 
Apprentices/Trainees 419 221 198 
Sub Total 9,182 5,275 3,907 
Total 12,584 6,883 5,701 
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Port Talbot: Ongoing Plant Configuration: June 19801183 
 Current Configuration Ongoing Configuration 
 No Units Shifts No Units Shifts 
Coke Ovens     
Margam 205 21   
Grange 80 21   
Morfa   84 21 
Ore Terminal     
P.T. Ore   }     
Llan. Ore  } 1 21 1 15 
Coal         }     
Ore to Llanwern  21  10 
Sinter 1 21 1 15 
Blast Furnaces 3 21 1 21 
BOS 1 21 1 20 
Universal Mill 1 21 1 15 
Hot Strip Mill 1 21 1 15 
Cold Temper Mill 1 15 1 5 
Slitter 1 15 1 10 
Cold Rolling     
Pickle Line 2 21 1 15 
3 Stand 1 15   
4 Stand    4 Crew-3x15 
Shift System 
5 Stand 1 21  1 Spare Crew 
on duty 
Annealing 1 21 1 10 
Temper Mills     
No1 1 10   
No2 1 15 } 4 Crew–10 
Shift on No 2 
and 3 Mills 
No3 1 21 }  
Cut Up/Rewind 
Lines 
1 10 1}  
 1 10 1} 5 Crews Mons 
to Fri 
 1 21 1}  
 1 15 1}  
Galvanising 1 21 1 21 
Despatch 1 15 1 10 
Other Despatch  10  5 
21 Bay  15  15 
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Appendix 33 
Port Talbot Activities Scheduled To Be Outsourced 19801184 
Maintenance/Repairs inclusive of Civil Engineering and Bricklayers 
Mobile Plant 
Internal Road Transport 
Slag Tipping 
Scrap Handling and Preparation 
Catering~ 
Amenities 
General Housekeeping and Plant Cleaning 
Technical Publications 
Project Engineering 





Port Talbot Works Output: Financial Years 1980-81 to 2007 (tonnes)1185 
 Coke Sinter Iron Liquid 
Steel 
Ingots Slab 
1980-81 537,600 1,397,320 1,139,020 1,360,510 1,299,830  
1981-82 986,300 1,850,150 1,641,050 1,940,970 1,854,400  
1982-83 1,031,870 1,655,150 1,478,900 1,704,180 1,330,980 291,790 
1983-84 1,176,060 2,053,650 1,670,000 1,964,150 853,020 1,006,130 
1984-85 1,226,830 2,292,280 1,732,050 2,020,740 570,690 1,359,180 
1985-86 1,222,980 1,920,150 1,449,980 1,597,450 189,690 1,345,680 
1986-87 1,149,580 2,297,750 1,702,190 1,901,010 6,150 1,828,990 
1987-88 1,278,840 2,684,690 2,009,050 2,263,380  2,199,010 
1988-89 1,215,210 2,697,530 1,943,490 2,219,080  2,142,180 
1989-90 1,221,320 2,860,920 2,084,250 2,354,840  2,269,590 
1990-91 1,190,970 3,022,800 2,096,400 2,334,200  2,291,140 
1991-92 1,163,700 3,394,500 2,467,950 2,795,750  2,692,720 
1992-93 1,185,470 3,193,550 2,457,130 2,735,490  2,676,400 
1993-94 1,207,000 3,498,000 2,903,000 3,227,000  3,157,000 
1994-95 1,257,238 3,600,700 2,979,050 3,373,394  3,294,055 
1995-96 1,265,500 3,740,960 3,043,330 3,424,507  3,354,279 
1996-97 1,304,929 3,916,890 3,180,343 3,466,559  3,369,623 
1997-98 1,266,291 4,099,222 3,260,510 3,591,000  3,492,747 
1998-99 1,282,759 3,835,585 3,085,260 3,303,267  3,202,839 
1999-00 1,236,886 3,703,828 3,034,964 3,246,210  3,147,017 
2000 1,208,228 3,471,896 2,925,240 3,155,129  3,054,720 
2001 989,792 3,367,724 2,750,120 2,996,146  2,892,456 
2002 755,381 2,844,047 1,905,260 2,210,794  2,149,702 
2003 667,993 3,893,389 3,328,050 3,721,059  3,604,270 
2004 525,312 3,827,692 3,339,568 3,705,888  3,594,113 
2005 683,531 3,940,366 3,380,476 3,709,319  3,595,812 
2006 921,532 4,574,567 3,638,309 4,177,783  4,042,699 
2007 944,745 4,405,515 3,855,281 4,413,902  4,295,603 
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